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Introduction 
The origin of this Handbook for self-learning on Brussels I Recast and Brussels II-bis 
Regulations lies in the LAWTrain Project: an innovative and interactive cross-border 
training for lawyers, funded by the European Union (Grant agreement no. 806937 - 
JUST-AG-2017/JUST-JTRA-EJTR-AG-2) and led by the University of Turin, Aix-Mar-
seille Université, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Universidad Com-
plutense de Madrid, Universität Passau, Univerza v Mariboru, Uniwersytet SWPS, 
the Consiglio dell’ordine degli avvocati of Lucca, Consiglio dell’ordine degli avvocati 
of Turin, Illustre Colegio de Abogados de Madrid, Območnizbor OZS Ljubljana, OIRP 
Warszawa, Ordre des Avocats du Barreau de Marseille and Rechtsanwaltskammer 
München.  
The entire LAWtrain consortium is very grateful to the European Union for the sup-
port it has granted to our free of charge training activities and to the LAWTrain 
external evaluator, professor Pietro Franzina, for his feedback and suggestions. 
The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the LAWTrain consor-
tium and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the European Commission. 
May this self-learning Handbook be a valuable assistance to its readers. 
 
Elena D’Alessandro 
LAWTrain Project coordinator 
https://www.eulawtrain.eu 
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Jurisdiction over Cyber Torts 
The Italian newspaper “Nuovo corriere”, published by Delta Editore s.p.a., a company with statutory 
seat in Turin (Italy), in its Italian digital and printed version, published that Mrs. Mary Stuart, domiciled 
and habitually resident in Warsaw (Poland), was involved in money laundering for a drug-trafficking 
network. 
The printed version of the newspaper was mainly distributed in Italy and had minor circulation in 
Warsaw, with only 230 copies sold in that city.  
The digital version was hosted on servers located in Turin, but visible everywhere in Europe. 
Mrs. Mary Stuart is now planning to sue Delta Editore s.p.a. for damages, for having spread fake news.  
Which Courts have international jurisdiction over the case? 
Answer: 
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources 
Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
December 2012, on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgements 
in civil and commercial matters (hereinafter: the “Brussels I Recast Regulation”) is 
the relevant instrument to determine which courts have jurisdiction over the case. 
Material scope of application: the Brussels I Recast Regulation applies in “civil and 
commercial matters” (Article 1), including torts and cyber torts. 
Territorial scope of application: the Brussels I Recast Regulation applies between 
all Member States of the European Union (if the defendant is domiciled in a Mem-
ber State) including Italy and Poland. 
 
 
 Elena D’Alessandro (University of Turin). 
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Temporal scope of application: the Brussels I Recast Regulation applies to legal 
proceedings instituted on or after 10 January 2015 (Article 66.1). 
 
 
FOR FURTHER READING on the Brussels I recast Regulation:  
https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_brussels_i_regulation_recast-350-en.do 
B. Find the correct provision 
I. General jurisdiction  
For actions in civil matters against companies domiciled in a EU Member State, gen-
eral jurisdiction lies in any Court of the Member State in which the defendant is 
domiciled (cf. Article 4.1 Brussels I Recast Regulation). As Delta Editore s.p.a. is 
domiciled in Italy (cf. Article 63.1(a)(b) Brussels I Recast Regulation), Italy has gen-
eral jurisdiction over the case. 
 
Article 63.1(a)(b) Brussels I Recast Regulation  
1. For the purposes of this Regulation, a company or other legal person or association of 
natural or legal persons is domiciled at the place where it has its 
(a) statutory seat; 
(b) central administration. 
II. Special jurisdiction in matters relating to tort  
In matters relating to tort, including cyber torts, Article 7.2 Brussels I Recast Regu-
lation provides that, in addition to the general place of jurisdiction at the defend-
ant’s domicile, the Courts for “the place where the harmful event occurred” also 
have jurisdiction over the case. 
 
Article 7.2 Brussels I Recast Regulation 
A person domiciled in a Member State may be sued in another Member State: 
2. in matters relating to tort […] in the Courts for the place where the harmful event 
occurred or may occur. 
 
The provision of Article 7.2 Brussels I Recast Regulation has to be interpreted 
broadly in accordance with the standards of an autonomous interpretation as held 
in CJEU, 27 September 1998, C-189/87, Athanasios Kalfelis v Bankhaus Schröder, 
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Münchmeyer, Hengst and Co. and others, ECLI: EU:C:1988:459 (concerning Article 
5.3 Brussels Convention 1968): 
 
CJEU, 27 September 1998, C-189/87, Athanasios Kalfelis v Bankhaus Schröder, Münch-
meyer, Hengst and Co. and others, ECLI: EU:C:1988:459 
17. In order to ensure uniformity in all the Member States, it must be recognized that the 
concept of “matters relating to tort” covers all actions which seek to establish the liabil-
ity of a defendant and which are not related to a “contract” within the meaning of Arti-
cle 5.1 [Article 7.2 Brussels I Recast Regulation]. 
 
 
FURTHER READING: In CJEU, 17 June 1992, C-26/91, Jakob Handte & Co. 
GmbH v Traitements Mécano-chimiques des Surfaces SA, ECLI:EU:C:1992:268, 
the CJEU held that there can only be a contractual relationship when a party 
has undertaken a contractual obligation towards the other party. 
III. “Place where the harmful event occurred” 
The CJEU, 30 November 1976, C-21/76, Handelskwekerij G. J. Bier BV v Mines de 
potasse d'Alsace SA, ECLI:EU:C:1976:166 (concerning Article 5.3 Brussels Conven-
tion 1968) has clarified that: 
 
CJEU, 30 November 1976, C-21/76, Handelskwekerij G. J. Bier BV v Mines de potasse d'Al-
sace SA, ECLI:EU:C:1976:166 
15. […] the place of the event giving rise to the damage no less than the place where the 
damage occurred can, depending on the case, constitute a significant connecting factor 
from the point of view of jurisdiction. 
19. Thus the meaning of the expression “place where the harmful event occurred” […] 
must be established in such a way as to acknowledge that the plaintiff has an option to 
commence proceedings either at the “place where the damage occurred” or the “place 
of the event giving rise to it”. 
IV. “Place where the harmful event occurred” in case of defamation by a 
printed newspaper 
The CJEU, 7 March 1995, C-68/93, Fiona Shevill, Ixora Trading Inc., Chequepoint 
SARL and Chequepoint International Ltd v Presse Alliance SA, ECLI:EU:C:1995:61 
(concerning Article 5.3 Brussels Convention 1968) held that, in a case of libel by a 
printed newspaper article, the words “the place where the harmful event occurred” 
in Article 7.2 of the Brussels I Recast Regulation means: 
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a) either “the place of the event giving rise to the damages”, which is located where 
the publisher of the defamatory publication is established, 
b) or “the place in which the damages occurred”, which is the place where the pub-
lication was distributed and where the victim claims to have suffered injury to his 
reputation, which have jurisdiction to rule solely with respect to the harm caused 
in the State of the court seised. 
 
CJEU, 7 March 1995, C-68/93, Fiona Shevill, Ixora Trading Inc., Chequepoint SARL and 
Chequepoint International Ltd v Presse Alliance SA, ECLI:EU:C:1995:61 
24. In the case of a libel by a newspaper article distributed in several Contracting States, 
“the place of the event giving rise to the damage”, within the meaning of those judg-
ments, can only be the place where the publisher of the newspaper in question is estab-
lished, since that is the place where the harmful event originated and from which the 
libel was issued and put into circulation. 
25. The Court of the place where the publisher of the defamatory publication is estab-
lished must therefore have jurisdiction to hear the action for damages for all the harm 
caused by the unlawful act. 
26. However, that forum will generally coincide with the head of jurisdiction set out in 
the first paragraph of Article 2 of the Convention. 
27. As the Court held in Handelskwekerij G. J. Bier BV v Mines de potasse d'Alsace SA, the 
plaintiff must consequently have the option to bring proceedings also in the place where 
the damage occurred, since otherwise Article 5.3 of the Convention would be rendered 
meaningless. 
28. The “place where the damage occurred” is the place where the event giving rise to 
the damage, entailing tortious, delictual or quasi-delictual liability, produced its harmful 
effects upon the victim. 
29. In the case of an international libel through the press, the injury caused by a defam-
atory publication to the honour, reputation and good name of a natural or legal person 
occurs in the places where the publication is distributed, when the victim is known in 
those places. 
30. It follows that the Courts of each Contracting State in which the defamatory publication 
was distributed and in which the victim claims to have suffered injury to his reputation have 
jurisdiction to rule on the injury caused in that State to the victim’s reputation. 
 
As the forum of “the place of the event giving rise to the damages” will gener-
ally coincide with the head of jurisdiction set out in the first paragraph of Arti-
cle 4 Brussels I Recast Regulation, Mary Stuart cannot refer to Article 7.2 Brus-
sels I Recast Regulation to sue Delta Editore s.p.a. in a Member State other than the 
Member State of its domicile. 
 
However, as Warsaw (Poland) is the place where the publication was distrib-
uted (= “the place where the damage occurred”), the Court of Warsaw has spe-
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cial jurisdiction over the case according to Article 7.2 Brussels I Recast Regulation. 
More precisely, the Court of Warsaw has jurisdiction to rule solely in respect of the 
harm caused in Poland by the printed version of the newspaper article. 
V. “Place where the harmful event occurred” in case of defamation by a dig-
ital newspaper 
Mary Stuart argues she was also defamated by the digital version of the newspaper 
“Nuovo corriere”. In this regard, CJEU, 25 October 2011, C-509/09 and C-161/10, eDate 
Advertising GmbH and Others v X and Société MGN LIMITED, ECLI:EU:C:2011:685 
applies: 
 
CJEU, 25 October 2011, C-509/09 and C-161/10, eDate Advertising GmbH and Others v X 
and Société MGN LIMITED, ECLI:EU:C:2011:685, operative part 
In the event of an alleged infringement of personality rights by means of content placed 
online on an internet website, the person who considers that his rights have been in-
fringed has the option of bringing an action for liability, in respect of all the damage 
caused: 
– either before the Courts of the Member State in which the publisher of that content is 
established, which is “the place of the event giving rise to the damage”, 
– or before the Courts of the Member State in which the centre of his/her interests is 
based, which is “the place where the damages occurred”. 
That person may also, instead of an action for liability in respect of all the damage caused, 
bring his action before the Courts of each Member State in the territory of which content 
placed online is or has been accessible. Those Courts have jurisdiction only in respect of 
the damage caused in the territory of the Member State of the Court seised. 
 
Once again, as Italy is “the place of the event giving rise to the damages”, Mary 
Stuart cannot refer to Article 7.2 Brussels I Recast Regulation to sue Delta Editore 
s.p.a. in a Member State other than the Member State of its domicile. 
VI. Localization of the “centre of interests” (“the place where the damages 
occurred”) 
The CJEU, 25 October 2011, C-509/09 and C-161/10, eDate Advertising GmbH 
and Others v X and Société MGN LIMITED, ECLI:EU:C:2011:685 held that: 
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CJEU, 25 October 2011, C-509/09 and C-161/10, eDate Advertising GmbH and Others v X 
and Société MGN LIMITED, ECLI:EU:C:2011:685 
49. The place where a person has the centre of his interests corresponds in general to 
his habitual residence. However, a person may also have the centre of his interests in a 
Member State in which he does not habitually reside, in so far as other factors, such as 
the pursuit of a professional activity, may establish the existence of a particularly close 
link with that State. 
 
As Mary Stuart is habitually resident in Warsaw (Poland), which is the forum 
actoris, Warsaw is the place where her centre of interests is based. Thus, War-
saw is “the place where the damage occurred”. Therefore, the Court of War-
saw has special jurisdiction over the case according to Article 7.2 Brussels I Recast 
Regulation. More precisely, the Court of Warsaw has jurisdiction to rule in respect 
of the all the damages caused everywhere by the digital version of the newspaper 
article. 
C. Conclusion 
As the below chart illustrates, Italy has general jurisdiction over the case 
according to Article 4 Brussels I Recast Regulation, whereas the Court of 
Warsaw (Poland) has special jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Article 
7.2 Brussels I Recast Regulation, with a restricted power to rule solely in respect of 
the harm caused in Poland by the printed version of the newspaper article, and a 





Art. 4 Brussels I Recast 
Regulation 
Poland 
Art. 7.2 Brussels I Recast 
Regulation 
International jurisdiction to 
award damages for ALL the 
harm caused by the defama-
tion by a printed newspaper 
✓ 
 
International jurisdiction to 
award damages for ALL the 
harm caused by the defama-










La Bocca della Verità s.p.a., a company incorporated under Italian law with statutory seat in Turin 
(Italy), included Komunikacja corp., a company incorporated under Polish law with statutory seat in 
Warsaw (Poland), in a blacklist on its website, stating that the company carries out acts of fraud and 
deceit. Many bad comments were posted on the website.  
The information about fraud and deceit of Komunikacja corp. and the relevant bad comments were 
in Italian and not translated into Polish.  
Komunikacja corp. carries out its main part of economic activities in Turin. 
Since La Bocca della Verità s.p.a. had refused to remove the alleged defamatory information and com-
ments from its website, Komunikacja corp. is planning to bring the following types of action: 
i) an action for compensation of the entirety of damage sustained; 
ii) an action for rectification and removal of the defamatory information. 
Which Court has international jurisdiction over these actions? 
Answer: 
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources 
Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
December 2012, on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgements 
in civil and commercial matters (hereinafter: the “Brussels I Recast Regulation”) is 
the relevant instrument to determine which Courts have jurisdiction over the case. 
Material scope of application: the Brussels I Recast Regulation applies in “civil and 
commercial matters” (Article 1), including torts and cyber torts. 
 
 
 Silvana Dalla Bontà (University of Trento). 
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Territorial scope of application: the Brussels I Recast Regulation applies between 
all Member States of the European Union (if the defendant is domiciled in a Mem-
ber State) including Italy and Poland. 
Temporal scope of application: the Brussels I Recast Regulation applies to legal 
proceedings instituted on or after 10 January 2015 (Article 66.1). 
 
 
FOR FURTHER READING on the Brussels I recast Regulation:  
https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_brussels_i_regulation_recast-350-en.do 
B. Find the correct provision 
I. General jurisdiction 
In civil matters for actions against companies domiciled in an EU Member State 
general jurisdiction lies in any Court of the Member State in which the defendant 
is domiciled (cf. Article 4.1 Brussels I Recast Regulation). As La Bocca della Verità 
s.p.a. is domiciled in Italy (cf. Article 63.1 (a)(b) Brussels I Recast Regulation), Italy 
has general jurisdiction over the case for both claims. 
 
Article 63.1(a)(b) Brussels I Recast Regulation  
1. For the purposes of this Regulation, a company or other legal person or association of 
natural or legal persons is domiciled at the place where it has its 
(a) statutory seat; 
(b) central administration. 
II. Special jurisdiction in matters relating to tort  
In matters relating to tort, including cyber torts, Article 7.2 Brussels I Recast Regulation 
provides that, in addition to the general place of jurisdiction at the defendant’s domi-
cile, the Courts of “the place where the harmful event occurred” also have jurisdiction. 
 
Article 7.2 Brussels I Recast Regulation 
A person domiciled in a Member State may be sued in another Member State: 
2) In matters relating to tort […] in the Courts of the place where the harmful event oc-
curred or may occur. 
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Article 7.2 Brussels I Recast Regulation has to be interpreted broadly in accordance with 
the standards of an autonomous interpretation as held by the CJEU, 27 September 
1998, C-189/87, Athanasios Kalfelis v Bankhaus Schröder, Münchmeyer, Hengst and Co. 
and others, ECLI: EU:C:1988:459 (concerning Article 5.3 Brussels Convention 1968): 
 
CJEU, 27 September 1998, C-189/87, Athanasios Kalfelis v Bankhaus Schröder, Münch-
meyer, Hengst and Co. and others, ECLI:EU:C:1988:459: 
17. In order to ensure uniformity in all the Member States, it must be recognized that the 
concept of “matters relating to tort” covers all actions which seek to establish the liabil-
ity of a defendant and which are not related to a “contract” within the meaning of Arti-
cle 5.1 [Article 7.1 Brussels I Recast Regulation]. 
 
 
FURTHER READING: In Handte, the CJEU held that there can only be a con-
tractual relationship when a party has undertaken a contractual obligation 
towards the other party.  
CJEU, 17 June 1992, C-26/91, Jakob Handte & Co. GmbH v Traitements Mé-
cano-chimiques des Surfaces SA, ECLI:EU:C:1992:268 
III. “Place where the harmful event occurred”  
The CJEU, 30 November 1976, C-21/76, Handelskwekerij G. J. Bier BV v Mines de 
potasse d’Alsace SA, ECLI:EU:C:1976:166 (concerning Article 5.3 Brussels Conven-
tion 1968) has clarified that: 
 
CJEU, 30 November 1976, C-21/76, Handelskwekerij G. J. Bier BV v Mines de potasse d'Al-
sace SA, ECLI:EU:C:1976:166 
15. […] the place of the event giving rise to the damage no less than the place where the 
damage occurred can, depending on the case, constitute a significant connecting factor 
from the point of view of jurisdiction. 
19. Thus the meaning of the expression “place where the harmful event occurred” […] 
must be established in such a way as to acknowledge that the plaintiff has an option to 
commence proceedings either at the “place where the damage occurred” or the “place 
of the event giving rise to it”. 
IV. Special jurisdiction in matters relating to cyber tort  
The CJEU, 25 October 2011, C-509/09 and C-161/10, eDate Advertising GmbH and 
Others v X and Société MGN LIMITED, ECLI:EU:C:2011:685 held that: 
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CJEU, 25 October 2011, C-509/09 and C-161/10, eDate Advertising GmbH and Others v X 
and Société MGN LIMITED, ECLI:EU:C:2011:685, operative part 
“In the event of an alleged infringement of personality rights by means of content placed 
online on an internet website, the person who considers that his rights have been infringed 
has the option of bringing an action for liability, in respect of all the damage caused: 
– either before the Courts of the Member State in which the publisher of that content is 
established, which is the “place of the event giving rise to the damage”, 
– or before the Courts of the Member State in which the centre of his/her interests is 
based, which is the “place where the damages occurred”. 
That person may also, instead of an action for liability in respect of all the damage caused, 
bring his action before the Courts of each Member State in the territory of which content 
placed online is or has been accessible. Those Courts have jurisdiction only in respect of 
the damage caused in the territory of the Member State of the Court seised”. 
 
As Italy is “the place of the event giving rise to the damages”, Komunikacja corp. 
cannot refer to Article 7.2 Brussels I Recast Regulation to sue La bocca della Ver-
ità s.p.a. in a Member State other than the Member State of its domicile. 
V. Notion of “centre of interests” 
In CJEU, 25 October 2011, C-509/09 and C-161/10, eDate Advertising GmbH 
and Others v X and Société MGN LIMITED, ECLI:EU:C:2011:685, the centre-of-inter-
ests-based forum actoris refers to a natural person, whereas Komunikacja corp. is 
a legal person. However, the CJEU, 17 October 2017, C‑194/16, Bolagsupplysningen 
OÜ and Ingrid Ilsjan v Svensk Handel AB, ECLI:EU:C:2017:766, has extended the ap-
plicability of such centre-of-interests based forum actoris to legal persons. 
VI. Localization of the “centre of interests” of a legal person (“place where 
the damages occurred”) 
The CJEU, 17 October 2017, C‑194/16, CJEU, Bolagsupplysningen OÜ and Ingrid 
Ilsjan v Svensk Handel AB, ECLI:EU:C:2017:766 held that: 
 
CJEU, 17 October 2017, C‑194/16, Bolagsupplysningen OÜ and Ingrid Ilsjan v Svensk Han-
del AB, ECLI:EU:C:2017:766 
41. As regards a legal person pursuing an economic activity […], the centre of interests 
of such a person must reflect the place where its commercial reputation is most firmly 
established and must, therefore, be determined by reference to the place where it car-
ries out the main part of its economic activities. 
Case 2. Scenario I 13 
  
In the case at hand, Komunikacja corp. has its statutory seat in Warsaw (Poland) 
but carries out the main part of its economic activities in Turin (Italy). Having in 
mind a similar situation, the CJEU, 17 October 2017, C‑194/16, Bolagsupplysningen 
OÜ and Ingrid Ilsjan v Svensk Handel AB, ECLI:EU:C:2017:766 held that: 
 
CJEU, 17 October 2017, C‑194/16, Bolagsupplysningen OÜ and Ingrid Ilsjan v Svensk Han-
del AB, ECLI:EU:C:2017:766 
41. While the centre of interests of a legal person may coincide with the place of its 
registered office when it carries out all or the main part of its activities in the Member 
State in which that office is situated and the reputation that it enjoys there is conse-
quently greater than in any other Member State, the location of that office is, not, how-
ever, in itself, a conclusive criterion for the purposes of such an analysis. 
 
According to CJEU, 17 October 2017, Bolagsupplysningen OÜ and Ingrid Ilsjan 
v Svensk Handel AB, ECLI:EU:C:2017:766 the centre of interests of Komunikacja 
corp. is located in Turin (Italy), where Komunikacja corp. carries out the main 
part of its economic activities, and its reputation its greater than in any other Mem-
ber State (and, therefore, compromised by the offences written in Italian). As Italy 
is “the place where the damages occurred”, Komunikacja corp. cannot refer to Ar-
ticle 7.2 Brussels I Recast Regulation to sue La bocca della Verità s.p.a. in a Member 
State other than the Member State of its domicile. 
C. Conclusion 
Italy has general jurisdiction over both claims according to Article 4 Brus-
sels I Recast Regulation.  
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Scenario II 
Assume that Komunikacja corp. carries out the main part of its commercial activities in Poland and 
that the defamatory information and relevant comments were in Polish. 
Which Courts have international jurisdiction over the two actions (action for compensa-
tion and action for rectification)? 
Answer: 
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources 
See Case 2, Scenario I, A 
B. Find the correct provisions 
I. General jurisdiction  
Cf. Case 2, B.1: as La Bocca della Verità s.p.a. is domiciled in Italy (cf. Article 63.1 
(a), (b) Brussels I Recast Regulation), Italy has general jurisdiction over the case for 
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II. Special jurisdiction: “place where the harmful event occurred” and locali-
zation of the “centre of interests” of a legal person 
Komunikacja corp. has its legal seat in Warsaw (Poland) and carries out the main 
part of its commercial activities in Poland. Its reputation is greater there than in any 
other Member State. Therefore, its centre of interests must be located in Warsaw 
(Poland). 
 
The Court of Warsaw, as the Court of “the place where the damages occurred” 
has special jurisdiction over the claim according to Article 7.2 Brussels I Recast 
Regulation. Such a Court has a general power to rule in respect of all the harm 
caused by the digital defamation. 
However, as clarified by the CJEU, 17 October 2017, C‑194/16, Bolagsupplysningen 
OÜ and Ingrid Ilsjan v Svensk Handel AB, ECLI:EU:C:2017:766: 
 
CJEU, 17 October 2017, C‑194/16, Bolagsupplysningen OÜ and Ingrid Ilsjan v Svensk Han-
del AB, ECLI:EU:C:2017:766 
48. An application for the rectification of the former and the removal of the latter is a 
single and indivisible application and can, consequently, only be made before a Court 
with jurisdiction to rule on the entirety of an application for compensation for damage 
and not before a Court that does not have jurisdiction to do so. 
 
Therefore, not only the Court of Warsaw has a general power to rule in respect of 
all the harm caused by the digital defamation, but it also has special jurisdiction 
over both claims: the action for compensation and the action for rectification and 
removal of the defamatory information. 
C. Conclusion 
As the chart below illustrates, Italy has general jurisdiction over both 
claims according to Article 4 Brussels I Recast Regulation.  
The Court of Warsaw (Poland)has special jurisdiction over both claims 
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Assume that Komunikacja corp. carries out its commercial activities equally within the EU. 
Which Courts have international jurisdiction over the two actions (action for compensa-
tion and action for rectification)? 
Answer: 
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources 
See Case 2, Scenario I, A 
B. Find the correct provisions 
I. General jurisdiction 
Cf. Case 1, B.1: as La Bocca della Verità s.p.a. is domiciled in Italy (cf. Article 63.1 (a)(b) 
Brussels I Recast Regulation), Italy has general jurisdiction over the case for both 
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II. Special jurisdiction: “Place where the harmful event occurred” and locali-
zation of the “centre of interests” of a legal person 
As Komunikacja corp. has its legal seat in Warsaw (Poland) but carries out its 
commercial activities equally within the EU, it is extremely hard to localize its 
“centre of interests”, that is the Member State in which its reputation its 
greater there than in any other Member State. 
However, according to CJEU, 25 October 2011, C-509/09 and C-161/10, eDate Ad-
vertising GmbH and Others v X and Société MGN LIMITED, ECLI:EU:C:2011:685, op-
erative part, Komunikacja corp. can bring the action for damages: 
 
CJEU, 25 October 2011, C-509/09 and C-161/10, eDate Advertising GmbH and Others v X 
and Société MGN LIMITED, ECLI:EU:C:2011:685, operative part 
[…] before the Courts of each Member State in the territory of which content placed 
online is or has been accessible. Those Courts have jurisdiction only in respect of the 
damage caused in the territory of the Member State of the Court seised. 
 
Komunikacja corp. can sue La bocca della Verità s.p.a. for damages before the 
Courts of each Member State where the damage was caused. Those Courts 
have special jurisdiction over the case according to Article 7.2 Brussels I Recast 
Regulation only in respect of the damage caused in the territory of the Member 
State of the Court seised. 
According to what held by the CJEU, 17 October 2017, C‑194/16, Bolagsup-
plysningen OÜ and Ingrid Ilsjan v Svensk Handel AB, ECLI:EU:C:2017:766, para 48 
(cf. above, Scenario II, B.II), as those Courts cannot rule on the entirety of an ap-
plication for compensation for damage, they do not have jurisdiction to grant an 
application for the rectification and the removal of defamatory information and 
comments. 
C. Conclusion 
As the chart below illustrates, Italy has general jurisdiction over both 
claims according to Article 4 Brussels I Recast Regulation, whereas the 
Courts of each Member State where the damage was caused have spe-
cial jurisdiction over the case according to Article 7.2 Brussels I Recast Regula-
tion only in respect of the damage caused in the territory of the Member State 
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Winter, a Polish Corporation and rightholder of the Polish trademark “Winter”, manufactures ski ser-
vicing tools and accessories and sells them worldwide. Power, a German company, also sells its own 
ski servicing tools and accessories, but also accessories for tools made by Winter. These “Winter ac-
cessories” are neither produced by, nor are they authorised by Winter. 
Power had reserved the keyword (“AdWords”) “Winter” in the Google advertising system, limited to 
Google’s German top-level domain (“google.de”). In consequence, an internet user who enters the 
keyword “Winter” into the search engine of google.de receives a link to Winter’s website as the first 
search result. However, the search also leads to an advertisement for Power appearing on the right-
hand side of the screen. The text of the advertisement bears the heading “Ski workshop accessories” 
and Power’s website address is given. Clicking on the heading “Ski workshop accessories” brings up 
the “Winter accessories” on offer on Power’s website. Power has not entered any advertisement 
linked to the search term “Winter” in Google’s Polish top-level domain (“google.pl”). 
Winter considers that its trademark has been infringed and wishes to bring an action for damages. 
Which Courts have international jurisdiction to decide? 
Answer: 
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources 
Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
12 December 2012, on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judge-
ments in civil and commercial matters (hereinafter: the “Brussels I Recast Regula-




 Wolfgang Hau (University of Munich) & Dennis Solomon (University of Passau). 
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Material scope of application: the Brussels I Recast Regulation applies in “civil and 
commercial matters” (Article 1), including torts. 
Territorial scope of application: the Brussels I Recast Regulation applies in all Mem-
ber States of the European Union including Germany and Poland, if the defendant 
is domiciled in a Member State (Art. 4, 5). 
Temporal scope of application: the Brussels I Recast Regulation applies to legal 
proceedings instituted on or after 10 January 2015 (Article 66.1). 
 
 
FOR FURTHER READING on the Brussels I recast Regulation:  
https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_brussels_i_regulation_recast-350-en.do 
B. Find the correct provision 
I. General jurisdiction 
In civil and commercial matters (cf. Article 1 Brussels I Recast Regulation) for actions 
against companies domiciled in an EU Member State pursuant to Article 4.1 Brus-
sels I Recast Regulation, in principle, the Courts of the Member State of the de-
fendant’s domicile have general jurisdiction over the case. 
 
As Power is domiciled in Germany (cf. Article 63.1(a)(b) Brussels I Recast Reg-
ulation), Winter can bring its action before German Courts. 
 
GOOD TO KNOW: Article 24.4 Brussels I Recast Regulation does not prevent this result, 
since, while that provision refers to proceedings concerning the registration or validity of 
trademarks, it does not concern actions based on the infringement upon them. 
II. Special jurisdiction 
If the subject matter of the proceedings is tort, delict or quasi-delict or claims aris-
ing out of such acts, Article 7.2 Brussels I Recast Regulation provides that, in addi-
tion to the general place of jurisdiction at the defendant’s domicile, the Courts of 
the place where the harmful event occurred also have international jurisdiction. 
The provision has to be interpreted broadly in accordance with the standards of an 
autonomous interpretation as held by the CJEU, 27 September 1998, C-189/87, Atha-
nasios Kalfelis v Bankhaus Schröder, Münchmeyer, Hengst and Co. and others, ECLI: 
EU:C:1988:459 (concerning Article 5.3 Brussels Convention 1968): 
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CJEU, 27 September 1998, C-189/87, Athanasios Kalfelis v Bankhaus Schröder, Münch-
meyer, Hengst and Co. and others, ECLI: EU:C:1988:459 
17. In order to ensure uniformity in all the Member States, it must be recognized that the 
concept of “matters relating to tort, delict and quasi-delict” covers all actions which 
seek to establish the liability of a defendant and which are not related to a “contract” 
within the meaning of Article 5.1. 
 
This also includes the claim for damages asserted here due to a trademark infringe-
ment. 
The international jurisdiction of the Polish Courts under Article 7.2 Brussels I Recast 
Regulation thus depends on whether the “place of the harmful event” is located 
in Poland. The CJEU ruled on the interpretation of this term in CJEU, 30 November 
1976, C-21/76, Handelskwekerij G. J. Bier BV v Mines de potasse d'Alsace SA, 
ECLI:EU:C:1976:166 (concerning Article 5.3 Brussels Convention 1968), stating: 
 
CJEU, 30 November 1976, C-21/76, Handelskwekerij G. J. Bier BV v Mines de potasse d'Al-
sace SA, ECLI:EU:C:1976:166 
15. As regards this, it is well to point out that the place of the event giving rise to the 
damage no less than the place where the damage occurred can, depending on the case, 
constitute a significant connecting factor form the point of view of jurisdiction. 
[…] 
19. Thus the meaning of the expression “place where the harmful event occurred” […] 
must be established in such a way as to acknowledge that the plaintiff has an option to 
commence proceedings either at the place where the damage occurred or the place of 
the event giving rise to it. 
 
An action by Winter against Power in Poland can therefore be considered if 
either the place where the damage occurred or the place of the action giving 
rise to it is located there. 
III. Place where the damage occurred 
Trademark infringements on the Internet can cause damage in different countries. 
Therefore, these are so-called scattered torts. The same applies to violations of 
personality rights through the publication of content on the Internet. There is es-
tablished case law of the CJEU on these kinds of cases, according to which the place 
where the damage occurs is located in all countries in which the corresponding 
content can be retrieved. However, the jurisdiction of the courts in question is to 
be limited to deciding on the damages caused within their State’s territory. 
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GOOD TO KNOW: This is the so-called mosaic theory, developed by CJEU, 7 March 1995, 
C-68/93, Fiona Shevill, Ixora Trading Inc., Chequepoint SARL and Chequepoint Interna-
tional Ltd v Presse Alliance SA, ECLI:EU:C:1995:61, on personality rights infringements in 
international press products. 
 
In the present case, this would result in limited jurisdiction in all States in which 
the website “google.de” can be accessed. On the other hand, the CJEU, referring 
to the necessary legal certainty, assumes a comprehensive place of jurisdiction at 
the centre of interests of the injured party. 
 
 
FOR FURTHER READING on place of jurisdiction at the centre of interests of the 
injured party: CJEU, 25 October 2011, C-509/09 and C-161/10, eDate Adver-
tising GmbH and Others v X and Société MGN LIMITED, ECLI:EU:C:2011:685, 
also confirmed for the infringement of corporate personality rights in CJEU, 
17 October 2017, C-194/16, Bolagsupplysningen OÜ and Ingrid Ilsjan v Svensk 
Handel AB, ECLI:EU:C:2017:766; for details see the case study 1 on “Jurisdic-
tion over Cyber Torts”. 
 
In the case of Winter, the centre of interests would have to be located in Poland 
for lack of other indications and establish the unlimited international jurisdiction of 
the Courts there. 
 
However, it is questionable, whether the mentioned law on personality rights 
infringements outlined above can even be applied to infringements of intel-
lectual property rights (such as the trademark infringements at issue here). In 
the present case, the CJEU has answered this question negatively (CJEU, 19 April 
2012, C-523/10, Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH, 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:220): 
 
CJEU, 19 April 2012, C-523/10, Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau 
GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:2012:220 
24. [T]hat assessment, made in the particular context of infringements of personality 
rights, does not apply also to the determination of jurisdiction in respect of infringements 
of intellectual property rights, such as those alleged in the main proceedings. 
25. Contrary to the situation of a person who considers that there has been an infringe-
ment of his personality rights, which are protected in all Member States, the protection 
afforded by the registration of a national mark is, in principle, limited to the territory of 
the Member State in which it is registered, so that, in general, its proprietor cannot rely 
on that protection outside the territory. 
26. Nevertheless, the question whether the use, for advertising, of a sign identical to a 
national mark on a website operating solely under a Country-specific top-level domain 
Case 3. Scenario I 23 
  
different from that of the Member State in which the trademark is registered in fact in-
fringes that mark falls within the scope of the examination of the substance of the action 
that the Court having jurisdiction will undertake in light of the applicable substantive law. 
27. With regard to jurisdiction to hear a claim of infringement of a national mark in a 
situation such as that in the main proceedings, it must be considered that both the ob-
jective of foreseeability and that of sound administration of justice militate in favor of 
conferring jurisdiction, in respect of the damage occurred, on the courts of the Member 
State in which the right at issue is protected. 
28. It is the Courts of the Member State in which the trademark at issue is registered 
which are best able to assess […] whether a situation such as that in the main proceedings 
actually infringes the protected national mark. Those courts have the power to determine 
all the damage allegedly caused to the proprietor of the protected right because of an 
infringement of it and to hear an application seeking cessation of all infringements of that 
right. 
29. Therefore it must be held that an action relating to infringement of a trademark reg-
istered in a Member State through the use, by an advertiser, of a keyword identical to 
that trademark on a search engine website operating under a Country-specific top-level 
domain of another Member State may be brought before the Courts of the Member 
State in which the trademark is registered. 
 
In Wintersteiger the CJEU thereby also refers – at least in the case of intellectual 
property rights for which a constitutive registration requirement exists – to the 
principle of national protection of intellectual property rights in international 
jurisdictional law. The place where the damage occurs can, in case of a trade-
mark infringement, only be located in the State in which the trademark is pro-
tected. 
 
The damage resulting from the infringement of a national trademark conse-
quently always occurs in the registration state. In the present case this is Po-
land, whose courts thus have international jurisdiction according to Article 7.2 
Brussels I Recast Regulation. 
IV. Place of the event giving rise to the damage 
Irrespective of what has been said so far, there is as well a place of tort jurisdiction 
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CJEU, 19 April 2012, C-523/10, Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau 
GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:2012:220 
30. As regards, second, the place where the event occurred which gives rise to an alleged 
infringement of a national mark through the use of a keyword identical to that trademark 
on a search engine operating under a Country-specific top-level domain of another Member 
State, it should be noted that the territorial limitation of the protection of a national mark 
is not such as to exclude the international jurisdiction of Courts other than the Courts of the 
Member State in which that trademark is registered. 
 
On the question of where this place of action should be located, the CJEU held: 
 
CJEU, 19 April 2012, C-523/10, Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau 
GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:2012:220 
34. In the case of an alleged infringement of a national trademark registered in a Member 
State because of the display, on the search engine website, of an advertisement using a key-
word identical to that trademark, it is the activation by the advertiser of the technical process 
displaying, according to pre-defined parameters, the advertisement which it created for its 
own commercial communications which should be considered to be the event giving rise to 
an alleged infringement, and not the display of the advertisement itself. 
35. As the Court has already held in the context of interpretation of the directive to approxi-
mate the laws of the Member States relating to trademarks, it is the advertiser choosing a 
keyword identical to the trademark, and not the provider of the referencing service, who uses 
it in the course of trade (Google France and Google, paragraphs 52 and 58). The event giving 
rise to a possible infringement of trademark law therefore lies in the actions of the adver-
tiser using the referencing service for its own commercial communications. 
36. It is true that the technical display process by the advertiser is activated, ultimately, 
on a server belonging to the operator of the search engine used by the advertiser. How-
ever, in view of the objective of foreseeability, which the rules on jurisdiction must pur-
sue, the place of establishment of that server cannot, by reason of its uncertain location, 
be considered to be the place where the event giving rise to the damage occurred for the 
purpose of the application of Article 5.3 Brussels I Regulation. 
37. By contrast, since it is a definite and identifiable place, both for the applicant and for 
the defendant, and is therefore likely to facilitate the taking of evidence and the conduct 
of the proceedings, it must be held that the place of establishment of the advertiser is 
the place where the activation of the display process is decided. 
 
In the present case, the place of the event giving rise to the alleged damage is 
located in Germany. However, since the general place of jurisdiction of Power 
is also located there, Article 7.2 Brussels I Recast Regulation does not apply 
(cf. the introduction before (1): “in another Member State”). 
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C. Conclusion 
German Courts have general jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Article 
4 Brussels I Recast Regulation (defendant’s home jurisdiction).  
Alternatively, Winter may bring an action in Poland: under Article 7.2 
Brussels I Recast Regulation, the Polish Courts have special jurisdiction over the 
case because the place of success of a trademark-infringement in tort is situated in 
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Scenario II 
Winter has not registered a Polish trademark for its product, but a European Union Trademark within 
the meaning of Regulation (EU) No. 1001/2017. Power is domiciled in Italy and sells accessory parts 
manufactured by Winter by promoting them on its website with an Italian top-level domain 
(Power.it), in German language. The website does not offer any ordering possibility but contains the 
contact data of Power. Power had given an undertaking to Winter declaring that it would refrain from 
exporting Winter-branded products to Germany or offering them for sale, advertising or marketing 
them there. 
Xeed-GmbH, based in Germany, requests a price list via e-mail to the address given on the website 
and, after receiving it, orders 150 accessory parts, also by e-mail. Xeed-GmbH commissions a forward-
ing company to transport the goods from Power to its plant in Germany. Winter considers that its 
European Union Trademark has been infringed because the goods have been sold on the European 
Union market without its consent and is seeking injunctive relief in Germany. 
Do German Courts have international jurisdiction over the case? 
Answer: 
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources 
1) Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 12 December 2012, on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgements in civil and commercial matters (hereinafter: the “Brussels I Recast 
Regulation”) is the relevant instrument to determine which Courts have jurisdiction 
over the case. 
Material scope of application: the Brussels I Recast Regulation applies in “civil and 
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Territorial scope of application: the Brussels I Recast Regulation applies in all Mem-
ber States of the European Union including Germany and Italy, if the defendant is 
domiciled in a Member State (Art. 4, 5). 
Temporal scope of application: the Brussels I Recast Regulation applies to legal 
proceedings instituted on or after 10 January 2015 (Article 66.1). 
 
 
FOR FURTHER READING on the Brussels I recast Regulation:  
https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_brussels_i_regulation_recast-350-en.do 
 
2) Regulation (EU) No. 1001/2017 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 14 June 2017, on the European Union Trademark (hereinafter: the “EUTMR”). 
Material scope of application: the EUTMR concerns “a trade mark for goods or 
services which is registered in accordance with the conditions contained in this Reg-
ulation” (Article 1). 
Territorial scope of application: the EUTMR applies between all Member States of 
the European Union including Italy, Germany and Poland. 




FOR FURTHER READING on the EUTMR:  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32017R1001 
B. Find the correct provisions  
The EUTMR regulates the international jurisdiction for civil proceedings concerning 
the infringement of Union trademarks itself in its Article 125: 
 
Article 125 EUTMR – International jurisdiction 
1. Subject to the provisions of this Regulation as well as to any provisions of Brussels I 
Recast Regulation applicable by virtue of Article 122, proceedings in respect of the ac-
tions and claims referred to in Article 124 shall be brought before the Courts of the Mem-
ber State in which the defendant is domiciled or, if he is not domiciled in any of the Mem-
ber States, in which he has an establishment. 
[…] 
5. Proceedings in respect of the actions and claims referred to in Article 124, with the 
exception of actions for a declaration of non-infringement of an EU trademark, may also 
be brought before the Courts of the Member State in which the act of infringement has 
been committed or threatened, or in which an act referred to in Article 11.2 has been 
committed. 
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According to Article 125.1 EUTMR, the Courts of the State in which the defendant 
is domiciled have international jurisdiction.  
 
Therefore, the Italian Courts have jurisdiction over Power. 
 
 
The international jurisdiction of the German Courts could, however, be based on 
Article 125.5 EUTMR if the alleged infringement has been committed or threat-
ened in Germany. In this context it must be noted that, in contrast to Article 7.2 
Brussels I Recast Regulation, the wording of Article 125.5 EUTMR does not alterna-
tively refer to the place of the event giving rise to the damage and the place where 
the damage occurred, but solely provides jurisdiction at the place of the event giv-
ing rise to the damage. As clarified by CJEU, 5 June 2014, C-360/12, Coty Germany 
GmbH v First Note Perfumes NV, ECLI:EU:C:2014:1318 (on the content-similar Reg-
ulation in Article 93.5 Regulation (EC) No 40/94 on the Community trademark, here-
inafter CTMR 1994): 
 
CJEU, 5 June 2014, C-360/12, Coty Germany GmbH v First Note Perfumes NV, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:1318 
31. With regard to the interpretation of Article 93.5, in the light of the findings in para-
graphs 27 and 28 above, the concept of “the Member State in which the act of infringe-
ment has been committed or threatened”, referred to in that provision, must be inter-
preted independently of the concept of “the place where the harmful event occurred or 
may occur” referred to in Article 5.3 Brussels I Regulation.  
32. Consequently, the duality of linking factors, namely the place of the event giving rise 
to the damage and that where the damage occurred, accepted by the Court’s case-law 
relating to Article 5.3 Brussels I Regulation (see CJEU, 30 November 1976, C-21/76, Han-
delskwekerij G. J. Bier BV v Mines de potasse d'Alsace SA, ECLI:EU:C:1976:166, paragraph 
19, and, most recently, CJEU, 16 January 2014, C-45/13, Andreas Kainz v Pantherwerke 
AG, ECLI:EU:C:2014:7, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited), cannot automatically apply 
to the interpretation of the concept of “the Member State in which the act of infringe-
ment has been committed or threatened” in Article 93.5 [CTMR 1994]. 
33. In order to determine whether an independent interpretation of the latter provision 
nevertheless leads to an acknowledgement of such a duality of linking factors, it is nec-
essary, in accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, to take into account not only the 
wording of that provision, but also its context and purpose. 
34. With regard to the wording of Article 93.5 [CTMR 1994], the concept of “the Mem-
ber State in which the act of infringement has been committed” implies, as the Advocate 
General stated in point 31 of his Opinion, that that linking factor relates to active conduct 
on the part of the person causing that infringement. Therefore, the linking factor pro-
vided for by that provision refers to the Member State where the act giving rise to the 
alleged infringement occurred or may occur, not the Member State where that infringe-
ment produces its effects. 
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35. It should also be noted that the existence of jurisdiction under Article 93.5 based on 
the place where the alleged infringement produces its effects would conflict with the 
wording of Article 94.2 of that Regulation, which limits the jurisdiction of Community 
trademark courts under Article 93.5 to acts committed or threatened in the Member 
State where the court seized is situated. 
36. Furthermore, as the Advocate General stated in points 28 and 29 of his Opinion, both 
the origin and the context of [the CTMR 1994] confirm the intention of the EU legislature 
to derogate from the rule on jurisdiction provided for in Article 5.3 Brussels I Regulation 
in the light, in particular, of the inability of the rule on jurisdiction to respond to the spe-
cific problems relating to the infringement of a Community trademark. 
37. Consequently, jurisdiction under Article 93.5 [CTMR 1994] may be established solely 
in favour of Community trademark Courts in the Member State in which the defendant 
committed the alleged unlawful act. 
 
As stated in CJEU, 5 June 2014, C-360/12, Coty Germany GmbH v First Note 
Perfumes NV, ECLI:EU:C:2014:1318, jurisdiction may be established in favour 
of the Courts in the Member State in which the defendant committed the al-
leged unlawful act. This raises the question whether Power has caused the infringe-
ment by marketing activities that took place in Germany. Such activities could solely 
be seen in the operation of the German-language website or the sending of the 
requested price list to Germany. A shipment of the goods to Germany, however, 
cannot be attributed to Power, since the forwarding agency in charge of the 
transport was commissioned by Xeed-GmbH. 
 
In the opinion of the German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof, 
hereinafter BGH), which transfers the CJEU-case law (CJEU, 27 September 
2017, C-24/16 and C-25/16, Nintendo Co. Ltd v BigBen Interactive GmbH and BigBen 
Interactive SA, ECLI:EU:C:2017:724) on Community designs because of the similarity 
of content of the relevant rules, the offer on the website in German does not lead 
to international jurisdiction of the German courts. 
 
BGH, 9 November 2017 – I ZR 164/16 = EuZW 2018, 84 (on Article 97 of Regulation (EC) 
No. 207/2009 on the Community trademark, hereinafter CTMR 2009, which is identical 
in content to Article 125 EUTMR) 
31. […] The Court of Appeal correctly assumed that the German-language website of the 
defendant does not lead to international jurisdiction of the German courts. However, 
contrary to the opinion of the Court of appeal, it is not important that the defendant’s 
website does not contain any ordering option and is limited to a general presentation of 
its business. Even if there was such an ordering option or – as the plaintiff states – com-
mercial perfume buyers in Germany would have been targeted directly by the web site, this 
would regularly not lead to international jurisdiction of the German courts. This follows 
from the judgement [CJEU, 27 September 2017, C-24/16 and C-25/16, Nintendo Co. Ltd v 
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BigBen Interactive GmbH and BigBen Interactive SA, ECLI:EU:C:2017:724]. This judgement 
has been passed on the Regulation (EC) No. 6/2002 on Community designs. However, be-
cause of the similarity in content of the relevant Regulations, the ruling of the CJEU can 
be transferred on European Union Trademarks […]. 
31. […] If an economic operator offers goods for sale which can be viewed on the screen and 
ordered via a website which is addressed to purchasers in other Member States, infringing 
a Community trademark, such conduct falls within the scope of the term using in the course 
of trade in the sense of Article 9.1 [CTMR 2009]. […] This is also an event giving rise to dam-
age. The location of this damaging event in the meaning of Article 97.5 [CTMR 2009] in such 
a case, however, is not the place, where the website can be accessed, but the place where 
the process of publication of the offer on the website was initiated […]. Even if the defend-
ant’s website were to contain an offer of goods, in doubt it would have to be assumed, that 
the process of publishing the offer had taken place in Italy. 
 
Further, in the opinion of the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH, 9 November 2017 – I ZR 
164/16 = EuZW 2018, 84, paras. 33 et seq.), sending the price list to Germany is also 
no sufficient connecting factor: 
 
BGH, 9 November 2017 – I ZR 164/16 = EuZW 2018, 84 
33. Contrary to the view of the Court of Appeal, the international jurisdiction of the Ger-
man Courts […] is not based on the fact that the defendant sent […] a product and price 
list to Germany by e-mail from Italy. 
34. In disputes concerning infringements of intellectual property rights, it is not uncom-
mon for the same defendant to be accused of several acts of infringement and for that 
reason an event giving rise to the damage to occur in several places. For determining the 
event giving rise to the damage in cases where the same defendant is alleged to have 
committed different acts of infringement within the meaning of Article 9.2 [CTMR 2009] 
in several Member states, it is not necessary to consider each individual act of infringe-
ment but to make an overall assessment of the conduct in order to determine the place 
where the original act of infringement to which the alleged conduct relates was com-
mitted or threatens to be committed (see CJEU, 27 September 2017, C-24/16 and C-
25/16, Nintendo Co. Ltd v BigBen Interactive GmbH and BigBen Interactive SA, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:724). In this respect, the considerations of the European Court of Jus-
tice regarding the interpretation of Article 8 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II Regulation), which is linguistically 
similar to Article 97.5 [CTMR 2009], apply […]. 
35. The reasoning that the Court seized can easily determine the applicable law on the basis 
of a uniform connecting factor – the place where the act of infringement was committed or 
threatened, which is the origin of several acts alleged against a defendant (see CJEU, 27 Sep-
tember 2017, C-24/16 and C-25/16, Nintendo Co. Ltd v BigBen Interactive GmbH and BigBen 
Interactive SA, ECLI:EU:C:2017:724) – also applies to the interpretation of Article 97.5 [CTMR 
2009]. The parties and the Court can then easily designate the Member State in which an 
infringement within the meaning of Article 97.5 [CTMR 2009] has been committed. 
36. Thus, it is not necessary to focus on individual acts of the infringement, but to make 
an overall assessment of the conduct of the defendant in order to determine the place 
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where the original act of infringement on which the alleged conduct is based, was com-
mitted or threatens to be committed. 
37. If […] there was already an offer executed on the defendant’s website, this would 
have to be regarded as the event giving rise to the damage. Sending an e-mail with a 
product list would then be irrelevant in this context. Anyhow, the place of the event giv-
ing rise to the damage in the case of an Internet offer is the place where its publication 
was initiated. Nothing has been established or otherwise ascertained that the publica-
tion of the website was initiated in in Germany. 
38. If the defendant’s website is not regarded as an offer, the event giving rise to the damage 
lies in the sending of product and price lists by e-mail. In this case, the place of the event 
giving rise to the damage is also not Germany. The application of the principles developed for 
the cases of orders via the Internet leads to the result that the place of the event giving rise 
to the damage in this case is the place where the e-mail is sent. In the absence of any diver-
gent indications, it can be assumed that this was done in Italy […]. It does not matter, whether 
the defendant has contacted [X] on its own initiative or on request. 
 
According to the opinion of the Bundesgerichtshof, in the case of the infringe-
ment of European Union Trademarks by distribution on the Internet, a place of 
jurisdiction pursuant to Article 125.5 EUTMR would therefore only be estab-
lished at the place from which the website is launched. Individual sales activities 
with reference to other Countries, such as the sending of information by e-mail, could 
not constitute a sufficient connection to establish the international jurisdiction of the 
local Court. The European Union Trademark proprietor’s right to bring an action 
would therefore normally be limited to the defendants home Country, unlike in the 
case of national trademarks, where the Country of the trademark registration is seen 
as the place where the damage occurred which often leads to international jurisdic-
tion of the plaintiff’s home Courts. In this respect, the enforcement of the European 
Union Trademark would be significantly more difficult in comparison with national 
trademarks. For that reason, the CJEU recently did not share the opinion of the Bun-
desgerichtshof. In CJEU, 5 September 2019, C-172/18, AMS Neve Ltd and Others v 
Heritage Audio SL and Pedro Rodríguez Arribas, ECLI:EU:C:2019:674, a case similar to 
this one, where a Spanish seller offered audio equipment to customers in the United 
Kingdom via his website and social media accounts in English language, naming i.a. 
distributors in the United Kingdom and – by doing so – (potentially) violating the EU 
trademark of a company from the United Kingdom, it held: 
 
CJEU, 5 September 2019, C-172/18, AMS Neve Ltd and Others v Heritage Audio SL and 
Pedro Rodríguez Arribas, ECLI:EU:C:2019:674 (on Article 97 of Regulation (EC) No. 
207/2009 on the Community trademark, hereinafter CTMR 2009, which is identical in 
content to Article 125 EUTMR) 
50. If the wording “Member State in which the act of infringement has been committed”, in 
Article 97.5 CTMR 2009, were to be interpreted as meaning that it refers to the Member 
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State in the territory of which the person carrying out those commercial acts set up his web-
site and activated the display of his advertising and offers for sale, parties established within 
the European Union committing an infringement, operating electronically and seeking to 
prevent the proprietors of infringed EU marks from resorting to an alternative forum, would 
have to do no more than ensure that the territory where the advertising and offers for sale 
were placed online was the same territory as that where those parties are established. In 
that way, Article 97.5 of that Regulation would, in the event that the advertising and the 
offers for sale are directed to consumers of other Member States, be deprived of any scope 
constituting an alternative to that of the rule on jurisdiction laid down in Article 97.1. 
51. An interpretation of the wording “Member State in which the act of infringement has 
been committed” as meaning that it refers to the place where the defendant took decisions 
and technical measures to activate a display on a website is all the more inappropriate given 
that it may, in many cases, prove excessively difficult, or even impossible, for the applicant 
to identify that place. As opposed to situations in which proceedings are already pending, a 
factor in the situation in which the proprietor of the EU trade mark finds himself before the 
bringing of Court proceedings is that it is impossible to compel the defendant to disclose that 
place, when no action has been brought before any Court at that stage. 
52. In order to maintain the effectiveness of the EU legislature’s provision of an alterna-
tive forum it is necessary, in accordance with the case-law to the effect, that the terms 
of a provision of EU law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member 
States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must be interpreted having 
regard to the context of the provision and the objectives pursued by the legislation of 
which it forms part (see, inter alia, CJEU, 3 September 2014, C-201/13, Johan Deckmyn 
and Vrijheidsfonds VZW v Helena Vandersteen and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2132, para-
graph 14, and CJEU, 18 May 2017, C-617/15, Hummel Holding A/S v Nike Inc. and Nike 
Retail B.V., ECLI:EU:C:2017:390, paragraph 22), to give to the wording “Member State in 
which the act of infringement has been committed” an interpretation which is consistent 
with the other provisions of Regulation No 207/2009 with respect to infringement. 
53. One of those provisions is, in particular, Article 9 CTMR 2009, which lists the acts of 
infringement which the rightholder of an EU trade mark can contest. 
54. Accordingly, the expression “the act of infringement” must be understood as relating 
to acts, specified in Article 9 CTMR 2009, which the applicant claims to have been com-
mitted by the defendant, such as, in this case, acts specified in Article 9.2(b) and (d) of 
that article, consisting of advertising and offers for sale under a sign identical to the mark 
at issue, and those acts must be held to have been “committed” in the territory where 
they can be classified as advertising or as offers for sale, namely where their commercial 
content has in fact been made accessible to the consumers and traders to whom it was 
directed. Whether the result of that advertising and those offers for sale was that, there-
after, the defendant’s products were purchased is, however, irrelevant. 
C. Conclusion 
Following the CJEU, German Courts have international jurisdiction over 
the case based on Article 125.5 EUTMR.    




Head, who lives in Warsaw (Poland), is a professional architecture photographer and author of illus-
trated books showing buildings by the well-known Polish architect Astrid. Astrid used the photographs 
of Head to illustrate her work at a conference organised by the German-based Agency Ester. After the 
end of the conference, Ester made these pictures available on its website for retrieval and download 
without the consent of Head and without stating a copyright designation. Head sees her copyrights 
infringed and brings action for damages against Ester before the commercial Court of Warsaw on the 
basis of Article 7.2 Brussels I Recast Regulation. Ester claims that the Courts do not have international 
jurisdiction, stating that its website is not directed toward Poland and that its mere accessibility in 
Poland is not sufficient to establish the jurisdiction of the Polish Courts. 
Does the commercial Court of Warsaw have international jurisdiction over the case? 
Answer: 
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources 
Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
December 2012, on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgements in 
civil and commercial matters (hereinafter: the “Brussels I Recast Regulation”) is the 
relevant instrument to determine which Courts have jurisdiction over the case. 
Material scope of application: the Brussels I Recast Regulation applies in “civil and 
commercial matters” (Article 1), including torts. 
Territorial scope of application: the Brussels I Recast Regulation applies in all Mem-
ber States of the European Union including Germany and Poland, if the defendant 
is domiciled in a Member State (Art. 4, 5). 
Temporal scope of application: the Brussels I Recast Regulation applies to legal 
proceedings instituted on or after 10 January 2015 (Article 66.1). 
 
 
 Wolfgang Hau (University of Munich) & Dennis Solomon (University of Passau). 
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FOR FURTHER READING on the Brussels I recast Regulation:  
https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_brussels_i_regulation_recast-350-en.do 
B. Find the correct provision 
I. General jurisdiction 
The place of general jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 4.1 Brussels I 
Recast Regulation lies with the Courts of the State in which the defendants’ 
company is domiciled. Therefore, the German Courts and not the Polish 
Courts have general jurisdiction over Ester. 
II. Special jurisdiction 
The Polish Courts may, however, have special jurisdiction over the case pursuant 
to Article 7.2 Brussels I Recast Regulation, if the place of the action giving rise or 
the place of success of the alleged copyright infringement, which constitutes a 
tortious act within the meaning of the provision, is to be located in Poland. 
Regarding the relevant act of infringement and the determination of its place in the 
case of publication of content on the Internet, CJEU, 22 January 2015, C-441/13, 
Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbHk, ECLI:EU:C:2015:28 (concerning Article 
5.3 Brussels I Regulation), states: 
 
CJEU, 22 January 2015, C-441/13, Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:28 
23. In the first place, it must be stated that the causal event, defined as the event which 
gives rise to the alleged damage (see CJEU, 16 July 2009, C-189/08, Zuid-Chemie BV v 
Philippo's Mineralenfabriek NV/SA, ECLI:EU:C:2009:475, paragraph 28), is not relevant 
for the purpose of attributing jurisdiction to the Court before which a case such as that 
in the main proceedings has been brought.  
24. In a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, in which the alleged tort 
consists in the infringement of copyright or rights related to copyright by the placing of cer-
tain photographs online on a website without the photographer’s consent, the activation of 
the process for the technical display of the photographs on that website must be regarded 
as the causal event. The event giving rise to a possible infringement of copyright therefore 
lies in the actions of the owner of that site (see, by analogy, CJEU, 19 April 2012, C-523/10, 
Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:2012:220, para-
graphs 34 and 35). 
Case 4 35 
  
25. In a case such as that in the main proceedings, the acts or omissions liable to consti-
tute such an infringement may be localised only at the place where [E] has its seat, since 
that is where the company took and carried out the decision to place photographs online 
on a particular website. It is undisputed that that seat is not in the Member State from 
which the present reference is made. 
26. It follows that in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, the 
causal event took place at the seat of that company and therefore does not attribute 
jurisdiction to the Court seized. 
 
The place of the event giving rise to the damage therefore is located in Ger-
many. Consequently, the Court of Warsaw does not have international juris-
diction over the case.  
 
It remains to be clarified whether its jurisdiction results from the fact that War-
saw is the place where the damage resulting from the copyright infringement 
occurred. To determine this place in the case of the infringement of copyrights 
by the distribution of works on physical media, the CJEU has referred to its case law 
on scattered torts in the judgement CJEU, 3 October 2013, C-170/12, Peter Pinckney 
v KDG Mediatech AG, ECLI:EU:C:2013:635 (on Article 5.3 Brussels I Regulation): 
 
CJEU, 3 October 2013, C-170/12, Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG, ECLI:EU:C:2013:635  
31. The Court has already interpreted Article 5.3 Brussels I Regulation with respect to alle-
gations of infringements committed via the internet and which may, as a result, produce 
their effects in numerous places (see CJEU, 25 October 2011, C-509/09 and C-161/10, eDate 
Advertising GmbH and Others v X and Société MGN LIMITED, ECLI:EU:C:2011:685 and CJEU, 
19 April 2012, C-523/10, Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH, 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:220). 
[…] 
39. First of all, it is true that copyright, like the rights attaching to a national trademark, 
is subject to the principle of territoriality. However, copyrights must be automatically 
protected, in particular by virtue of Directive 2001/29, in all Member States, so that they 
may be infringed in each one in accordance with the applicable substantive law. 
40. In that connection, it must be stated from the outset that the issue as to whether the 
conditions under which a right protected in the Member State in which the Court seized is 
situated may be regarded as having been infringed and whether that infringement may be 
attributed to the defendant falls within the scope of the examination of the substance of the 
action by the court having jurisdiction (see, to that effect, CJEU, 19 April 2012, C-523/10, Win-
tersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:2012:220, paragraph 26). 
41. At the stage of examining the jurisdiction of a Court to adjudicate on damage caused, 
the identification of the place where the harmful event giving rise to that damage oc-
curred for the purposes of Article 5.3 Brussels I Regulation cannot depend on criterias 
which are specific to the examination of the substance and which do not appear in that 
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provision. Article 5.3 Brussels I Regulation lays down, as the sole condition, that a harmful 
event has occurred or may occur. 
[…] 
43. It follows that, as regards the alleged infringement of a copyright, jurisdiction to hear 
an action in tort, delict or quasi-delict is already established in favour of the Court seized 
if the Member State in which that Court is situated protects the copyrights relied on by 
the plaintiff and that the alleged damage may occur within the jurisdiction of the Court 
seized. 
[…] 
45. However, if the protection granted by the Member State of the place of the Court 
seized is applicable only in that Member State, the Court seized only has jurisdiction to 
determine the damage caused within the Member State in which it is situated.  
46. If that Court also had jurisdiction to adjudicate on the damage caused in other 
Member States, it would substitute itself for the Courts of those States even though, in 
principle, in the light of Article 5.3 Brussels I Regulation and the principle of territoriality, 
the latter have jurisdiction to determine, first, the damage caused in their respective 
Member States and are best placed to ascertain whether the copyrights protected by the 
Member State concerned have been infringed and, second, to determine the nature of 
the harm caused. 
 
In the present case, the CJEU also applies these principles to copyright infringements 
caused by the publication of protected works on the Internet (CJEU, 22 January 
2015, C-441/13, Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:2015:28, on Ar-
ticle 5.3 Brussels I Regulation): 
 
CJEU, 22 January 2015, C-441/13, Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:28 
29. In that regard, the Court has stated not only that the place where the alleged damage 
occurred within the meaning of that provision may vary according to the nature of the 
right allegedly infringed, but also that the likelihood of damage occurring in a particular 
Member State is subject to the condition that the right whose infringement is alleged is 
protected in that Member State (see CJEU, 3 October 2013, C-170/12, Peter Pinckney v 
KDG Mediatech AG, ECLI:EU:C:2013:635, paragraphs 32 and 33).  
30. With regard to the second aspect, in the case in the main proceedings, [H] alleges 
infringement of her copyright as a result of the placing of her photographs online on the 
website of [E]. It is not disputed, as is clear in particular from paragraph 22 above, that 
the rights on which she relies are protected in Austria. 
31. With regard to the likelihood of the damage occurring in a Member State other than 
the one where [E] has its seat, that company states that its website, on which the photo-
graphs at issue were published, operating under a Country-specific German top-level do-
main, that is to say “.de”, is not directed at Austria and that consequently the damage 
did not occur in that Member State. 
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32. It is clear from the Court’s case-law that, unlike Article 15.1I Brussels I Regulation, 
which was interpreted in the judgment in Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof (CJEU, 7 Decem-
ber 2010, Peter Pammer v Reederei Karl Schlüter GmbH & Co. KG and Hotel Alpenhof 
GesmbH v Oliver Heller, C-585/08 and C-144/09, ECLI:EU:C:2010:740), Article 5.3 does 
not require, in particular, that the activity concerned be “directed to” the Member State 
in which the Court seized is situated (see CJEU, 3 October 2013, C-170/12, Peter Pinckney 
v KDG Mediatech AG, ECLI:EU:C:2013:635, paragraph 42). 
33. Therefore, for the purposes of determining the place where the damage occurred 
with a view to attributing jurisdiction on the basis of Article 5.3 Brussels I Regulation, it 
is irrelevant that the website at issue in the main proceedings is not directed at the 
Member State in which the Court seized is situated. 
34. In circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, it must thus be held 
that the occurrence of damage and/or the likelihood of its occurrence arise from the ac-
cessibility in the Member State of the referring court, via the website of [E], of the pho-
tographs to which the rights relied on by [H] pertain. 
[…] 
36. However, given that the protection of copyright and rights related to copyright 
granted by the Member State of the Court seized is limited to the territory of that Mem-
ber State, a Court seized on the basis of the place where the alleged damage occurred 
has jurisdiction only to rule on the damage caused within that Member State (see, to 
that effect, CJEU, 3 October 2013, C-170/12, Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:635, paragraph 45). 
 
In the case of copyright infringements, it is sufficient for the establishment of 
international and local jurisdiction that the right whose infringement is alleged 
is legally protected in the State of the forum and that the damage has occurred 
in the district of the Court seized.  
It is not necessary that the (potentially) infringing activity is directed towards the 
State of jurisdiction. The principle of national protection, on the basis of which, in 
the case CJEU, 19 April 2012, C-523/10, Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sonder-
maschinenbau GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:2012:220, a restriction of the possible place where 
a damage can occur from copyright infringements to the state of registration was 
made for national trademark rights dependant on registration (see above case 3), 
in this case only has the effect that the international jurisdiction of the Court at 
the place where the damage occurred is limited to the damage caused at its State. 
C. Conclusion 
The Commercial Court of Warsaw (Poland) has international jurisdiction 
over the case according to Article 7.2 Brussels I Recast Regulation, as the 
chart illustrates. 
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Poland 
Art. 4 Brussels I Recast 
Regulation 
Poland 
Art. 7.2 Brussels I Recast 
Regulation 
International jurisdiction to 
award damages for the harm 







Choice of Court Agreements and Consumers 
Scenario I 
John, an Austrian salesman domiciled in Rome (Italy), was a Face user.  
Face is a social network.  
John was banned from the social media site for posting a photo of “My Birth” (Frida Kahlo’s painting 
of a woman giving birth) on his publicly-available Face wall, together with a link to a television program 
aired on “Arte” (a European channel, promoting programs in the areas of culture and the arts) about 
the history of Frida Kahlo.  
According to the explanation given by Face, John was banned from the social media because, pur-
suant to the site’s community standards, nudity and other explicit content are prohibited from 
Face. 
John decides to file a complaint against Face before the Court of first instance of Rome, arguing that 
the social media was not able to distinguish pornography from art. The European head of Face, whose 
office is located in Berlin (Germany), is served with the claim form. 
John is seeking the reactivation of his Face account as well as € 40,000 in damages. 
At the hearing, Face’s lawyer argues that the Court of first instance of Rome has no jurisdiction over 
the case because, in activating his account, John had agreed to the site’s terms of service, which spec-
ify that: 
“You will resolve any claim, cause of action or dispute you have with us arising out of or relating to 
Face exclusively in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, and you agree to submit 
to the personal jurisdiction of such Courts for the purpose of litigating all such claims”. 
1. Is John a consumer?  





 Elena D’Alessandro (University of Turin). 
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Answer 1: 
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources 
Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
12 December 2012, on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judge-
ments in civil and commercial matters (hereinafter the “Brussels I Recast Regula-
tion”) is the relevant instrument to determine whether John is a consumer and 
which Court has jurisdiction over the case. 
Material scope of application: the Brussels I Recast Regulation applies “in civil and 
commercial matters whatever” (Article 1), including consumer matters. 
Territorial scope of application: the Brussels I Recast Regulation applies between 
all Member States of the European Union including Italy and Germany. 
Temporal scope of application: the Brussels I Recast Regulation applies to legal 
proceedings instituted on or after 10 January 2015 (Article 66.1). 
 
 
FOR FURTHER READING on the Brussels I recast Regulation:  
https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_brussels_i_regulation_recast-350-en.do 
B. Find the correct provision 
I. The notion of consumer in the Brussels I Recast Regulation 
Article 17.1 Brussels I Recast Regulation, clarifies that a “consumer” is a person con-
cluding a contract “for a purpose which can be regarded as being outside his trade 
or profession”.  
The CJEU, 3 July 1997, C‑269/95, Francesco Benincasa v Dentalkit Srl, 
ECLI:EU:C:1997:337, para 16 and CJEU, 20 January 2005, C-464/01, Johann Gruber 
v Bay Wa AG, ECLI:EU:C:2005:32, has made clear that: 
 
CJEU, 20 January 2005, C-464/01, Johann Gruber v Bay Wa AG, ECLI:EU:C:2005:32 
36. The concept of “consumer” must be strictly construed, reference being made to the 
position of the person concerned in a particular contract, having regard to the nature and 
aim of that contract and not to the subjective situation of the person concerned, since 
the same person may be regarded as a consumer in relation to certain supplies and as an 
economic operator in relation to others. 
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FOR FURTHER READING on consumer protection under EU Law:  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/consumers/consumer-protection_en 
 
John is a salesman domiciled in a Member State. Nevertheless, being a salesman in 
one’s professional life does not mean that one will be considered as professional in 
all life situations. 
In the case at hand, John opened and was using his Face account solely for private 
purposes. 
Hence, as clarified by the CJEU, 25 January 2018, C-498/16, Maximilian Schrems v 
Facebook Ireland Limited, ECLI:EU:C:2018:37 (concerning Articles 15-17 Brussels I 
Regulation), he is a private Face account user and not a professional. 
 
CJEU, 25 January 2018, C-498/16, Maximilian Schrems v Facebook Ireland Limited, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:37 
31. […] the special rules of jurisdiction in Articles 15 to 17 of Regulation No 44/2001 apply, 
in principle, only where the contract has been concluded between the parties for the 
purpose of a use of the relevant goods or services that is other than a trade or profes-
sional use […]. 
32. As regards, more particularly, a person who concludes a contract for a purpose which 
is partly concerned with his trade or profession and is therefore only partly outside it, the 
Court has held that he could rely on those provisions only if the link between the contract 
and the trade or profession of the person concerned was so slight as to be marginal and, 
therefore, had only a negligible role in the context of the supply in respect of which the 
contract was concluded, considered in its entirety. 
[…] 
40. An interpretation of the notion of “consumer” which excluded such activities would 
have the effect of preventing an effective defence of the rights that consumers enjoy in 
relation to their contractual partners who are traders or professionals, including those 
rights which relate to the protection of their personal data. Such an interpretation would 
disregard the objective set out in Article 169.1. TFEU of promoting the right of consumers 
to organize themselves in order to safeguard their interests. 
41. In the light of all of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first question 
is that Article 15 of Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted as meaning that the 
activities of publishing books, lecturing, operating websites, fundraising and being as-
signed the claims of numerous consumers for the purpose of their enforcement do 
not entail the loss of a private Face account user’s status as a “consumer” within the 
meaning of that Article. 
 
John is a consumer for the purposes of the Brussels I Recast Regulation. 
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C. Conclusion 
John is a consumer. 
 
Answer 2: 
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources 
See Answer 1, A 
B. Find the correct provision 
I. General jurisdiction (Article 4 Brussels I Recast Regulation) 
In civil matters for actions against companies domiciled in a EU Member State gen-
eral jurisdiction lies in any Court of the Member State in which the defendant is 
domiciled (cf. Article 4.1 Brussels I Recast Regulation). Face is not domiciled within 
the EU, as it only has an office in Berlin (cf. Article 63.1(a)(b) Brussels I Recast Reg-
ulation), therefore Article 4 Brussels I Recast Regulation cannot apply. 
 
Article 63.1(a)(b) Brussels I Recast Regulation  
1. For the purposes of this Regulation, a company or other legal person or association of 
natural or legal persons is domiciled at the place where it has its 
(a) statutory seat; 
(b) central administration. 
 
Article 4 Brussels I Recast Regulation cannot apply. 
 
 
II. General jurisdiction (lex fori) 
According to Article 6.1 Brussels I Recast Regulation, in order to determine 
whether a Court (in our case: the Court of Rome, Italy) has general jurisdiction over 
a defendant not domiciled in a Member State, the lex fori applies. 
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Article 6.1 Brussels I Recast Regulation 
1. If the defendant is not domiciled in a Member State, the jurisdiction of the Courts of 
each Member State shall […] be determined by the law of that Member State. 
 
Pursuant to Article 3.1 of Italian Private International Law Act (Law 31 May 
1995, No. 218) Italian Courts have no jurisdiction over a defendant not 
domiciled or resident in Italy nor having a representative in Italy enabled to appear 
before an Italian Court. 
 
Therefore, according to the Italian lex fori, Italian Courts lacks general jurisdic-
tion over Face. 
 
III. Special jurisdiction in consumer contracts 
John is a consumer domiciled in a Member State (Italy), who entered into a service 
contract with Face. Article 17 Brussels I Recast Regulation provides very protective 
rules on jurisdiction for consumers, as they are considered “weaker parties” in re-
spect of professionals. 
Such protective heads of jurisdiction are applicable even when the professional pur-
suing commercial and professional activities within the EU is not domiciled in a 
Member State. 
 
Article 17 Brussels I Recast Regulation 
1. In matters relating to a contract concluded by a person, the consumer, for a purpose 
which can be regarded as being outside his trade or profession, jurisdiction shall be de-
termined by this Section 4 [Articles 17-19], without prejudice to Article 6 and point 5 of 
Article 7, if: 
[…] 
(c) in all other cases, the contract has been concluded with a person who pursues com-
mercial or professional activities in the Member State of the consumer’s domicile or, by 
any means, directs such activities to that Member State or to several States including that 
Member State, and the contract falls within the scope of such activities. 
2. Where a consumer enters into a contract with a party who is not domiciled in a Mem-
ber State but has a branch, agency or other establishment in one of the Member States, 
that party shall, in disputes arising out of the operations of the branch, agency or estab-
lishment, be deemed to be domiciled in that Member State. 
 
Face can be considered “domiciled in Germany” for the purposes of Section 4 of 
the Brussels I Recast Regulation, as it is a professional with a branch in Germany 
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pursuing activities directed to multiple States, including the Member State in which 
the consumer is domiciled (Italy). Therefore, the provisions of Section 4 Brussels I 
Recast Regulation apply. 
In particular, according to Article 18.1 Brussels I Recast Regulation:  
 
Article 18.1 Brussels I Recast Regulation 
1. A consumer may bring proceedings against the other party to a contract either in the 
Courts of the Member State in which that party is domiciled or, regardless of the domi-
cile of the other party, in the Courts for the place where the consumer is domiciled. 
 
According to Article 18.1 Brussels I Recast Regulation the Court of Rome has 
special jurisdiction over the claim. 
 
However, in the case at hand, Face is challenging the jurisdiction of the Court 
of Rome, invoking an exclusive choice of Court agreement in favour of the 
Court of California, which would have the effect of depriving the Court of Rome 
(Italy) of its jurisdiction over the case. 
 
GOOD TO KNOW: An exclusive choice of Court agreement confers jurisdiction to the 
Court selected by the parties, at the same time depriving any other Court of the power 
to adjudicate the case on the merits. 
 
 




GOOD TO KNOW: On the formal validity of a Brussels I Recast choice of Court agreement 
regulated agreed to via click wrapping. 
CJEU, 21 May 2015, C-322/14, Jaouad El Majdoub v CarsOnTheWeb.Deutschland GmbH, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:334, held that: 
36. The purpose [of Article 25.2 Brussels I Recast Regulation] […], is to treat certain forms 
of electronic communications in the same way as written communications in order to 
simplify the conclusion of contracts by electronic means, since the information con-
cerned is also communicated if it is accessible on screen. In order for electronic commu-
nication to offer the same guarantees, in particular as regards evidence, it is sufficient 
that it is “possible” to save and print the information before the conclusion of the con-
tract. It follows that the prorogation of jurisdiction clause accepted by the professional 
who clicked on the contract’s general terms and conditions, that can be saved and 
printed prior to concluding the contract, must be considered formally valid pursuant to 
Article 25.2. 
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IV. Effectiveness of the choice of Court agreement in favor of California 
Pursuant to Article 19 Brussels I Recast Regulation, the provisions of Article 18.1 
may be departed from only by a choice of Court agreement: 
 
Article 19 Brussels I Recast Regulation 
(1) which is entered into after the dispute has arisen; 
(2) which allows the consumer to bring proceedings in Courts other than those indi-
cated in this Section [Section 4]; or 
(3) which is entered into by the consumer and the other party to the contract, both of 
whom are at the time of conclusion of the contract domiciled or habitually resident in 
the same Member State, and which confers jurisdiction on the Courts of that Member 
State, provided that such an agreement is not contrary to the law of that Member State. 
 
As none of this requirement has been fulfilled in the case hand, the choice of 
Court agreement in favour of the Court of California included in the site's terms 
of service is not effective and, therefore, it not deprives the Court of Rome of 
its jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Article 18.1 Brussels I Recast Regulation. 
 
C. Conclusion 
The Court of Rome (Italy) has special jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim 










Now assume that, in the case described above, John is suing Face for a total sum of € 300,000 in 
damages on the basis of both his own rights and similar rights which other four Face users (all of 
which consumers) have assigned to him for the purposes of his action against Face.  
The four Face users are domiciled in Italy (Rome), Germany, Argentina and Venezuela. 
Can John sue Face in Rome for a total sum of € 300,000 in damages? 
Answer:  
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources 
See Case 1, Scenario I, A 
B. Find the correct provision 
I. General jurisdiction 
Cf. Case 1, Scenario I, B.I and II. 
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II. Special jurisdiction for consumer contract disputes  
John, domiciled in Rome, has brought proceedings in Rome according to Article 
18.1 Brussels I Recast Regulation for the purpose of asserting his own claims and 
also claims assigned to him by other consumers, one of them domiciled in Italy 
(Rome), another domiciled in a Member State (Germany) and the last two domi-
ciled in non-Member countries (Argentina, Venezuela). 
In this respect the CJEU, 25 January 2018, C-498/16, Maximilian Schrems v Face-
book Ireland Limited, ECLI:EU:C:2018:37 (concerning Articles 15-17 Brussels I Regu-
lation) stated that Article 16.1 Regulation No 44/2001 [which corresponds to Article 
18.1 Brussels I Recast Regulation ] must be interpreted as meaning that:  
– it applies to a proceedings brought by a consumer for the purpose of asserting, in 
the Courts of the place where he is domiciled, his own claims, but 
– it does not apply to proceedings brought for the purposes of asserting claims 
assigned by other consumers domiciled in the same Member State, in other Mem-
ber States or in non-member countries. 
 
CJEU, 25 January 2018, C-498/16, Maximilian Schrems v Facebook Ireland Limited, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:37 
43. […] that rules on jurisdiction laid down in Section 4 of Chapter II of Regulation No 
44/2001 constitute a derogation both from the general rule of jurisdiction laid down in 
Article 2 of that Regulation [Article 4 Brussels I Recast Regulation], which confers juris-
diction upon the Courts of the Member State in which the defendant is domiciled, and 
from the rule of special jurisdiction for contracts set out in Article 5.1 [Article 7.1 Brussels 
I Recast Regulation]. Thus, those rules must necessarily be interpreted strictly. 
44. [As a matter of fact the rules established in Article 17 et seq. of the Brussels I Recast 
Regulation are] […] inspired by the concern to protect the consumer as the party deemed 
to be economically weaker and less experienced in legal matters than the other party to 
the contract, the consumer is protected only in so far as he is, in his personal capacity, 
the plaintiff or defendant in proceedings. Consequently, an applicant who is not himself 
a party to the consumer contract in question cannot enjoy the benefit of the jurisdic-
tion relating to consumer contracts. 
 
The Court of Rome can only adjudicate John’s own claims on the merits pursu-
ant to Article 18.1 Brussel I Recast Regulation. 
 
Conversely, as Article 18.1 Brussels I Recast Regulation does not apply to pro-
ceedings brought by a consumer in the Court of the place where he is domiciled 
for the purpose of asserting claims assigned by other consumers domiciled in 
the same or different States not “personally participating” in the proceedings, the 
Court of Rome lacks special jurisdiction over Face to adjudicate on the merits the 
four claims assigned to John. 
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More precisely, as the case of a claim assigned by a consumer to another con-
sumer in respect of a professional having its domicile in a third State (but with 
a branch, agency or other establishment in one of the Member States) falls 
outside the scopes of Article 18.1 (special jurisdiction), Italian Courts do not have 
special jurisdiction to adjudicate on the merits the four claims assigned to John. 
III. Lex fori (general and special heads of jurisdiction) 
The case at hand also falls outside the scope of the Italian general jurisdiction 
rules (cf. Variation Case I, Scenario 2, B.II). 
 
Nevertheless, is not clear whether John, pursuant to the Italian lex fori, 
can benefit from a special head of jurisdiction over Face, at least with re-
spect to the claim assigned to John – the formal party of the proceedings – by the 
consumer domiciled in Rome. 
 
The doubt arises from the fact that Article 3.2. Italian Private International Law 
Act (Law 31 May 1995, No. 218) states that: 
 
Article 3.2 Italian Private International Law Act (Law 31 May 1995, No. 218) 
Italian Courts shall further have jurisdiction according to the criteria set out in Sections 
2, 3 and 4 of Title II of the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgements 
in Civil and Commercial Matters with Protocol, signed in Brussels on 27 September 1968, 
enforced by Law No. 804 of 21 June 1971, with amendments in force for Italy, including 
when the defendant is not domiciled in the territory of a contracting State, with respect 
to any of the matters falling within the scope of application of the Convention. 
 
Article 14, Section 4, Title II, 1968 Brussels Convention 
A consumer may bring proceedings against the other party to a contract either before 
the Courts of the Contracting State in which that party is domiciled or before the Courts 
of the Contracting State in which he is himself domiciled. 
 
Article 3.2 Italian Private International Law Act refers to the special head of 
jurisdiction for consumer contract disputes listed in Article 14 Brussels Conven-
tion (= forum actoris) extending its territorial scope of application to profes-
sionals domiciled outside the European Union. As a result, a consumer can bring 
proceedings in the forum actoris even when the defendant is not domiciled in a 
Member State.  
Due to lack of case-law, it is not clear whether the reference made to the 1968 
Brussels Convention by the Italian Private International Law shall be interpreted in 
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accordance with CJEU, 25 January 2018, C-498/16, Maximilian Schrems v Facebook 
Ireland Limited, ECLI:EU:C:2018:37 (even though referred to Article 18.1 Brussels I 
Recast Regulation), in the sense that John can benefit from the forum actoris only 
in respect of the claims directly related to his Face account. 
However, as clarified in CJEU, 18 October 1990, C-297/88 and C-197/89, Massam 
Dzodzi v Belgian State, ECLI:EU:C:1990:360, para 37, where EU law is made applica-
ble by national provisions: 
 
CJEU, 18 October 1990, C-297/88 and C-197/89, Massam Dzodzi v Belgian State, 
ECLI:EU:C:1990:360 
37. […] is manifestly in the interest of the Community legal order that, in order to fore-
stall future differences of interpretation, every Community provision should be given a 
uniform interpretation irrespective of the circumstances in which it is to be applied. 
 
In the light of CJEU, 18 October 1990, C-297/88 and C-197/89, Massam Dzodzi v 
Belgian State, ECLI:EU:C:1990:360, any attempt to interpret the reference to Arti-
cle 14 Brussels Convention so to allow John to enjoy the benefit of the jurisdiction 
relating to consumers respect to the claim assigned to him by the consumer domi-
ciled in Rome, seems to have a high risk to fail. 
C. Conclusion 
As the chart below illustrates, the Court of Rome (Italy) can probably ad-
judicate only John’s own claims, for a total sum in damages, which will be 
far below the requested € 300,000. 
 
 
Italy: International jurisdiction  
to adjudicate the dispute according  
to Article 18.1 Brussels I Recast Regulation 
(special jurisdiction) or Article 4 Brussels I 
Recast Regulation (general jurisdiction) 
John’s own claims ✓ 
Claims assigned by the consumer domiciled 
in Italy (Rome) and Germany 
 
Claims assigned by the consumers domiciled 
in Argentina and Venezuela 
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
Provisional and Protective Measures 
Scenario I 
The French company Société de Construction Métallique de la Lorraine (hereinafter: S.C.M.L.) sup-
plies metal pipes to a French construction company, La Maison.  
Faced with the non-payment of the latest supplies, S.C.M.L. decides to sue the construction company 
before the Tribunal de Grande Instance of Dijon (France), where the defendant has its registered of-
fice and where the payments should have been made.  
Given the evidence that the assets of the defendant in France are very small, S.C.M.L. decides to en-
visage a provisional seizure of the credit that La Maison has against a Spanish company, Fomento de 
Construcciones y Contratas, for the realization of the cover in a building of Madrid (Spain), a credit 
that amounts to the sum of 420,000 euros. 
1. Can the application to seize the credit be submitted to a Spanish Court, even though 
the procedure on the merits is already pending in Dijon?  
2. Could the application be filed prior to the opening of the main proceedings before a 
French Court? 
Answer 1: 
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources 
Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
12 December 2012, on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judge-
 
 
 Fernando Gascón-Inchausti (University Complutense of Madrid). 
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ments in civil and commercial matters (hereinafter: the “Brussels I Recast Regula-
tion”) is the relevant instrument to determine when Courts have jurisdiction to 
grant provisional, including protective measures, and also to rule the relationship 
between proceedings pending in different Member States. 
Material scope of application: the Brussels I Recast Regulation applies “in civil and 
commercial matters whatever” (Article 1), including claims for payment of mone-
tary sums. 
Territorial scope of application: the Brussels I Recast Regulation applies between 
all Member States of the European Union including Spain and France. 
Temporal scope of application: the Brussels I Recast Regulation applies to legal 
proceedings instituted on or after 10 January 2015 (Article 66.1). 
 
 
FOR FURTHER READING on the Brussels I recast Regulation:  
https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_brussels_i_regulation_recast-350-en.do 
B. Find the correct provision 
I. Jurisdiction to grant provisional and protective measures  
Any Court having jurisdiction to hear a case on the merits is also empowered to 
grant interim relief by means of provisional and protective measures as established 
in its national procedural law. Sometimes, however, provisional and/or protective 
measures need to be effective in a different Member State, e.g. the assets to be 
seized are located in a different Member State to that where the case is being dealt 
with. In such situation, Article 35 Brussels I Recast Regulation applies. 
 
Article 35 Brussels I Recast Regulation 
Application may be made to the Courts of a Member State for such provisional, including 
protective, measures as may be available under the law of that Member State, even if the 
Courts of another Member State have jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter. 
 
Article 35 Brussels I Recast Regulation allows to separate the proceedings to 
grant interim relief and the proceedings on the merits, if this is considered 
convenient by the claimant.  
In the case at hand, the Spanish Courts do not have jurisdiction as to the substance 
of the matter, as the defendant has its registered office in France (general jurisdic-
tion: Article 4 Brussels I Recast Regulation) and the payments should have been 
made in France (special jurisdiction: Article 7.1 Brussels I Recast Regulation). How-
ever, the mere fact that the Spanish Courts do not have international jurisdiction 
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to hear the case on the merits does not bar the creditor from obtaining an interim 
relief in Spain, due to the fact that, according to the lex fori, Spanish provisional 
measures are available (as Spain is the place where Fomento de Construcciones y 
Contratas has the credit against La Maison). 
 
More precisely, in order to determine whether a Spanish provisional 
measure is available and which Spanish Court has vertical and territorial 
competence for granting such an interim relief, referral has to be done to the 
Spanish procedural rules (lex fori), and not to the Brussels I Recast Regulation. 
II. Meaning of “provisional and protective measures” under the Brussels I 
Recast Regulation 
In the Reichert case (concerning Article 24 of the 1968 Brussels Convention), the 
CJEU defined what was generally to be understood as “provisional, including pro-
tective, measures” within the scope of the Brussels I Recast Regulation. 
 
CJEU, 26 March 1992, C-261/90, Mario Reichert, Hans-Heinz Reichert and Ingeborg Kock-
ler v Dresdner Bank AG, ECLI:EU:C:1992:149 
34. The expression “provisional, including protective, measures” within the meaning of 
[Article 24 = 35] must therefore be understood as referring to measures which, in matters 
within the scope of the [Convention = Regulation], are intended to preserve a factual or 
legal situation so as to safeguard rights the recognition of which is sought elsewhere 
from the Court having jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter. 
 
In the light of CJEU, 26 March 1992, C-261/90, Mario Reichert, Hans-Heinz 
Reichert and Ingeborg Kockler v Dresdner Bank AG, ECLI:EU:C:1992:149, an ap-
plication to seize the credit is a “provisional measure” which falls within the 
scope of Article 35 Brussels I Recast Regulation. 
C. Conclusion 
According to Article 35 Brussels I Recast Regulation, the application to 
seize the credit can be submitted to a Spanish Court, even though the 
procedure on the merits is already pending in Dijon and even though 
France is the Member State having jurisdiction to adjudicate the case on the 
merits. 
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Answer 2: 
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources 
See Case 1, Scenario I, Answer 1, A 
B. Find the correct provisions 
I. The possibility of applying for provisional measures in another Member 
State before main proceedings are pending before the Court with juris-
diction as to the substance of the matter 
Article 35 Brussels I Recast Regulation deals with applications for interim relief 
sought in a Member State when proceedings on the merits have already been in-
stituted before a Court having jurisdiction to adjudicate the case located in a dif-
ferent Member State, and with applications for interim relief sought prior to the 
institution of any proceedings on the merits (ante demandam), when the lex fori 
allows it. 
In other words: Article 35 Brussels I Recast Regulation also grants the possibility of 
applying for provisional measures in another Member State before the institution 
of the main proceedings in the State having jurisdiction to adjudicate the case on 
the merits according to the Brussels I Recast Regulation, if the lex fori allows pro-
visional measures ante demandam. 
 
Spain allows provisional measures ante demandam, at least where the 
urgency of the case justifies it. However, provisional measures granted 
prior to proceedings must be followed by commencement of proceedings on 
the merits within a specific time frame (either ex lege or upon request of the de-
fendant). Those proceedings on the merit will commence before the Courts of a 
different Member State having jurisdiction on the merits according to the Brussels 
I Recast Regulation. 
C. Conclusion 
According to Spanish law, an application to seize the credit could be filed 
in Spain prior to the institution of any proceedings on the merits in 
France.  
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Scenario II 
Assume that a provisional seizure of the credit that Fomento de Construcciones y Contratas has 
against La Maison has also been requested to a French Judge.  
Would the Spanish Court grant the provisional seizure? 
Answer: 
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources 
See Case 1, Scenario I, A 
B. Find the correct provisions 
I. The risk of having two pending applications to grant the same provisional 
measure before the Courts of different Member States 
Article 35 Brussels I Recast Regulation opens the door to a “dissociation” between 
proceedings on the merit and proceedings to grant provisional measures (See Case 
1, Scenario 1, Answer 2). There is, therefore, a risk that the same provisional meas-
ure, to protect the same credit, be sought at the same time before the Court hear-
ing the case on the merits and before a Court of another Member State on the basis 
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The issue of what would be the appropriate way to proceed if a provisional 
seizure of the same credit had also been requested to a Spanish and a French 
Court, is not specifically addressed by the Brussels I Recast Regulation. The 
Regulation does not envisage any sort of direct communication between the Court 
handling the proceedings on the merits and the Court dealing with the provisional 
measures (this potential direct communication could be a solution). 
 
However, this situation of two pending applications to grant the same 
provisional measure to protect the same credit may be not suitable 
under Spanish procedural law, since it entails a clear abuse of process. It will 
be the debtor’s burden to seek application of the domestic rules on abuse of pro-
cess and procedural bad faith. 
C. Conclusion 
Despite the silence of Brussels I Recast Regulation in this respect, under 
Spanish procedural law, the possibility to dissociate main proceedings 






Assume that the French Court had already rejected the provisional seizure of the credit that Fomento 
de Construcciones y Contratas has against La Maison on the grounds that there is no periculum in 
mora or fumus boni iuris. 
Would the Spanish Court grant the provisional seizure? 
Answer: 
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources 
See Case 1, Scenario I, A 
B. Find the correct provisions 
I. The risk of using Article 35 Brussels I Recast Regulation after the Court 
hearing the case on the merits has already refused to grant the same pro-
visional measure 
The “double-door system” allowed by the Brussels I Recast Regulation (see Case 1, 
Scenario II), to seek provisional measures entails an additional risk: the temptation 
to make “a second try” on the basis of Article 35 Brussels I Recast Regulation, if the 
Court seized with the case on the merits has refused to grant a provisional measure; 
a temptation that could be fostered by the expectance of a more lenient approach 
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Member State. 
In the scenario at hand, S.C.M.L. is seeking to seize the credit that Fomento de Con-
strucciones y Contratas has against La Maison through a Spanish Court after the 
French Court had already rejected granting an equivalent provisional measure to 
protect the same credit on the grounds that there is no periculum in mora or fumus 
boni iuris. 
The problem was in the basis of the decision made by the CJEU, 6 June 2002, C-
80/00, Italian Leather SpA v WECO Polstermöbel GmbH & Co, ECLI:EU:C:2002:342. 
 
CJEU, 6 June 2002, C-80/00, Italian Leather SpA v WECO Polstermöbel GmbH & Co, 
ECLI:EU:C:2002:342 
34. [...] a foreign decision on interim measures ordering an obligor not to carry out cer-
tain acts is irreconcilable with a decision on interim measures refusing to grant such an 
order in a dispute between the same parties in the State where recognition is sought. 
 
In CJEU, 6 June 2002, C-80/00, Italian Leather SpA v WECO Polstermöbel GmbH & 
Co, ECLI:EU:C:2002:342, the party had gained in the second Member State a provi-
sional measure that had been previously rejected in the first Member State; she 
then tried to have that second decision enforced in the first Member State, which 
led to the preliminary ruling by the CJEU. The focus was put therefore not on the 
possibility for the second Court to grant a provisional measure, but rather on its 
further recognition and enforceability: the CJEU denied it, on the basis of the irrec-
oncilability of this second (favorable) decision with the first (non favorable) one. 
 
In the light of CJEU, 6 June 2002, C-80/00, Italian Leather SpA v WECO Pol-
stermöbel GmbH & Co, ECLI:EU:C:2002:342, the party against which the meas-
ure is sought before the Spanish Court could adduce the previous denial of the 
measure in France as a ground to sustain her opposition to the motion: direct recog-
nition of the French negative decision to grant the interim relief should be binding 
on the Spanish Court, provided that the factual situation has not changed, and 
should impede the Spanish Court to grant the requested provisional relief. 
C. Conclusion 
The party against which the measure is sought in Spain (Fomento de Con-
strucciones y Contratas) could adduce that the request should not be 
granted, as French negative decision is recognizable and binding for the 
Spanish Court, provided that the factual situation has not changed. 
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
The Spanish company Transportodo entered into a contract with the French company Produits 
Deluxe, under which Transportodo committed to transport from the factories of Produits Deluxe, in 
France, a certain volume of merchandise to its distribution points in Spain. The contract included a 
choice of Court agreement, according to which any claim arising from the contract should fall within 
the jurisdiction of the Spanish Courts (more specifically, the Commercial Court of Madrid). 
Transportodo institutes proceedings in Madrid (Spain) pursuant to the agreement, on the ground 
that Produits Deluxe had failed to pay certain invoices submitted to it by Transportodo. 
At the same time, Transportodo files a request before the Tribunal de Grande Instance of Poitiers 
(France) – the place where the defendant had its registered office ‒ in order to obtain a référé-provi-
sion, that is, an order addressed by the Court to Produits Deluxe to perform provisional payment of 
the amount due. 
1. Could a référé-provision be considered a “provisional measure” in the sense of Article 
35 Brussels I Recast Regulation?  
2. In the case of a positive answer: would the French Court be entitled to grant such an 
order? 
Answer 1:  
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources 
Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
12 December 2012, on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judge-
ments in civil and commercial matters (hereinafter: the “Brussels I Recast Regula-
tion”) is the relevant instrument to determine when Courts have jurisdiction to 





 Fernando Gascón-Inchausti (University Complutense of Madrid). 
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Material scope of application: the Brussels I Recast Regulation applies “in civil and 
commercial matters whatever” (Article 1), including claims arising from transport 
contracts and claims for payment of monetary sums. 
Territorial scope of application: the Brussels I Recast Regulation applies between 
all Member States of the European Union including Spain and France. 
Temporal scope of application: the Brussels I Recast Regulation applies to legal 
proceedings instituted on or after 10 January 2015 (Article 66.1). 
 
 
FOR FURTHER READING on the Brussels I recast Regulation:  
https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_brussels_i_regulation_recast-350-en.do 
B. Find the correct provision 
I. Injunctions to perform payment as “provisional measures” in the sense of 
Article 35 Brussels I Recast Regulation 
In the Reichert case (concerning Article 24 1968 Brussels Convention), the CJEU has 
defined what was generally to be understood as “provisional, including protective, 
measures”. 
 
CJEU, 26 March 1992, C-261/90, Mario Reichert, Hans-Heinz Reichert and Ingeborg Kock-
ler v Dresdner Bank AG, ECLI:EU:C:1992:149 
34. The expression “provisional, including protective, measures” within the meaning of 
[Article 24 = 35] must therefore be understood as referring to measures which, in matters 
within the scope of the [Convention = Regulation], are intended to preserve a factual or 
legal situation so as to safeguard rights the recognition of which is sought elsewhere 
from the Court having jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter. 
 
In the light of CJEU, 26 March 1992, C-261/90, Mario Reichert, Hans-Heinz Reichert 
and Ingeborg Kockler v Dresdner Bank AG, ECLI:EU:C:1992:149, judicial decisions as 
the French référé-provision (also the Dutch kort geding or the German Leistung-
sverfügung) could raise concerns, since they do not have a strictly preservative na-
ture. Differently, they are suitable to fully satisfy the claimant’s interest.  
Some national procedural systems, indeed, admit the possibility of granting provi-
sional relief in cases where the claimant’s right appears to exist; this provisional 
relief may lead to provisional satisfaction of a claim to pay or to perform: this is the 
case of the above mentioned French ordonnance de référé-provision (the German 
Leistungsverfügung or the Dutch kort geding, among others). If the defendant does 
not react or files a statement of opposition, the dispute will probably end there. 
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This is why it has been sometimes controversial if such proceedings can be in-
cluded within the scope of Article 35 Brussels I Recast Regulation: if so, a claimant 
could use this rule to file an application before a non-competent Court on the mer-
its and to overturn the general system to allocate jurisdiction established by the 
Regulation. As clarified by the CJEU, in the judgment of 17 November 1998, C-
391/95, Van Uden Maritime BV, trading as Van Uden Africa Line v Kommanditge-
sellschaft in Firma Deco-Line and Another, ECLI:EU:C:1998:543: 
 
CJEU, 17 November 1998, C-391/95, Van Uden Maritime BV, trading as Van Uden Africa 
Line v Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco-Line and Another, ECLI:EU:C:1998:543 
47. Interim payment of a contractual consideration does not constitute a provisional 
measure within the meaning of [Article 24 1968 Brussels Convention = Article 35 Brussels 
I Recast Regulation] unless, first, repayment to the defendant of the sum awarded is 
guaranteed if the plaintiff is unsuccessful as regards the substance of his claim and, sec-
ond, the measure sought relates only to specific assets of the defendant located or to 
be located within the confines of the territorial jurisdiction of the Court to which appli-
cation is made. 
 
 
FOR FURTHER READING on Injunctions to perform payment as “provisional 
measures” in the context of the Brussels I Recast Regulation: CJEU, 27 April 1999, 
C-99/96, Hans-Hermann Mietz v Intership Yachting Sneek BV, ECLI:EU:C:1999:202 
and CJEU 12 July 2012, C-616/10, Solvay SA v Honeywell Fluorine Products Europe 
BV and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2012:445 
 
 
FOR FURTHER READING on référé-provision (in French):  
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/id/LEGISCTA000006149709/2015-10-01/ 
 
This approach to provisional and protective measures is rather flexible, since qual-
ification as “provisional and protective measures” in the context of the Brussels I 
Recast Regulation does not depend on the content of the measures, but rather on 
two procedural issues:  
1) the debtor needs to be entitled to contest the order and have it reviewed, alt-
hough this does not mean that the creditor has the burden to establish a procedure 
on the merits within a defined deadline; and 
2) there must be a specific link between the provisional measure and the place of 
the Court seized by means of Article 35 Brussels I Recast Regulation. The interim 
order will not need to be enforced abroad (in our case: outside France) since the 
assets to materialize it have to be located within the confines of the Member State 
where the application is made. 
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Both the above-mentioned requirements are fulfilled in the case at hand. 
 
C. Conclusion 
The French référé-provision can be considered a “provisional measure” 
in the sense of Article 35 Brussels I Recast Regulation. 
 
Answer 2: 
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources 
See Case 2, Answer 1, A 
B. Find the correct provisions 
I. Jurisdiction to grant provisional and protective measures  
Article 35 Brussels I Recast Regulation endorses the possibility of applying for pro-
visional measures to the Courts of a Member State different to those having juris-
diction to hear a case on the merits. 
 
Article 35 Brussels I Recast Regulation  
Application may be made to the Courts of a Member State for such provisional, including 
protective, measures as may be available under the law of that Member State, even if 
the Courts of another Member State have jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter. 
 
Article 35 Brussels I Recast Regulation allows to split or separate the proceedings 
to grant interim relief and the proceedings on the merits (see Case 1, Scenario II). 
The mere fact that the French Courts do not have jurisdiction to hear the case on 
its merits, due to the choice of Court agreement in favor of the Spanish Court, 
should not be an obstacle to grant interim relief, upon request of the claimant, if 
what is sought is a “provisional, including protective measure”, in the sense of Ar-
ticle 35 Brussels I Recast Regulation. 
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However, in order to determine whether France has jurisdiction to grant 
provisional measures and which French Court has vertical and territorial 
competence for granting such an interim relief, French procedural law applies (lex 
fori). 
C. Conclusion 
Whether or not the French Court has jurisdiction to issue a référé-provi-
sion depends on French procedural law. 
   





The French Banque de Bretagne commences before the Commercial Court of Laval (France) a pro-
ceedings against Jean Rabelais, residing in Quimper (France), claiming payment of 2.5 million euros. 
Within the framework of this proceedings, the Court, after having heard Jean Rabelais, issues a deci-
sion authorizing the Bank to proceed with the “inscription hypothecaire judiciaire provisoire” ∆ on 
certain properties that Rabelais has in Almuñécar (Spain), to ensure the effectiveness of a potential 
favorable judgment.  
1. Is the French “inscription hypothéquaire judiciaire provisoire” enforceable in Spain?  
∆ The “inscription hypothecaire judiciaire provisoire” is a provisional measure enabling the seizure of 
real estate property and involving the registration thereof in the land registry. 
Answer: 
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources 
Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
12 December 2012, on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judge-
ments in civil and commercial matters (hereinafter: the “Brussels I Recast Regula-
tion”) is the relevant instrument to determine when Courts have jurisdiction to 
grant provisional, including protective, measures; it also establishes when decisions 
granting provisional, including protective, measures can be recognized and en-
forced in a different Member State. 
Material scope of application: the Brussels I Recast Regulation applies “in civil and 
 
 
 Fernando Gascón-Inchausti (University Complutense of Madrid). 
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commercial matters whatever” (Article 1), including claims for payment of mone-
tary sums. 
Territorial scope of application: the Brussels I Recast Regulation applies between 
all Member States of the European Union including Spain and France. 
Temporal scope of application: the Brussels I Recast Regulation applies to legal 
proceedings instituted on or after 10 January 2015 (Article 66.1). 
 
 
FOR FURTHER READING on the Brussels I recast Regulation:  
https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_brussels_i_regulation_recast-350-en.do 
B. Find the correct provision 
I. On the enforceability of judicial decisions on provisional and protective 
measures 
In general terms, any decision rendered by the Courts of a Member State is auto-
matically enforceable in any other Member State (provided that it falls within the 
scope of application of Brussels I Recast Regulation). 
Decisions on provisional measures, however, deserve a specific treatment, at least 
when they are granted in ex parte proceedings, i.e. in proceedings where only the 
applicant is heard (inaudita parte debitoris). The CJEU, in a quite old judgment given 
on 21 May 1980, C-125/79, Bernard Denilauler v SNC Couchet Frères, 
ECLI:EU:C:1980:130 (concerning the 1968 Brussels Convention), made a difference 
based on how the decision had been made by the national Court: 
 
CJEU, 21 May 1980, C-125/79, Bernard Denilauler v SNC Couchet Frères, ECLI:EU:C:1980:130 
18. Judicial decisions authorizing provisional or protective measures, which are delivered 
00without the party against which they are directed having been summoned to appear 
and which are intended to be enforced without prior service do not come within the 
system of recognition and enforcement” of the Brussels Convention (= Brussels I Recast 
Regulation). 
 
The CJEU did not want to allow the circulation of such decisions granted in ex parte 
proceedings, even though the “surprise effect” may be of the essence to ensure 
effectiveness of provisional or protective measures: there would be a high risk that 
the debtor’s legal position would be hindered. 
The Denilauer’s ruling of CJEU has been transformed into a proper rule by the Brus-
sels I Recast Regulation and was enshrined in Article 2(a). 
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Article 2(a) Brussels I Recast Regulation  
For the purposes of Chapter III, “judgment” includes provisional, including protective, 
measures ordered by a Court or Tribunal which by virtue of this Regulation has jurisdic-
tion as to the substance of the matter. It does not include a provisional, including protec-
tive, measure which is ordered by such a Court or Tribunal without the defendant being 
summoned to appear, unless the judgment containing the measure is served on the 
defendant prior to enforcement. 
 
According to Article 2(a) Brussels I Recast Regulation the French “inscription 
hypothéquaire judiciaire provisoire” shall in principle be enforced in Spain, as 
it was issued after having heard Mr. Rabelais. 
II. How to deal with recognition and enforcement of provisional measures 
that are unknown to the legal system of the requested Member State 
Cross-border enforcement of provisional measures has encountered in the past 
some difficulties stemming from the divergence of national procedural systems. It 
is not easy, for instance, to include in the Spanish property register an order which 
is not foreseen by Spanish law and might not be understood by any other inter-
ested party. This was seen on some occasions to amount into a public policy in-
fringement pursuant to Article 45(a) Brussels I Recast Regulation. 
The Court of Justice, in CJEU, 12 April 2011, C-235/09, DHL Express France SAS v 
Chronopost SA, ECLI:EU:C:2011:238 addressed this kind of situation in a case that 
dealt with the enforcement of a coercive measure imposed by the Community 
trademark Court of a Member State, which needed to be enforced in another Mem-
ber State where such a coercive measure did not exist. 
 
CJEU, 12 April 2011, C-235/09, DHL Express France SAS v Chronopost SA, ECLI:EU:C:2011:238, 
operative part 
Where the national law of one of those other Member States does not contain a coercive 
measure similar to that ordered by the Community trade mark Court, the objective pur-
sued by that measure must be attained by the competent Court of that other Member 
State by having recourse to the relevant provisions of its national law which are such as 
to ensure that the prohibition is complied with in an equivalent manner. 
 
In DHL Express France SAS v Chronopost SA, the CJEU held that there is a duty to 
reach the highest level of cooperation in order to ensure cross-border effective-
ness of judicial decisions within the European Union. Therefore, the requested 
Court shall make the effort to “translate” the foreign unknown judicial decision 
into a national one aiming at the same purpose.  
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The ruling of the CJEU in the decision of 12 April 2011, C-235/09, DHL Express France 
SAS v Chronopost SA, ECLI:EU:C:2011:238 has been transposed into Article 54.1 of 
the Brussels I Recast Regulation. 
 
Article 54.1 Brussels I Recast Regulation  
1. If a judgment contains a measure or an order which is not known in the law of the 
Member State addressed, that measure or order shall, to the extent possible, be 
adapted to a measure or an order known in the law of that Member State which has 
equivalent effects attached to it and which pursues similar aims and interests. 
Such adaptation shall not result in effects going beyond those provided for in the law of 
the Member State of origin. 
 
According to Article 54.1 Brussels I Recast Regulation, if a judgment or a provi-
sional measure has an effect which is not known in the law of the Member 
State addressed, that measure or order shall, to the extent possible, be 
adapted to a measure or an order known in the law of that Member State which 
has equivalent effects attached to it and which pursues similar aims and interests.  
 
 
The Spanish equivalent to the French “inscription hypothéquaire judiciaire 








Spanish Courts should enforce the French “inscription hypothéquaire ju-
diciaire provisoire” as an embargo preventivo. 
  




Assume that an English Court, having jurisdiction on the merits in a proceedings instituted within the 
end of December 2020, grants a freezing order (often referred to as “Mareva injunction”) which pro-
hibits Jean Rabelais from disposing of his real estate assets in Spain. 
Is the English freezing order enforceable in Spain? 
Answer: 
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources 
See Case 3, Scenario I, A 
 
Territorial scope of application: the Brussels I Recast Regulation shall apply 
between the European Union and the United Kingdom to the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments given in legal proceedings instituted before the 
end of the transitional period (31 December 2020) by virtue of the 2019 With-
drawal Agreement between the European Union and the United Kingdom on the 
terms of the United Kingdom’s orderly withdrawal from the EU. 
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B. Find the correct provisions 
In this case, Article 54.1 Brussels I Recast Regulation applies. 
 
Article 54.1 Brussels I Recast Regulation  
1. If a judgment contains a measure or an order which is not known in the law of the 
Member State addressed, that measure or order shall, to the extent possible, be 
adapted to a measure or an order known in the law of that Member State which has 
equivalent effects attached to it and which pursues similar aims and interests. 
Such adaptation shall not result in effects going beyond those provided for in the law of 
the Member State of origin. 
 
Article 54.1 Brussels I Recast Regulation would be applicable, even though the 
search of an “equivalent” measure to the English freezing order might render its 
application difficult.  
As a matter of fact, the duty to carry on an adaptation might be more tricky when 
the provisional measure belongs to the common law legal tradition: unlike the con-
tinental provisional measures protecting pecuniary interests which operate in 
rem, freezing orders (also called Mareva injunctions) operate in personam, i.e. 
they do not lead to the attachment of assets. On the contrary, they are orders ad-
dressed to defendants and preventing them from disposing of their assets. 
 
GOOD TO KNOW: English Freezing Orders are orders which stop a party from removing 
assets located in the jurisdiction or restraining them from dealing with assets located 
anywhere in the world. Uniquely they take effect from the time they are made, making 
service of the order of paramount importance. The failure to comply with the order gives 
rise to contempt of Court proceedings. 
 
However, as the spirit of the Brussels I Recast Regulation is to promote cross-border 
effectiveness of judicial decisions to the highest possible extent, probably in perso-
nam orders from the common law legal tradition should be turned into seizures 
and attachments (both in rem) when enforced in civil law Member States. 
C. Conclusion 
The English freezing order is enforceable in Spain according to the Brus-
sels I Recast Regulation. The Spanish Court, pursuant to Article 54.1 Brus-
sels I Recast Regulation, shall adapt it into a seizure and attachment.  
Section 
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Case 1. Jurisdiction in Matrimonial Matters. Scenario I 71 
 

Jurisdiction in Matrimonial Matters 
Scenario I 
Adam and Eve are married, but about to get divorced. 
Eve is an Italian national, Adam is a Swiss national. 
Both spouses are habitually resident in Italy.  
Can Eve request divorce before an Italian Court? 
Answer: 
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources 
1) Regulation (EU) No. 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the 
matters of parental responsibility (hereinafter: Brussels II bis Regulation). 
Material scope of application: the Brussels II bis Regulation applies, whatever the 
nature of the Court or Tribunal, in civil matters relating to: 
a) divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment; 
b) the attribution, exercise, delegation, restriction or termination of parental re-
sponsibility. 
Territorial scope of application: the Brussels II bis Regulation applies in all Member 
States of the European Union, except for Denmark (cf. Article 2.3). 
Temporal scope of application: the Brussels II bis Regulation applies from 1 March 
 
 
 Wolfgang Hau (University of Munich) & Dennis Solomon (University of Passau). 
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2005, with the exception of Articles 67, 68, 69 and 70, which apply from 1 August 
2004 (Article 72). 
 
 
FOR FURTHER READING on the Brussels II bis Regulation:  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32003R2201 
 
2) Regulation (EU) No. 2019/1111 of 25 June 2019 on jurisdiction, the recognition 
and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental 
responsibility, and on international child abduction (hereinafter: Brussels II ter Reg-
ulation). 
Material scope of application: the Brussels II ter Regulation applies in civil matters 
of: 
a) divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment; 
b) the attribution, exercise, delegation, restriction or termination of parental re-
sponsibility. 
Territorial scope of application: the Brussels II ter Regulation applies between all 
Member States of the European Union. 
Temporal scope of application: the Brussels II ter Regulation shall apply from 1 Au-
gust 2022, with the exception of Articles 92, 93 and 103, which shall apply from 22 
July 2019 (Article 105). 
 
 
FOR FURTHER READING on the Brussels II ter Regulation:  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELLAR%3A524570fa-
9c9a-11e9-9d01-01aa75ed71a1 
B. Find the correct provision  
Matrimonial matters between married couples, including matters of divorce, fall 
within the scope of application of the Brussels II bis Regulation (cf. Article 1.1(a)).  
The new Brussels II ter Regulation will replace the Brussels II bis Regulation, but 
only as regards legal proceedings instituted on or after 1 August 2022 (Article 100.1). 
International jurisdiction for claims and counterclaims (Article 4 Brussels II bis Reg-
ulation) in matrimonial matters is determined by Article 3.1 Brussels II bis Regula-
tion, which reads: 
 
Article 3.1 Brussels II bis Regulation – General jurisdiction 
1. In matters relating to divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment, jurisdiction 
shall lie with the Courts of the Member State 
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(a) in whose territory: 
– the spouses are habitually resident, or 
– the spouses were last habitually resident, insofar as one of them still resides there, or 
– the respondent is habitually resident, or 
– in the event of a joint application, either of the spouses is habitually resident, or 
– the applicant is habitually resident if he or she resided there for at least a year imme-
diately before the application was made, or 
– the applicant is habitually resident if he or she resided there for at least six months 
immediately before the application was made and is either a national of the Member 
State in question or, in the case of the United Kingdom and Ireland, has his or her “dom-
icile” there; 
(b) of the nationality of both spouses or, in the case of the United Kingdom and Ireland, 
of the “domicile” of both spouses. 
 
As Adam and Eve are habitually resident in Italy, Italy is the competent forum 
state according to Article 3.1(a) indent 1 Brussels II bis Regulation. As all grounds 
of jurisdiction listed in Article 3 Brussels II bis Regulation are of equal rank, jurisdic-
tion of the Italian Courts is also established by indent 3 and indent 5, which shows 
that habitual residence of either the applicant or the respondent would also be suf-
ficient in this case.  
 
Since the jurisdiction of the Italian Courts can be based on Article 3.1(a) Brus-
sels II bis Regulation, there is neither any possibility nor necessity to fall back 
upon national law in order to determine jurisdiction. The Regulation – as a 
matter of priority – overrides the national rules on jurisdiction. 
C. Conclusion 
Eve can request divorce before an Italian Court. As both spouses are ha-
bitually resident in Italy, Italy has jurisdiction over the case according to 




Watch the case on our YouTube Channel “LAWTrain self-learning” 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RSx4l8hN_4E&list=PLfBAAUqaoG0lvE-
vxYm5F-M6sRHbmwot4q&index=1 
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Scenario II 
Adam and Eve are married, but about to get divorced. 
Eve is an Italian national, Adam is a Swiss national. 
Adam and Eve have lived together in Germany.  
Eve returns to Italy where she immediately files for divorce. 
Can Eve request divorce before an Italian Court? 
Answer: 
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources 
Regulation (EU) No. 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the 
matters of parental responsibility (hereinafter: Brussels II bis Regulation). 
Material scope of application: the Brussels II bis Regulation applies, whatever the 
nature of the court or tribunal, in civil matters relating to: 
a) divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment; 
b) the attribution, exercise, delegation, restriction or termination of parental re-
sponsibility. 
Territorial scope of application: the Brussels II bis Regulation applies in all Member 
States of the European Union, except for Denmark (cf. Article 2.3). 
Temporal scope of application: the Brussels II bis Regulation applies from 1 March 
2005, with the exception of Articles 67, 68, 69 and 70, which apply from 1 August 
2004 (Article 72). 
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FOR FURTHER READING on the Brussels II bis Regulation:  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32003R2201 
B. Find the correct provision  
In this scenario, Eve has not yet acquired habitual residence in Italy. Article 3 Brus-
sels II bis Regulation does therefore not provide for jurisdiction in Italy. 
National (Italian) grounds for jurisdiction however, would provide for international 
competence of the Italian Courts as Eve is an Italian national and Italian Courts have 
jurisdiction on divorce matters when one of the spouses is an Italian citizen or the 
marriage was celebrated in Italy (Article 32 Italian Private International Law Act,  
Law 31 May 1995, No. 218). 
 
Article 32 Italian Private International Law Act (Law no 218 of 31 may 1995) – Jurisdiction 
in divorce matters 
In addition to the cases where there is Italian jurisdiction under art 3, Italian jurisdiction 
extends to cases of nullity, annulment, separation and dissolution of marriage when one 
of the spouses is an Italian citizen or the marriage was celebrated in Italy. 
 
Italian International Private Statute can nevertheless be barred if there is a precise 
forum in another Member State applying the Brussels II bis Regulation. This is es-
pecially the case when Article 6 Brussels II bis Regulation applies: 
 
Article 6 Brussels II bis Regulation – Exclusive nature of jurisdiction under Articles 3, 4 and 5 
A spouse who: 
(a) is habitually resident in the territory of a Member State; or 
(b) is a national of a Member State, or, in the case of the United Kingdom and Ireland, 
has his or her ‘domicile’ in the territory of one of the latter Member States,  
may be sued in another Member State only in accordance with Articles 3, 4 and 5. 
 
Since Adam still remains habitually resident in Germany, Article 3.1(a) indent 2 
and 3 Brussels II bis Regulation provide for jurisdiction in Germany. In conse-
quence Article 6(a) Brussels II bis Regulation has to be taken into account which 
contains a so-called jurisdictional privilege: a spouse cannot be sued in a Member 
State other than the State of his habitual residence in accordance with Article 3-5 
Brussels II bis Regulation. Consequently, Eve can only request divorce in Germany 
with the German Court having to apply the Brussels II bis Regulation. 
76 Section  2 
C. Conclusion 
Eve cannot request divorce before an Italian Court. As Eve has not yet ac-
quired habitual residence in Italy and Adam is still habitually resident in 
Germany, she can only request divorce in Germany pursuant to Articles 
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Scenario III 
Adam and Eve are married, but about to get divorced. 
Eve is an Italian national, Adam is a Swiss national. 
Having lived with Adam in Switzerland for years, Eve moves to France where she establishes a new 
habitual residence. Nevertheless, after having lived in France for more than a year, she petitions for 
divorce in Italy. 
Can Eve request divorce before an Italian Court? 
Answer: 
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources 
See Case 1, Scenario II, A 
B. Find the correct provision  
Article 3 Brussels II bis Regulation does not render the Italian Courts compe-
tent. 
 
Instead, according to Article 3.1(a) indent 5 Brussels II bis Regulation the 
French Courts have international jurisdiction on this matter because Eve is 
habitually resident in France. International jurisdiction of the Italian Courts 
again could only be based on Italian rules. 
In this case, Article 6 Brussels II bis Regulation does not prevent the Italian Courts 
from applying their national provisions, since Adam is neither habitually resident in 
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nor a national of any Member State. However, in this scenario Article 7 Brussels II 
bis Regulation comes into play: 
 
Article 7 Brussels II bis Regulation – Residual jurisdiction 
1. Where no Court of a Member State has jurisdiction pursuant to Articles 3, 4 and 5, 
jurisdiction shall be determined, in each Member State, by the laws of that State. 
 
According to this provision, the fall back on national grounds of jurisdiction is 
only permissible when no Court of another Member State is competent based 
on the Brussels II bis Regulation. The CJEU confirmed this in its judgement of  29 
November 2007, C-68/07, Kerstin Sundelind Lopez v Miguel Enrique Lopez Lizazo, 
ECLI:EU:C:2007:740. 
 
CJEU, 29 November 2007, C-68/07, Kerstin Sundelind Lopez v Miguel Enrique Lopez 
Lizazo, ECLI:EU:C:2007:740 
18. According to the clear wording of Article 7.1 Brussels II bis Regulation, it is only where 
no Court of a Member State has jurisdiction pursuant to Articles 3 to 5 Brussels II bis 
Regulation that jurisdiction is to be governed, in each Member State, by the laws of 
that State. 
[…] 
21. […], that interpretation is not affected by Article 6 Brussels II bis Regulation. 
22. Admittedly, Article 6, which provides that a respondent having his habitual residence 
in a Member State or being a national of a Member State can, in view of the exclusive 
nature of the jurisdiction set out in Articles 3 to 5 Brussels II bis Regulation, be sued in 
the Courts of another Member State only pursuant to those provisions, and consequently 
not pursuant to the rules of jurisdiction laid down by national law, does not prohibit a 
respondent who has neither his habitual residence in a Member State nor the nationality 
of a Member State from being sued before a Court of a Member State pursuant to the 
rules of jurisdiction provided for by the national law of that State. 
23. In accordance with Article 7.1 Brussels II bis Regulation, that may be the case where 
no Court of a Member State has jurisdiction pursuant to Articles 3 to 5 thereof, Article 
7.2 Brussels II bis Regulation providing, in such a situation, that, if the petitioner is a na-
tional of a Member State and is habitually resident within the territory of another Mem-
ber State, he may, like the nationals of that State, avail himself of the rules of jurisdiction 
applicable in that State against such a respondent. 
24. Such an interpretation would in effect be tantamount to ignoring the clear wording 
of Articles 7.1 and 17 Brussels II bis Regulation, the application of which does not depend, 
as is clear from paragraphs 18 to 20 of this judgment, on the position of the respondent, 
but solely on the question whether the Court of a Member State has jurisdiction pursuant 
to Articles 3 to 5 o Brussels II bis Regulation. 
25. That interpretation would, moreover, be contrary to the objective pursued by Brus-
sels II bis Regulation. As is clear from Recitals 4 and 8 in the preamble to Regulation No 
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1347/2000, whose provisions on the jurisdiction to hear questions relating to divorce are 
essentially repeated in Brussels II bis Regulation, the latter Regulation aims to lay down 
uniform conflict of law rules for divorce in order to ensure a free movement of persons 
which is as wide as possible. Consequently, Brussels II bis Regulation applies also to na-
tionals of non-Member States whose links with the territory of a Member State are suf-
ficiently close, in keeping with the grounds of jurisdiction laid down in that Regulation, 
grounds which, according to Recital 12 in the preamble to Regulation No 1347/2000, are 
based on the rule that there must be a real link between the party concerned and the 
Member State exercising jurisdiction. 
 
In consequence, according to Article 7 Brussels II bis Regulation, the Italian 
Court is not allowed to apply its national (i.e. Italian) rules on jurisdiction. 
 
C. Conclusion 
Eve cannot request divorce before an Italian Court. As Eve is habitually 
resident in France, French Courts have international jurisdiction on this 




Watch the case on our YouTube Channel “LAWTrain self-learning” 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RSx4l8hN_4E&list=PLfBAAUqaoG0lvE-
vxYm5F-M6sRHbmwot4q&index=1 
   




Adam and Eve are habitually resident in Switzerland.  
Eve, an Italian national, wants to file for divorce in Italy. 
Adam is a German national. 
Can Eve request divorce before an Italian Court? 
Answer: 
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources 
Regulation (EU) No. 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the 
matters of parental responsibility (hereinafter: Brussels II bis Regulation). 
Material scope of application: the Brussels II bis Regulation applies, whatever the 
nature of the Court or Tribunal, in civil matters relating to: 
a) divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment; 
b) the attribution, exercise, delegation, restriction or termination of parental re-
sponsibility. 
Territorial scope of application: the Brussels II bis Regulation applies in all Member 
States of the European Union, except for Denmark (cf. Article 2.3). 
Temporal scope of application: the Brussels II bis Regulation applies from 1 March 
2005, with the exception of Articles 67, 68, 69 and 70, which apply from 1 August 
2004 (Article 72). 
 
 
 Wolfgang Hau (University of Munich) & Dennis Solomon (University of Passau). 
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FOR FURTHER READING on the Brussels II bis Regulation:  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32003R2201 
B. Find the correct provision  
International jurisdiction of the Italian Courts cannot be based on Article 3 
Brussels II bis Regulation, as none of the spouses is habitually resident there. 
  
The Italian Court cannot apply Italian jurisdictional law either. This follows 
from Article 6(b) Brussels II bis Regulation which protects the husband by en-
suring the application of the jurisdictional law of his home Country.  
 
This shows that, even if none of the Member States is competent under Article 
3 Brussels II bis Regulation, the Court seised can nevertheless be barred from 
applying its national rules of jurisdiction.  
 
In this scenario, Eve could sue in Switzerland, the Country of residence of both 
spouses. Alternatively, she could sue in Germany because the German rules 
allow a petition for divorce in Germany if the defendant is a German national. 
C. Conclusion 
Eve cannot request divorce before an Italian Court. Article 3 Brussels II bis 
Regulation does not confer international jurisdiction to the Italian Courts 
and Italian Courts are barred from applying its national rules on jurisdic-
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Scenario II 
Adam and Eve are habitually resident in Switzerland.  
Eve, an Italian national, wants to file for divorce in Italy. 
Adam is a Dutch national. 
Can Eve request divorce before an Italian Court? 
Answer: 
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources 
See Case 2, Scenario 1, A 
B. Find the correct provision  
Like in Scenario 1 of this case, Article 3 Brussels II bis Regulation does not pro-
vide for jurisdiction in Italy and Italian Courts are barred from a recourse to 
national rules on jurisdiction by Article 6(b) Brussels II bis Regulation.  
 
A petition for divorce in the Netherlands on the other hand could be possible 
on grounds of the Dutch rules on jurisdiction, as Adam is a Dutch national. 
However, the Dutch rules do not allow a petition for divorce in the Nether-
lands because the defendant is a Dutch national.  
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Thus, the Italian wife Eve could sue neither in Italy nor in the Netherlands but 
only in Switzerland, the Country of residence of both spouses. As a matter of 
consequence, the Brussels II bis Regulation refutes the widely held belief that 
the right to access to justice always requires guaranteeing a forum in the applicant’s 
home Country. 
C. Conclusion  
Eve cannot request divorce before an Italian Court. Article 3 Brussels II bis 
Regulation does not confer international jurisdiction to the Italian Courts 
and Italian Courts are barred from applying its national rules on jurisdic-
tion by Article 6(b) Brussels II bis Regulation. 
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Scenario III 
Adam and Eve are habitually resident in Switzerland.  
Eve, an Italian national, wants to file for divorce in Italy. 
Adam is a Swiss national. 
Can Eve request divorce before an Italian Court? 
Answer: 
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources 
See Case 2, Scenario 1, A 
B. Find the correct provision  
In this scenario, neither Article 3 nor Article 6 Brussels II bis Regulation are 
applicable.  
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C. Conclusion 
Eve can request divorce before an Italian Court by virtue of Article 32 Ital-
ian Private International Law Act, which provides for their international ju-
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
Eve is an Italian and French national. 
Adam is a French national.  
Although both are habitually resident in Italy and have not visited France for many years, Eve wants 
to file for divorce in France. 
Can Eve request divorce before a French Court? 
Answer: 
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources 
Regulation (EU) No. 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the 
matters of parental responsibility (hereinafter: Brussels II bis Regulation). 
Material scope of application: the Brussels II bis Regulation applies, whatever the 
nature of the Court or Tribunal, in civil matters relating to: 
a) divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment; 
b) the attribution, exercise, delegation, restriction or termination of parental re-
sponsibility. 
Territorial scope of application: the Brussels II bis Regulation applies in all Member 
States of the European Union, except for Denmark (cf. Article 2.3). 
Temporal scope of application: the Brussels II bis Regulation applies from 1 March 
2005, with the exception of Articles 67, 68, 69 and 70, which apply from 1 August 
2004 (Article 72). 
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FOR FURTHER READING on the Brussels II bis Regulation:  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32003R2201 
B. Find the correct provision 
Article 3.1(a) Brussels II bis Regulation does not provide for jurisdiction of the 
French Courts, as neither Eve nor Adam habitually reside there.  
 
Before considering Article 6 and 7 Brussels II bis Regulation to determine if a 
recourse to the French rules on international jurisdiction is possible, it has to 
be examined, whether the Brussels II bis Regulation allows a petition for di-
vorce in France because of the French nationality of the spouses. Even though the 
previous cases clearly show, that the central connecting factor of European family 
law is habitual residence, nationality becomes relevant as a connecting factor if 
both partners share a common nationality of a Member State. In those cases, Arti-
cle 3.1(b) Brussels II bis Regulation provides for jurisdiction of the Courts of that 
Member State. 
 
Here Adam and Eve both are French nationals.  
 
However, Eve also is an Italian national and both spouses are habitually resi-
dent in Italy and have not visited France for many years. Therefore, the ques-
tion arises, if only the nationality of the Member State with which a spouse 
with dual nationality has the closest links – the “most effective” nationality – must 
be taken into account when determining the jurisdiction based on Article 3.1(b) 
Brussels II bis Regulation, so that the Courts of that State alone have jurisdiction on 
the basis of nationality, or whether both nationalities are to be taken into account, 
so that the Courts of those two Member States can have jurisdiction on that basis, 
allowing the persons concerned to choose the Member State in which to bring pro-
ceedings.  
In this respect, CJEU, 16 July 2009, C-168/08, Laszlo Hadadi (Hadady) v Csilla 
Marta Mesko, épouse Hadadi (Hadady), ECLI:EU:C:2009:474 states: 
 
CJEU, 16 July 2009, C-168/08, Laszlo Hadadi (Hadady) v Csilla Marta Mesko, épouse 
Hadadi (Hadady), ECLI:EU:C:2009:474 
51. […] there is nothing in the wording of Article 3.1(b) Brussels II bis Regulation to 
suggest that only the “effective” nationality can be taken into account in applying that 
provision. Article 3.1(b) Brussels II bis Regulation, inasmuch as it makes nationality a 
ground of jurisdiction, endorses a link that is unambiguous and easy to apply. It does not 
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provide for any other criterion relating to nationality such as, for example, how effective 
it is. 
52. Moreover, no basis can be found in the objectives of that provision or in the context 
of which it forms part for an interpretation according to which only an “effective” nation-
ality can be taken into consideration for the purposes of Article 3.1 Brussels II bis Regu-
lation. 
53. First, such an interpretation would restrict individuals’ choice of the Court having ju-
risdiction, particularly in cases where the right to freedom of movement for persons had 
been exercised. 
54. In particular, since habitual residence would be an essential consideration for the 
purpose of determining the most effective nationality, the grounds of jurisdiction pro-
vided for in Article 3.1(a) and (b) Brussels II bis Regulation would frequently overlap. On 
the facts, that would amount to establishing, with regard to persons holding a number of 
nationalities, a hierarchy between the grounds of jurisdiction laid down in Article 3.1, for 
which there is no basis in the wording of that paragraph. By contrast, a couple holding 
only the nationality of one Member State would always be able to seize the Courts of 
that State, even if they had not had their habitual residence in that Member State for 
many years and even if they had few real links with that State. 
55. Secondly, in the light of the imprecise nature of the concept of “effective national-
ity” a whole set of factors would have to be taken into consideration, not always leading 
to a clear result. The need to check the links between the spouses and their respective 
nationalities would make verification of jurisdiction more onerous and thus be at odds 
with the objective of facilitating the application of Brussels II bis Regulation by the use of 
a simple and unambiguous connecting factor. 
56. It is true that, pursuant to Article 3.1(b) of Brussels II bis Regulation, the Courts of a 
number of Member States can have jurisdiction where the individuals in question hold 
several nationalities. However, as the Commission and the French, Hungarian and Slovak 
Governments pointed out, were the Courts of several Member States to be seised pur-
suant to that provision, the conflict of jurisdiction could be resolved by applying the rule 
laid down in Article 19.1 of that Regulation. 
57. Finally, it should be acknowledged that Brussels II bis Regulation, in so far as it reg-
ulates only jurisdiction but does not lay down conflict rules determining the substan-
tive law to be applied, might indeed […] induce spouses to rush into seizing one of the 
Courts having jurisdiction in order to secure the advantages of the substantive divorce 
law applicable under the private international law rules used by the court seised. How-
ever […], such a fact cannot, by itself, mean that the seizing of a Court having jurisdic-
tion under Article 3.1(b) of that Regulation may be regarded as an abuse. […].  
 
The French Courts have international jurisdiction in this case based on Article 
3.1(b) Brussels II bis Regulation because both spouses are French nationals. 
Their jurisdiction especially is not barred by the fact that Eve also holds the – 
in absence of any other link to France – “more effective” Italian nationality.  
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C. Conclusion 
French Courts have international jurisdiction by virtue of Article 3.1(b) 














Adam and Eve are Italian nationals. 
During their marriage, both have been habitually resident in Germany. 
After their separation, Adam becomes habitually resident in Italy and files for divorce before a com-
petent Italian Court. 
Eve becomes habitually resident in France. 
Eve files for maintenance and equalization of the accrued gains before a French Court while the di-
vorce proceedings are still pending in Italy. 
Has the French Court jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims on equalization of the accrued 
gains and maintenance? 
Answer: 
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources 
1) Regulation (EU) No. 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the 
matters of parental responsibility (hereinafter: Brussels II bis Regulation). 
Material scope of application: the Brussels II bis Regulation applies, whatever the 
nature of the Court or Tribunal, in civil matters relating to: 
a) divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment; 
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Territorial scope of application: the Brussels II bis Regulation applies in all Member 
States of the European Union, except for Denmark (cf. Article 2.3). 
Temporal scope of application: the Brussels II bis Regulation applies from 1 March 
2005, with the exception of Articles 67, 68, 69 and 70, which apply from 1 August 
2004 (Article 72). 
 
 
FOR FURTHER READING on the Brussels II bis Regulation:  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32003R2201 
 
2) Regulation (EU) No. 2016/1103 of 24 June 2016 implementing enhanced coop-
eration in the area of jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforce-
ment of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes (hereinafter: Matri-
monial Property Regulation). 
Material Scope of application: the Matrimonial Property Regulation applies to matrimo-
nial property regimes. It shall not apply to revenue, customs or administrative matters. 
Territorial scope of application: the Matrimonial Property Regulation applies be-
tween Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Cro-
atia, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia, Fin-
land, Sweden and Cyprus. 
Temporal scope of application: the Matrimonial Property Regulation applies from 
29 January 2019, except for Articles 63 and 64, which apply from 29 April 2018, and 
Articles 65, 66 and 67, which apply from 29 July 2016.  
 
 
FOR FURTHER READING on the Matrimonial Property Regulation:  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016R1103 
 
3) Regulation (EC) No. 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, 
recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to 
maintenance obligations (hereinafter: Maintenance Regulation). 
Material scope of application: the Maintenance Regulation applies to maintenance 
obligations arising from a family relationship, parentage, marriage or affinity. 
Territorial scope of application: the Maintenance Regulation applies between all 
the Member States of the European Union, with the exception of Denmark. 
Temporal scope of application: the Maintenance Regulation applies from 18 June 2011. 
 
 
FOR FURTHER READING on the Maintenance Regulation:  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32009R0004 
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B. Find the correct provision 
I. Equalization of the accrued gains 
In proceedings concerning matrimonial property, which are initiated as of 29 Janu-
ary 2019, the international jurisdiction is determined by the Matrimonial Property 
Regulation. For cases in which a Court of a Member State is seised to decide on an 
application for divorce, Article 5 Matrimonial Property Regulation states: 
 
Article 5 Matrimonial Property Regulation – Jurisdiction in cases of divorce, legal separa-
tion or marriage annulment 
1. Without prejudice to paragraph 2, where a Court of a Member State is seised to rule 
on an application for divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment pursuant to Reg-
ulation (EC) No 2201/2003, the Courts of that State shall have jurisdiction to rule on 
matters of the matrimonial property regime arising in connection with that application. 
2. Jurisdiction in matters of matrimonial property regimes under paragraph 1 shall be 
subject to the spouses’ agreement where the Court that is seised to rule on the applica-
tion for divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment: 
(a) is the Court of a Member State in which the applicant is habitually resident and the 
applicant had resided there for at least a year immediately before the application was 
made, in accordance with the fifth indent of Article 3.1(a) of Regulation (EC) No 
2201/2003; 
(b) is the Court of a Member State of which the applicant is a national and the applicant 
is habitually resident there and had resided there for at least six months immediately 
before the application was made, in accordance with sixth indent of Article 3.1(a) of Reg-
ulation (EC) No 2201/2003; 
(c) is seised pursuant to Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 in cases of conversion 
of legal separation into divorce; or 
(d) is seised pursuant to Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 in cases of residual 
jurisdiction. 
3. If the agreement referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article is concluded before the Court 
is seised to rule on matters of matrimonial property regimes, the agreement shall comply 
with Article 7.2. 
 
Pursuant to Article 5.1 Matrimonial Property Regulation, the Italian Court seised by 
Adam to rule on his application for divorce has exclusive jurisdiction on Eve’s claim 
for equalization of the accrued gains. As required by Article 5.1 Matrimonial Prop-
erty Regulation, her claim is connected to the divorce because it also arises from 
the termination of the marriage. 
Furthermore, the Italian Court has international jurisdiction on the divorce pro-
ceedings. In cases where this jurisdiction is based on one of the Brussels II bis Reg-
ulation jurisdictional rules, according to Article 5.2 and Article 5.3 Matrimonial 
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Property Regulation, it can be extended on the matrimonial property proceedings 
only if the spouses agree on this. 
In this case however, the jurisdiction of the Italian Courts inter alia derives from 
the common Italian nationality of the spouses (Article 3.1(b) Brussels II bis Regula-
tion); this is why such an agreement is not necessary. 
The jurisdiction of the Italian Court is extended on the claim for equalization of the 
accrued gains, which – as the wording of Article 6 Matrimonial Property Regulation 
shows – bars a jurisdiction of the French Courts on other grounds. 
 
Therefore, the seised French Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate on 
equalization of the accrued gains and maintenance. 
 
II. Maintenance 
The claim for Maintenance falls in the scope of the Maintenance Regulation.  
In this case, the international jurisdiction is determined in accordance with Article 
3 Maintenance Regulation, which reads: 
 
Article 3 Maintenance Regulation – General provisions 
In matters relating to maintenance obligations in Member States, jurisdiction shall lie with: 
(a) the Court for the place where the defendant is habitually resident, or 
(b) the Court for the place where the creditor is habitually resident, or 
(c) the Court which, according to its own law, has jurisdiction to entertain proceedings 
concerning the status of a person if the matter relating to maintenance is ancillary to 
those proceedings, unless that jurisdiction is based solely on the nationality of one of 
the parties, or 
(d) the Court which, according to its own law, has jurisdiction to entertain proceedings con-
cerning parental responsibility if the matter relating to maintenance is ancillary to those pro-
ceedings, unless that jurisdiction is based solely on the nationality of one of the parties. 
 
Even though, similar to Article 5(c) Matrimonial Property Regulation renders the 
Courts having international jurisdiction on status proceedings like a divorce compe-
tent for ancillary maintenance matters, the jurisdiction of the French Courts is not 
barred by this provision.  
Different from Article 5 Matrimonial Property Regulation, jurisdiction under Article 
3(c) Maintenance Regulation is not exclusive because the creditor is free to choose 
which Court to be seized. 
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Therefore, the French Courts have international jurisdiction to decide on Eve’s 
maintenance claim by virtue of Article 3(b) Maintenance Regulation because 
she is habitually resident in France. 
C. Conclusion 
French Courts do not have international jurisdiction to adjudicate on 
equalization of the accrued gains according to Article 5.1 Matrimonial 
Property Regulation.  
French Courts have nevertheless international jurisdiction on maintenance by vir-









International jurisdiction to 
adjudicate on equalization of 
the accrued gains 
 
 





Case 5. Scenario I 95 
 
Scenario II 
Adam and Eve are Italian nationals.  
During their marriage, both have been habitually resident in Germany.  
After their separation, Adam becomes habitually resident in Italy and files for divorce be-
fore a competent Italian Court.  
Eve becomes habitually resident in France. 
Eve files for maintenance and equalization of the accrued gains before a French Court after 
the divorce proceedings before the Italian Courts have been concluded. 
Has the French Court jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims on equalization of the accrued 
gains and maintenance? 
Answer: 
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources 
See Case 4, Scenario 1, A 
B. Find the correct provision  
I. Equalization of the accrued gains 
After the conclusion of the divorce proceedings, Article 5 Matrimonial Property 
Regulation does not apply. Instead, Article 6 Matrimonial Property Regulation has 
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Article 6 Matrimonial Property Regulation – Jurisdiction in other cases 
Where no Court of a Member State has jurisdiction pursuant to Article 4 or 5 or in cases 
other than those provided for in those Articles, jurisdiction to rule on a matter of the 
spouses’ matrimonial property regime shall lie with the Courts of the Member State: 
(a) in whose territory the spouses are habitually resident at the time the Court is seised; 
or failing that; 
(b) in whose territory the spouses were last habitually resident, insofar as one of them 
still resides there at the time the Court is seised; or failing that; 
(c) in whose territory the respondent is habitually resident at the time the Court is seised; 
or failing that; 
(d) of the spouses’ common nationality at the time the Court is seised. 
 
Since the habitual residence of the creditor is not a relevant connecting factor 
under that provision, the French Courts do not have international jurisdiction 
on Eve’s claim for equalization of the accrued gains. 
II. Maintenance 
With regard to the maintenance claim, there is no difference to scenario I. 
 
The French Courts have international jurisdiction to decide on Eve’s mainte-
nance claim by virtue of Article 3(b) Maintenance Regulation because she is 
habitually resident in France. 
C. Conclusion 
French Courts do not have international jurisdiction to adjudicate on 
equalization of the accrued gains according to Article 5.1 Matrimonial 
Property Regulation.  
French Courts have nevertheless international jurisdiction on maintenance by vir-
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Adam is a German national. 
Eve an Italian national.  
Both have been habitually resident in Germany during the time of their marriage and have a common 
child, a German national, over which they exercise joint custody.  
After their separation, Adam stays resident in Germany and files for divorce before a German Court.  
Eve lawfully moves to Italy with the child, they both establish a new habitual residence there. 
Eve applies for sole custody before the Italian Court.  
Do the Italian Courts have international jurisdiction over the case? 
Answer: 
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources 
Regulation (EU) No. 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the 
matters of parental responsibility (hereinafter: Brussels II bis Regulation). 
Material scope of application: the Brussels II bis Regulation applies, whatever the 
nature of the Court or Tribunal, in civil matters relating to: 
a) divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment; 
b) the attribution, exercise, delegation, restriction or termination of parental re-
sponsibility. 
Territorial scope of application: the Brussels II bis Regulation applies in all Member 
States of the European Union, except for Denmark (cf. Article 2.3). 
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Temporal scope of application: the Brussels II bis Regulation applies from 1 March 
2005, with the exception of Articles 67, 68, 69 and 70, which apply from 1 August 
2004 (Article 72). 
 
 
FOR FURTHER READING on the Brussels II bis Regulation:  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32003R2201 
B. Find the correct provision  
In addition to matrimonial matters, the Brussels II bis Regulation also concerns cer-
tain matters of parental responsibility. In this respect, the Regulation significantly 
supersedes national law on jurisdiction: Article 1.1(b) Brussels II bis Regulation lists 
the issues covered: 
 
Article 1.1(b) Brussels II bis Regulation – Scope 
1. This Regulation shall apply, whatever the nature of the Court or Tribunal, in civil mat-
ters relating to: 
(b) the attribution, exercise, delegation, restriction or termination of parental respon-
sibility. 
 
These matters are further specified in paragraph 2 of Article 2 Brussels II bis Regu-
lation. 
 
Article 2.2 Brussels II bis Regulation – Definitions 
2. The matters referred to in paragraph 1(b) may, in particular, deal with: 
(a) rights of custody and rights of access; 
(b) guardianship, curatorship and similar institutions; 
(c) the designation and functions of any person or body having charge of the child’s per-
son or property, representing or assisting the child; 
(d) the placement of the child in a foster family or in institutional care; 
(e) measures for the protection of the child relating to the administration, conservation 
or disposal of the child’s property. 
 
Custody proceedings therefore fall in the scope of application of the Regulation. 
According to Article 8.1 Brussels II bis Regulation, the main connecting factor is 
simply the child’s habitual residence: 
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Article 8 Brussels II bis Regulation – General jurisdiction 
1. The Courts of a Member State shall have jurisdiction in matters of parental responsi-
bility over a child who is habitually resident in that Member State at the time the Court 
is seised. 
 
Pursuant to Article 8 Brussels II bis Regulation the Italian Courts have interna-
tional jurisdiction, as the child is habitually resident in Italy. 
 
C. Conclusion 
Italian Courts have international jurisdiction over the case because of the 
habitual residence of the child in their State, according to Article 8 Brus-
sels II bis Regulation. 
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Scenario II 
Adam is a German national. 
Eve an Italian national.  
Both have been habitually resident in Germany during the time of their marriage and have a common 
child, a German national, over which they exercise joint custody.  
After their separation, Adam stays resident in Germany and files for divorce before a German Court.  
Eve lawfully moves to Italy with the child, both establish a new habitual residence there. 
Eve applies for sole custody before the German Courts, Adam agrees to that.  
Does Germany have international jurisdiction to decide on the custody of the child? 
Answer: 
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources 
See Case 5, Scenario I, A 
B. Find the correct provision  
Since the child is habitually resident in Italy, Article 8.1 Brussels II bis Regulation 
does not provide for international jurisdiction of the German Courts in this scenario. 
However, Article 12.1 Brussels II bis Regulation allows the parties to agree on ancil-
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Article 12.1 Brussel II bis Regulation – Prorogation of jurisdiction 
1. The Courts of a Member State exercising jurisdiction by virtue of Article 3 on an appli-
cation for divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment shall have jurisdiction in any 
matter relating to parental responsibility connected with that application where: 
(a) at least one of the spouses has parental responsibility in relation to the child; and 
(b) the jurisdiction of the Courts has been accepted expressly or otherwise in an une-
quivocal manner by the spouses and by the holders of parental responsibility, at the time 
the Court is seised, and is in the superior interests of the child. 
 
Adam and Eve both have parental responsibility in relation to the child and 
accept the jurisdiction of the German Courts which exercise jurisdiction on 
Adam’s application for divorce by virtue of Article 3.1(a) indent 1 and 6 Brussels 
II bis Regulation. Therefore, the German Courts also have jurisdiction on the cus-
tody matter according to Article 12.1 Brussels II bis Regulation, if they hold that this 
is in the superior interests of the child. 
C. Conclusion 
Germany has international jurisdiction over the claim on the custody of 
the common child according to Article 12.1 Brussels II bis Regulation. 
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Scenario III 
Adam is a German national. 
Eve an Italian national.  
Both have been habitually resident in Germany during the time of their marriage and have a common 
child, a German national, over which they exercise joint custody. 
After their separation, Adam stays resident in Germany and files for divorce before a German Court.  
Eve lawfully moves to Italy with the child, both establish a new habitual residence there. 
Eve applies for sole custody before the German Courts after the divorce proceedings in Germany have 
been concluded, Adam agrees to that. 
Does Germany have international jurisdiction to decide on the custody of the child? 
Answer: 
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources 
See Case 5, Scenario I, A 
B. Find the correct provision  
Article 8.1 Brussels II bis Regulation does not provide for international jurisdic-
tion of the German Courts in this scenario.  
 
Also, Article 12.1 Brussels II bis Regulation does not provide for jurisdiction of 
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have been concluded and the application for sole custody therefore is not con-
nected to the matrimonial matter.  
However, Article 12.3 Brussels II bis Regulation has to be considered: 
 
Article 12.3 Brussel II bis Regulation – Prorogation of jurisdiction 
3. The Courts of a Member State shall also have jurisdiction in relation to parental re-
sponsibility in proceedings other than those referred to in paragraph 1 where: 
(a) the child has a substantial connection with that Member State, in particular by virtue 
of the fact that one of the holders of parental responsibility is habitually resident in that 
Member State or that the child is a national of that Member State; and 
(b) the jurisdiction of the Courts has been accepted expressly or otherwise in an unequiv-
ocal manner by all the parties to the proceedings at the time the Court is seised and is in 
the superior interests of the child. 
 
Article 12.3 Brussels II bis Regulation allows the parties to agree on custody juris-
diction of the Courts of a Member State in the absence of matrimonial proceedings, 
if the child has a substantial connection with that Member State. According to Ar-
ticle 12.3(a) Brussels II bis Regulation, such a connection can especially be assumed, 
if one of the holders of parental responsibility is habitually resident in that Member 
State or the child is a national of that Member State.  
 
As Adam is habitually resident in Germany and the child is a German national, 
in this scenario the German Courts have international jurisdiction by virtue of 
Article 12.3 Brussels II bis Regulation, if this is in the superior interests of the 
child (cf. lit. b). 
C. Conclusion 
German Courts have international jurisdiction to decide on the custody 
of the child by virtue of Article 12.3 Brussels II bis Regulation, if this is in 
the superior interests of the child. 
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Scenario IV 
Adam is a German national. 
Eve an Italian national.  
Both have been habitually resident in Germany during the time of their marriage and have a common 
child, a German national, over which they exercise joint custody.  
After their separation, Adam stays resident in Germany and files for divorce before a German Court.  
Eve lawfully moves to Italy with the child, both establish a new habitual residence there. 
Eve applies for sole custody before the Italian Courts.  
Adam requests a transfer of the proceedings to a German Court, which he finds to be better placed 
to hear the case. 
On which grounds would the Italian Courts transfer the proceedings to a German Court? 
Answer: 
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources 
See Case 5, Scenario I, A 
B. Find the correct provision  
In this scenario, Italian Courts have international jurisdiction by virtue of Article 
8.1 Brussels II bis Regulation, as the child is habitually resident in Italy.  
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Article 15 Brussels II bis Regulation – Transfer to a Court better placed to hear the case 
1. By way of exception, the Courts of a Member State having jurisdiction as to the sub-
stance of the matter may, if they consider that a Court of another Member State, with 
which the child has a particular connection, would be better placed to hear the case, or 
a specific part thereof, and where this is in the best interests of the child: 
(a) stay the case or the part thereof in question and invite the parties to introduce a 
request before the Court of that other Member State in accordance with paragraph 4; or 
(b) request a Court of another Member State to assume jurisdiction in accordance with 
paragraph 5. 
2. Paragraph 1 shall apply: 
(a) upon application from a party; or 
(b) of the Court’s own motion; or 
(c) upon application from a Court of another Member State with which the child has a 
particular connection, in accordance with paragraph 3. 
A transfer made of the Court’s own motion or by application of a Court of another Mem-
ber State must be accepted by at least one of the parties. 
 
With due consideration of the best interests of the child, Article 15 Brussels II bis 
Regulation seeks to attain justice in each individual case, even if this happens at the 
expense of clearly defined jurisdictional rules. It might be regarded as a limited ap-
plication of the Anglo-Saxon doctrine of forum non conveniens within the European 
regime of international litigation. Therefore, despite having international jurisdic-
tion, a Court may even refrain from a decision on the substance of the matter and 
request a foreign Court to assume jurisdiction instead. 
A transfer of the proceedings on the grounds of Article 15.1 Brussels II bis Regula-
tion firstly requires that the receiving Court is better placed to hear the case. This 
can be the case, for example, if the receiving Court is better able to take evidence 
required for dealing with the case.  
Secondly there must be a particular connection of the child to the Member State 
of the receiving Court. Article 15.3 Brussels II bis Regulation sets out factors in light 
of which such a connection shall be assumed: 
 
Article 15.3 Brussels II bis Regulation – Transfer to a Court better placed to hear the case 
3. The child shall be considered to have a particular connection to a Member State as 
mentioned in paragraph 1, if that Member State 
(a) has become the habitual residence of the child after the Court referred to in para-
graph 1 was seised; or 
(b) is the former habitual residence of the child; or 
(c) is the place of the child’s nationality; or 
(d) is the habitual residence of a holder of parental responsibility; or 
(e) is the place where property of the child is located and the case concerns measures for 
the protection of the child relating to the administration, conservation or disposal of this 
property. 
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Finally, the transfer again has to be in the best interests of the child. 
 
If the Italian Court sees these mentioned criteria to be fulfilled, it can – 
upon application from Adam or on its own motion – stay the case and invite 
the parties to introduce a request before the Court of that other Member 
State in accordance with paragraph 4 (Article 15.1(a) Brussels II bis Regulation) or 
request the German Courts to assume jurisdiction in accordance with paragraph 5 
(Article 15.1(b) Brussels II bis Regulation), which state: 
 
Article 15.4 and 15.5 Brussels II bis Regulation – Transfer to a Court better placed to hear 
the case 
4. The Court of the Member State having jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter 
shall set a time limit by which the Courts of that other Member State shall be seised in 
accordance with paragraph 1. If the Courts are not seised by that time, the Court which 
has been seised shall continue to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with Articles 8 to 14. 
5. The Courts of that other Member State may, where due to the specific circumstances 
of the case, this is in the best interests of the child, accept jurisdiction within six weeks 
of their seizure in accordance with paragraph 1(a) or 1(b). In this case, the Court first 
seised shall decline jurisdiction. Otherwise, the Court first seised shall continue to exer-
cise jurisdiction in accordance with Articles 8 to 14. 
C. Conclusion 
Italian Courts would transfer the proceedings to the German court if the 
requirements listed in Article 15.3 Brussels II bis Regulation are fulfilled. 
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
Lis Alibi Pendens in Matrimonial Matters 
Mr and Ms Dupont, French nationals, were married in Paris (France) and then moved to Brussels 
(Belgium). The couple had two children, both born in Brussels. The entire family continued to reside 
in Brussels until January 2020, when Mr Dupont returned to the former matrimonial home in Paris. 
From that moment on, Mr Dupont lived in Paris. 
On 5 September 2020, Mr Dupont lodged a request for divorce before the French Family Court of 
Paris. Ms Dupont was served with the request on 20 September 2020.  
On 30 September 2020 Ms Dupont filed a petition for divorce before the Belgian Family Court of Brussels.  
Which Court should pronounce the divorce of the spouses Dupont? 
Answer: 
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources  
1) Regulation (EU) No. 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the 
matters of parental responsibility (hereinafter: Brussels II bis Regulation). 
Material scope of application: the Brussels II bis Regulation applies, whatever the 
nature of the Court or Tribunal, in civil matters relating to: 
a) divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment; 
b) the attribution, exercise, delegation, restriction or termination of parental re-
sponsibility. 
Territorial scope of application: the Brussels II bis Regulation applies in all Member 
States of the European Union (including France and Belgium), except for Denmark 
(cf. Article 2.3). 
 
 
 Vincent Egea (University of Aix-Marseille). 
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Temporal scope of application: the Brussels II bis Regulation applies from 1 March 
2005, with the exception of Articles 67, 68, 69 and 70, which apply from 1 August 
2004 (Article 72). 
 
 
FOR FURTHER READING on the Brussels II bis Regulation:  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32003R2201 
 
2) Regulation (EU) No. 2019/1111 of 25 June 2019 on jurisdiction, the recognition 
and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental 
responsibility, and on international child abduction (hereinafter: Brussels II ter Reg-
ulation). 
Material scope of application: the Brussels II ter Regulation applies in civil matters 
of: 
a) divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment; 
b) the attribution, exercise, delegation, restriction or termination of parental re-
sponsibility. 
Territorial scope of application: the Brussels II ter Regulation applies between all 
Member States of the European Union. 
Temporal scope of application: the Brussels II ter Regulation shall apply from 1 Au-
gust 2022, with the exception of Articles 92, 93 and 103, which shall apply from 22 
July 2019 (Article 105). 
 
 
FOR FURTHER READING on the Brussels II ter Regulation:  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELLAR%3A524570fa-
9c9a-11e9-9d01-01aa75ed71a1 
B. Find the correct provision 
Matrimonial matters between married couples, including matters of divorce, fall 
within the scope of application of the Brussels II bis Regulation (cf. Article 1.1(a)).  
The new Brussels II ter Regulation will replace the Brussels II bis Regulation, but 
only as regards legal proceedings instituted on or after 1 August 2022 (Article 100.1). 
I. Jurisdiction to pronounce divorce 
As Mr and Ms Dupont are habitually resident in Belgium, Belgium has international 
jurisdiction to pronounce their divorce to Article 3.1(a) indent 2 Brussels II bis 
Regulation. 
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Article 3.1(a) Brussels II bis Regulation – General jurisdiction 
1. In matters relating to divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment, jurisdiction 
shall lie with the Courts of the Member State 
(a) in whose territory: 
– the spouses are habitually resident, or 
– the spouses were last habitually resident, insofar as one of them still resides there, or 
– the respondent is habitually resident, or 
– in the event of a joint application, either of the spouses is habitually resident, or 
– the applicant is habitually resident if he or she resided there for at least a year imme-
diately before the application was made, or 
– the applicant is habitually resident if he or she resided there for at least six months 
immediately before the application was made and is either a national of the Member 
State in question or, in the case of the United Kingdom and Ireland, has his or her “dom-
icile” there. 
 
Even France has jurisdiction to pronounce the divorce of Mr and Ms Dupont ac-
cording to Article 3.1.(a) indent 6 Brussels II bis Regulation, as Mr Dupont, the ap-
plicant, resided in France for at least six months immediately before the application 
and is a French national. 
 
Article 3.1(a) Brussels II bis Regulation – General jurisdiction 
1. In matters relating to divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment, jurisdiction 
shall lie with the Courts of the Member State 
(a) in whose territory: 
– the spouses are habitually resident, or 
– the spouses were last habitually resident, insofar as one of them still resides there, or 
– the respondent is habitually resident, or 
– in the event of a joint application, either of the spouses is habitually resident, or 
– the applicant is habitually resident if he or she resided there for at least a year imme-
diately before the application was made, or 
– the applicant is habitually resident if he or she resided there for at least six months 
immediately before the application was made and is either a national of the Member 
State in question or, in the case of the United Kingdom and Ireland, has his or her “dom-
icile” there. 
 
As all grounds of jurisdiction listed in Article 3 Brussels II bis Regulation are of 
equal rank, we are in presence of two parallel proceedings of divorce pending be-
fore two different Courts having jurisdiction over the case (lis alibi pendens).  
However, when Ms Dupont seised the Belgium Court, the French Judge had already 
been seised. 
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II. Lis alibi pendens under Article 19 Brussels II bis Regulation 
Under Article 19 Brussels II bis Regulation, a situation of lis pendens exists when the 
proceedings brought between the same parties (here: Mr and Ms Dupont) and re-
lating to petitions for divorce, are pending simultaneously before the Courts of two 
different Member States (here: Belgium and France). 
 
Article 19 Brussels II bis Regulation – Lis pendens and dependent actions 
1. Where proceedings relating to divorce […] between the same parties are brought be-
fore Courts of different Member States, the Court second seised shall of its own motion 
stay its proceedings until such time as the jurisdiction of the Court first seised is estab-
lished. 
[…] 
3. Where the jurisdiction of the Court first seised is established, the Court second seised 
shall decline jurisdiction in favour of that Court. 
In that case, the party who brought the relevant action before the Court second seised 
may bring that action before the Court first seised. 
 
The lis alibi pendens rule listed in Article 19 Brussels II bis Regulation operates on 
a rigid “prior in tempore” basis.  
The main goal of Article 19 Brussels II bis Regulation is that of avoiding the risk of 
having two (irreconcilable) judgment on the same divorce within the European 
judicial area. 
On the contrary the risk of having two irreconcilable judgments on the same divorce 
in the same Member State (here: France of Belgium) is prevented by Article 22 
Brussels II bis Regulation. 
 
Article 22 Brussels II bis Regulation – Grounds of non-recognition for judgments relating 
to divorce 
1. A judgment relating to a divorce […] shall not be recognised: 
[…] 
(c) if it is irreconcilable with a judgment given in proceedings between the same parties 
in the Member State in which recognition is sought; or 
(d) if it is irreconcilable with an earlier judgment given in another Member State or in a 
non-Member State between the same parties, provided that the earlier judgment fulfils 
the conditions necessary for its recognition in the Member State in which recognition is 
sought. 
 
In the case at hand, the Belgian Court, which is the court second seised 
(on 30 September 2020), shall of its own motion stay its proceedings 
until such time as the jurisdiction of the French Judge is established. 
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On the contrary, the French Court shall firstly establish its jurisdiction 
over the case on Article 3.1.(a) indent 6 Brussels II bis Regulation (supra 
II) and then pronounce the divorce of the spouses Dupont. 
III. Seising of a Court: determination of temporal priority 
In order to determine the moment when a Court in a Member State is 
deemed seised for the purposes of the application of the rules on lis alibi 
pendens, Article 16 Brussels II bis Regulation applies. 
 
Article 16 Brussels II bis Regulation – Grounds of non-recognition for judgments relating 
to divorce 
1. A Court shall be deemed to be seised: 
(a) at the time when the document instituting the proceedings or an equivalent docu-
ment is lodged with the Court, provided that the applicant has not subsequently failed 
to take the steps he was required to take to have service effected on the respondent; or 
(b) if the document has to be served before being lodged with the Court, at the time 
when it is received by the authority responsible for service, provided that the applicant 
has not subsequently failed to take the steps he was required to take to have the docu-
ment lodged with the Court. 
 
Article 16 Brussels II bis Regulation takes into consideration the two main modal-
ities in which the introductory phase of the proceedings can be articulated accord-
ing to the lex fori: (a) that in which the claim form is first lodged with the Court and 
then served on the defendant – and (b) that where the claim form must be served 
on the defendant first and then lodged with the Court.  
Accordingly, the CJEU, order 16 July 2015, C-507/14, P v M, ECLI:EU:C:2015 has clar-
ified that: 
 
CJEU, order 16 July 2015, C-507/14, P v M, ECLI:EU:C:2015  
43. In the light of all the foregoing, the answer to the question is that Article 16.1 Brussels 
II bis Regulation must be interpreted as a jurisdiction is seised the day of the institution 
of the proceedings or the day when an equivalent document is lodged with the Court, 
even if the procedure has been, in the meantime, stayed by the applicant himself who 
has submitted it without notification to the defendant and without knowledge by the 
defendant or any type of participation from him, provided that the claimant has not sub-
sequently failed to take the steps he was required to take to have service effected on the 
defendant. 
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In the case at hand, whichever of the two modalities applies (depending 
on French Procedural Law), the French Court, for the purpose of Article 19 




FOR FURTHER READING on divorce in French Procedural Law:  
https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_divorce-45-fr-en.do?member=1 
C. Conclusion 
The French Court is the Court which should pronounce the divorce of the 
spouses Dupont. 
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
Mr Gonzalez, a Spanish national, lived in Madrid (Spain) from 2010 until June 2018 with Ms Bernard, 
a French national. Their relationship resulted in the birth of a child, Kevin, born in 2012. The relation-
ship between Mr Gonzalez and Ms Bernard deteriorated during the spring 2018. In June 2018, Mr 
Bernard moved to Paris (France). Mr Gonzalez and Kevin continued to live in Madrid. In oral agree-
ment with the father, Kevin spent the end of year celebration holidays in France with his maternal 
family. He moved back to Madrid at the beginning of 2019. The child was supposed to spend in France 
the months of July and August, according to an oral parental agreement.  
On 15 July 2019, Ms Bernard seised the French Court to obtain a provisional measure awarding her 
exclusive custody in respect of Kevin during the summer, in order to authorise medical examinations, 
without a paternal prerogative. 
In response, Mr Gonzalez seised the Spanish Court on 30 July 2019, to obtain a judgment on the 
merits awarding him the exclusive custody of Kevin. In the Spanish proceeding, Ms Bernard objected 
that, as the same action was pending before the Court in France when the Spanish action was filed, 
the Spanish Court should stay its proceedings until the French Court has delivered its decision. 
Will the Spanish Court stay the proceedings because of the lis alibi pendens rule? 
Answer: 
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources  
1) Regulation (EU) No. 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the 
matters of parental responsibility (hereinafter: Brussels II bis Regulation). 
Material scope of application: the Brussels II bis Regulation applies, whatever the 
nature of the Court or Tribunal, in civil matters relating to: 
a) divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment; 
 
 
 Vincent Egea (University of Aix-Marseille). 
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b) the attribution, exercise, delegation, restriction or termination of parental re-
sponsibility; 
c) rights of custody. 
Territorial scope of application: the Brussels II bis Regulation applies in all Member 
States of the European Union (including France and Spain), except for Denmark 
(cf. Article 2.3). 
Temporal scope of application: the Brussels II bis Regulation applies from 1 March 
2005, with the exception of Articles 67, 68, 69 and 70, which apply from 1 August 
2004 (Article 72). 
 
 
FOR FURTHER READING on the Brussels II bis Regulation:  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32003R2201 
 
2) Regulation (EU) No. 2019/1111 of 25 June 2019 on jurisdiction, the recognition 
and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental 
responsibility, and on international child abduction (hereinafter: Brussels II ter Reg-
ulation). 
Material scope of application: the Brussels II ter Regulation applies in civil matters 
of: 
a) divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment; 
b) the attribution, exercise, delegation, restriction or termination of parental re-
sponsibility. 
Territorial scope of application: the Brussels II ter Regulation applies between all 
Member States of the European Union. 
Temporal scope of application: the Brussels II ter Regulation shall apply from 1 Au-
gust 2022, with the exception of Articles 92, 93 and 103, which shall apply from 22 
July 2019 (Article 105). 
 
 
FOR FURTHER READING on the Brussels II ter Regulation:  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELLAR%3A524570fa-
9c9a-11e9-9d01-01aa75ed71a1 
B. Find the correct provision 
Matrimonial matters between married couples, including parental responsibility 
and rights of custody over a child, fall within the scope of application of the Brussels 
II bis Regulation (cf. Article 1.1(b) and 1.2(a)).  
The new Brussels II ter Regulation will replace the Brussels II bis Regulation, but 
only as regards legal proceedings instituted on or after 1 August 2022 (Article 100.1). 
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I. French jurisdiction over the substance of the case 
As Kevin is habitually resident in Madrid (Spain), according to Article 8.1 Brussels II 
bis Regulation, the French Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate on the 
merits over the rights of custody over him. 
 
The mere summer presence of Kevin in France (i.e. for a transitional 
period), according to an oral parental agreement, is not enough to es-
tablish the French jurisdiction. 
 
Article 8.1 Brussels II bis Regulation – General jurisdiction 
1. The Courts of a Member State shall have jurisdiction in matters of parental responsi-
bility over a child who is habitually resident in that Member State at the time the Court 
is seised. 
 
On the contrary, pursuant Article 8.1 Brussels II bis Regulation, the 
Spanish Courts have general jurisdiction in matters on parental re-
sponsibility over Kevin. 
II. French jurisdiction to indicate provisional measures on parental responsi-
bility 
Article 20 Brussels II bis Regulation provides for jurisdiction to indicate provisional 
measures, explaining that, in urgent cases, a Court of a Member State can take a 
provisional measure – including on parental responsibility – even if, under this Reg-
ulation, the Court of another Member State has jurisdiction as to the substance of 
the matter. 
 
Article 20 Brussels II bis Regulation – Provisional, including protective, measures 
1. In urgent cases, the provisions of this Regulation shall not prevent the Courts of a 
Member State from taking such provisional, including protective, measures in respect of 
persons or assets in that State as may be available under the law of that Member State, 
even if, under this Regulation, the Court of another Member State has jurisdiction as 
to the substance of the matter. 
2. The measures referred to in paragraph 1 shall cease to apply when the Court of the 
Member State having jurisdiction under this Regulation as to the substance of the matter 
has taken the measures it considers appropriate. 
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However, in order to obtain a provisional measure by the Court of a Mem-
ber State not having jurisdiction over the substance of the matter, the con-
ditions established by national lex fori (for example: the urgency condition) must 
be fulfilled. In the case at hand, the conditions established by French law must be 
fulfilled. 
 
If the conditions established by French law are fulfilled, the French Court, 
even though France is not the State where Kevin is habitually resident, shall 
order provisional measures. 
III. Lis alibi pendens  
In the light of the aforementioned (II) it must be established whether the lis pen-
dens rule listed in Article 19 Brussels II bis Regulation applies when the Court first 
seised is seised only for the purpose of its granting provisional measures, whereas 
the Court second seised is asked to pronounce obtain final and substantive 
measures. 
In that respect, the CJEU, 9 November 2010, C-296/10, Bianca Purrucker v Guillermo 
Vallés Pérez, ECLI:EU:C:2010:665, held that: 
 
CJEU, 9 November 2010, C-296/10, Bianca Purrucker v Guillermo Vallés Pérez, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:665 
78. […] if it is evident from the applicant’s claims or from the factual background con-
tained in the action brought before the Court first seised that, even where the action is 
directed to obtaining provisional measures, the action has been brought before a Court 
which, prima facie, might have jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter, the Court 
second seised must stay its proceedings in accordance with Article 19.2 Brussels II bis 
Regulation until such time as the jurisdiction of the Court first seised is established. Ac-
cording to circumstances and if the conditions of Article 20 of the regulation are satisfied, 
the Court second seised may take such provisional measures as are necessary in the in-
terests of the child. 
[…] On the contrary: 
86. The provisions of Article 19.2 Brussels II bis Regulation are not applicable where a 
Court of a Member State first seised for the purpose of obtaining measures in matters 
of parental responsibility is seised only for the purpose of its granting provisional 
measures within the meaning of Article 20 Brussels II bis Regulation and where a Court 
of another Member State which has jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter 
within the meaning of the same regulation is seised second of an action directed at 
obtaining the same measures, whether on a provisional basis or as final measures.  
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In the case at hand, the French proceeding was brought by the mother only for 
the purpose of obtaining provisional measures but France does not have inter-
national jurisdiction over the substance of the case. The Spanish Court second 
seised has jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter under Article 8 Brussels II 
bis Regulation. Therefore, Article 19.2 Brussels II bis Regulation does not apply. 
C. Conclusion 
The motion to stay the Spanish proceedings on the basis of lis alibi pen-
dens will be dismissed. 
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
Hearing of the Child 
Scenario I 
Agata is a Greek citizen who lived in Greece until she was 23 years old. At that point, she went to 
Germany to pursue post-graduate studies. While she was in Germany, she met Frederic, a French co-
student. Agata and Frederic started a serious relationship and lived together.  
After two years, they got married in Greece. A year later, their first son, Alexander, was born. The next 
year Kael followed. Both boys have French and Greek nationality. Agata speaks Greek to the children 
and Frederic French; Agata and Frederic speak German to each other. In years to come, the couple 
went through difficult times.  
Agata realized that she had no serious support from Frederic at home anymore, and it then turned 
out that Alexander had an autism disorder, and he needed extra help and attention. After that, fights 
started between the couple, Agata informed Frederic that she wanted to go to Greece to consider 
what she was going to do with the rest of her life. Frederic agreed that she would go to Greece and 
take the boys with her for a period of three months. The agreement was that Frederic would come 
to Greece three months later, and then they would discuss things further. However, in the meantime, 
Frederic consulted a lawyer in France about instituting divorce proceedings there.  
At the end of the school year, Agata informed Frederic that she wanted to get divorced. After that, 
Frederic quickly instituted divorce proceedings in France.  
He requested the French Court to grant him sole custody of the children, claiming that Agata was 
paranoid and, therefore, not a trustworthy mother. He wanted to exercise this sole custody and thus 
wanted the boys to return. He also instituted return proceedings under the 1980 Hague Child Abduc-
tion Convention for the return of his sons to Germany.  
A French Court granted the divorce and permanent custody to the child’s father, asking the mother 
to return the child to father and issued a certificate in accordance with Article 42 Brussels II bis Regu-
lation. 
Agata claims that the boys had become habitually resident in Greece. Additionally, she claims that 
Frederic was psychologically abusive and that there would be a risk, particularly for the son with 
autism, to return to Germany.  
 
 
 Tjaša Ivanc (University of Maribor) & Vesna Rijavec (University of Maribor). 
Case 1. Hearing of the Child. Scenario I 119 
1) Could the event of removing the boys from Germany and placing them to live in Greece 
be considered as an international wrongful removal or retention of a child?  
2) Does the issuance of the Certificate according to art. 42 Brussels II bis Regulation guar-
antee that the child has been heard or has been given the opportunity to be heard in 
France as Member State of origin? 
Answer 1: 
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources  
1) Regulation (EU) No. 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the 
matters of parental responsibility (hereinafter: Brussels II bis Regulation). 
Material scope of application: the Brussels II bis Regulation applies, whatever the 
nature of the Court or Tribunal, in civil matters relating to: 
a) divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment; 
b) the attribution, exercise, delegation, restriction or termination of parental re-
sponsibility.  
Territorial scope of application: the Brussels II bis Regulation applies between all 
Member States of the European Union. 
Temporal scope of application: the Brussels II bis Regulation applies from 1 March 
2005, with the exception of Articles 67, 68, 69 and 70, which apply from 1 August 
2004 (Article 72). 
 
 
FOR FURTHER READING on the Brussels II bis Regulation:  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32003R2201 
 
2) Regulation (EU) No. 2019/1111 of 25 June 2019 on jurisdiction, the recognition 
and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental 
responsibility, and on international child abduction (hereinafter: Brussels II ter Reg-
ulation). 
Material scope of application: the Brussels II ter Regulation applies in civil matters 
of: 
a) divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment; 
b) the attribution, exercise, delegation, restriction or termination of parental re-
sponsibility. 
Territorial scope of application: the Brussels II ter Regulation applies between all 
Member States of the European Union. 
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Temporal scope of application: the Brussels II ter Regulation shall apply from 1 Au-
gust 2022, with the exception of Articles 92, 93 and 103, which shall apply from 22 
July 2019 (Article 105). 
 
 




3) Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 concerning the Civil Aspects of Interna-
tional Child Abduction (hereinafter: the 1980 Hague Convention). 
Material scope of application: the 1980 Hague Convention aims to: 
a) secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any 
Contracting State; and 
b) ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting 
State are effectively respected in the other Contracting States. 
Territorial scope of application: the 1980 Hague Convention applies between the 
States signatory to the Convention, including France, Greece and Germany. 




FOR FURTHER READING on the 1980 Hague Convention:  
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions 
B. Find the correct provision 
Matrimonial matters between married couples, including matters over child cus-
tody and abduction issues, fall within the scope of application of the Brussels II bis 
Regulation (cf. Article 1). The new Brussels II ter Regulation will replace the Brus-
sels II bis Regulation, but only as regards decisions given in legal proceedings in-
stituted on or after 1 August 2022 (Article 100.1). 
I. Meaning of wrongful removal or retention of children under Brussels II bis 
Regulation 
Article 11 Brussels II bis Regulation is headed “return of the child” and addresses 
cases of wrongful removal or retention of children. It establishes a specific EU pro-
cedure which complements that indicated by the 1980 Hague Convention with the 
aim of ensuring a certain procedural unification among EU Member States. 
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The distinction between the wrongful removal and wrongful retention is im-
portant in order to determine the date of unlawful abduction. 
If a child is wrongfully removed from one EU Member State to another, the starting 
point is that the 1980 Hague Convention still applies. However, the Brussels II bis 
Regulation completes the Convention (recitals 17 and 18 and Articles 11 and 60(e) 
Brussels II bis Regulation).  
 
Recital 17 and 18 Brussels II bis Regulation 
17. In cases of wrongful removal or retention of a child, the return of the child should 
be obtained without delay, and to this end the 1980 Hague Convention would continue 
to apply as complemented by the provisions of this Regulation, in particular Article 11. 
The Courts of the Member State to or in which the child has been wrongfully removed or 
retained should be able to oppose his or her return in specific, in duly justified cases. How-
ever, such a decision could be replaced by a subsequent decision by the Court of the Mem-
ber State of habitual residence of the child prior to the wrongful removal or retention. 
Should that judgment entail the return of the child, the return should take place without 
any special procedure being required for recognition and enforcement of that judgment in 
the Member State to or in which the child has been removed or retained. 
18. Where a Court has decided not to return a child on the basis of Article 13 of the 1980 
Hague Convention, it should inform the Court having jurisdiction or Central Authority in 
the Member State where the child was habitually resident prior to the wrongful removal 
or retention. Unless the Court in the latter Member State has been seized, this Court or 
the Central Authority should notify the parties. This obligation should not prevent the 
Central Authority from also notifying the relevant public authorities in accordance with 
national law. 
 
Article 11 Brussels II bis Regulation – Return of the child 
1. Where a person, institution or other body having rights of custody applies to the com-
petent authorities in a Member State to deliver a judgment on the basis of the 1980 
Hague Convention, in order to obtain the return of a child that has been wrongfully re-
moved or retained in a Member State other than the Member State where the child was 
habitually resident immediately before the wrongful removal or retention, paragraphs 2 
to 8 shall apply. 
2. When applying Articles 12 and 13 of the 1980 Hague Convention, it shall be ensured 
that the child is given the opportunity to be heard during the proceedings unless this 
appears inappropriate having regard to his or her age or degree of maturity. 
3. A Court to which an application for return of a child is made as mentioned in paragraph 
1 shall act expeditiously in proceedings on the application, using the most expeditious 
procedures available in national law. 
Without prejudice to the first subparagraph, the Court shall, except where exceptional 
circumstances make this impossible, issue its judgment no later than six weeks after the 
application is lodged. 
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The definition of an international child abduction is considered as wrongful re-
moval or retention of a child outside the Country of the child’s habitual residence, 
according to Article 3 of the 1980 Hague Convention and Article 2.11 Brussels II bis 
Regulation: 
 
Article 3 1980 Hague Convention 
The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where: 
– it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other 
body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was habitually 
resident immediately before the removal or retention; and 
– at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly 
or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention. 
The rights of custody mentioned in sub-paragraph a) above, may arise in particular by 
operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an 
agreement having legal effect under the law of that State. 
 
Article 2.11 Brussels II bis Regulation on the definition of wrongful removal or the reten-
tion of a child 
11. The term “wrongful removal or retention” shall mean a child’s removal or retention 
where: 
(a) it is in breach of rights of custody acquired by judgment or by operation of law or by 
an agreement having legal effect under the law of the Member State where the child was 
habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and 
(b) provided that, at the time of removal or retention, the rights of custody were actually 
exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or 
retention. Custody shall be considered to be exercised jointly when, pursuant to a judgment 
or by operation of law, one holder of parental responsibility cannot decide on the child’s place 
of residence without the consent of another holder of parental responsibility. 
 
The CJEU5, 5 October 2010, C-400/10, J. Mcb. v L.E., ECLI:EU:C:2010:582, noted that: 
 
CJEU, 5 October 2010, C-400/10, J. Mcb. v L.E., ECLI:EU:C:2010:582 
41 […] the concept of “rights of custody” is an autonomous concept, independent of the 
law of Member States. It follows from the need for uniform application of European Un-
ion law and from the principle of equality that the terms of a provision of that law which 
makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of deter-
mining its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and uniform inter-
pretation throughout the Union, having regard to the context of the provision and the 
objective pursued by the legislation in question.  
Accordingly, for the purposes of applying Brussels II bis Regulation, rights of custody in-
clude, in any event, the right of the person with such rights to determine the child’s place 
of residence. 
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However, as clarified by the CJEU in the aforementioned decision, pursuant to Ar-
ticle 2.11 Brussels II bis Regulation, the wrongfulness of a removal or retention is 
entirely dependent on the existence of rights of custody, conferred by the law of 
the Member State where the child was habitually resident immediately before the 
removal or retention, in breach of which the removal or retention had taken place. 
 
CJEU, 5 October 2010, C-400/10, J. Mcb. v L.E., ECLI:EU:C:2010:582 
42. An entirely separate matter is the identity of the person who has rights of custody. In 
that regard, it is apparent from Article 2.11(a) Brussels II bis Regulation that whether or 
not a child’s removal is wrongful depends on the existence of rights of custody acquired 
by judgment or by operation of law or by an agreement having legal effect under the law 
of the Member State where the child was habitually resident immediately before the 
removal or retention. 
 
Finally, CJEU, 22 December 2010, C‑491/10, Joseba Andoni Aguirre Zarraga v 
Simone Pelz, ECLI:EU:C:2010:828, held that:  
 
CJEU, 22 December 2010, C‑491/10, Joseba Andoni Aguirre Zarraga v Simone Pelz, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:828 
44. Brussels II bis Regulation starts from the assumption that the wrongful removal or 
retention of a child in breach of a Court judgment handed down in another Member State 
is seriously prejudicial to the interests of that child and it therefore lays down measures 
to enable the return of the child to the place where he or she is habitually resident as 
quickly as possible. In that regard, that Regulation set up a system whereby, in the event 
that there is a difference of opinion between the Court where the child is habitually 
resident and the Court where the child is wrongfully present, the former retains exclu-
sive jurisdiction to decide whether the child is to be returned. 
 
Briefly summarizing: the definition of “wrongful removal or retention” laid 
down in Article 2.11 Brussels II bis Regulation is clearly based on Article 3 of 
the 1980 Hague Convention. In accordance with both Articles, the term 
“wrongful removal or retention” refers to situations where the child is removed 
or retained in breach of rights of custody provided that, at the time of removal or 
retention, those rights were actually exercised, or would have been exercised, had 
removal or retention not taken place.  
According to Article 2.11(b) Brussels II bis Regulation, rights of custody may be ex-
ercised either jointly or alone. Joint custody takes place when, pursuant to a judg-
ment or by operation of law, one holder of parental responsibility cannot decide on 
the child’s place of residence without the consent of another holder of parental 
responsibility. 
It is for national law to determine the conditions under which the natural father 
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acquires rights of custody in respect of his child, within the meaning of Article 2.9 
Brussels II bis Regulation, and which may provide that his acquisition of such rights 
is dependent on his obtaining a judgment from the national Court with jurisdiction 
awarding such rights to him. 
What is important to note in order to solve our case, is that the CJEU, 5 October 
2010, C-400/10, J. McB. v L.E., ECLI:EU:C:2010:582, found that, under the Brussels 
II bis Regulation, the breach of (existing) rights of custody, conferred by the rele-
vant national law, is a prerequisite in order for a removal to be considered as 
wrongful. 
 
CJEU, 5 October 2010, C-400/10, J. McB. v L.E., ECLI:EU:C:2010:582 
44. In the light of the foregoing, Brussels II bis Regulation must be interpreted as meaning 
that whether a child’s removal is wrongful for the purposes of applying that Regulation 
is entirely dependent on the existence of rights of custody, conferred by the relevant 
national law, in breach of which that removal has taken place. 
C. Conclusion 
The case at hand is a case of wrongful retention (and not removal) of the 
children. The father agreed to a temporary residence of the sons in 
Greece, but not to a non-return of the children. 
Answer 2: 
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources  
See answer 1, A 
B. Find the correct provision 
I. The hearing of the child under Brussels II bis Regulation 
The Brussels II bis Regulation contains several provisions on the hearing of the child. 
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Recitals 19 and 20 Brussels II bis Regulation  
19. The hearing of the child plays an important role in the application of this Regulation, 
although this instrument is not intended to modify national procedures applicable. 
20. The hearing of a child in another Member State may take place under the arrangements 
laid down in Council Regulation (EC) No. 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 on cooperation between 
the Courts of the Member States in the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters. 
 
Article 11.2 Brussels II bis Regulation – Return of the child 
When applying Articles 12 and 13 1980 Hague Convention, it shall be ensured that the 
child is given the opportunity to be heard during the proceedings unless this appears 
inappropriate having regard to his or her age or degree of maturity. 
* The 1980 Hague Convention does not explicitly state that a child is to be given the op-
portunity to be heard in the return proceedings in the State where a child has been 
wrongfully retained. 
II. The hearing of the child as a ground for refusal of recognition and enforce-
ment 
Under Article 42.2 Brussels II bis Regulation the enforcement of the return order is 
conditional on the child having been given the opportunity to be heard during the 
proceedings. 
In addition, Article 23(b) Brussels II bis Regulation establishes that the failure to 
hear a child can be a reason for declining recognition of judgments on parental re-
sponsibility. 
 
Article 42.2 Brussels II bis Regulation – Return of the child 
2. The Judge of origin who delivered the judgment referred to in Article 40(1)(b) shall 
issue the certificate referred to in paragraph 1 only if: 
(a) the child was given an opportunity to be heard, unless a hearing was considered 
inappropriate having regard to his or her age or degree of maturity; 
(b) the parties were given an opportunity to be heard; and 
(c) the Court has taken into account in issuing its judgment the reasons for and evidence 
underlying the order issued pursuant to Article 13 of the 1980 Hague Convention. 
In the event that the Court or any other authority takes measures to ensure the protec-
tion of the child after its return to the State of habitual residence, the certificate shall 
contain details of such measures. 
The Judge of origin shall out of his or her own motion issue that certificate using the 
standard form in Annex IV (certificate concerning return of the child(ren)). 
The certificate shall be completed in the language of the judgment. 
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Article 23(b) Brussels II bis Regulation – Grounds of non-recognition for judgments relat-
ing to parental responsibility 
A judgment relating to parental responsibility shall not be recognised: 
(b) if it was given, except in case of urgency, without the child having been given an 
opportunity to be heard, in violation of fundamental principles of procedure of the Mem-
ber State in which recognition is sought. 
 
Article 42.2(a) Brussels II bis Regulation is to be interpreted in accordance with Ar-
ticle 24 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which does not impose an abso-
lute obligation to hear the child in every single case of abduction. 
 
Article 24 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights – The rights of the child 
1. Children shall have the right to such protection and care as is necessary for their well-
being. They may express their views freely. Such views shall be taken into consideration 
on matters which concern them in accordance with their age and maturity. 
2. In all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities or private insti-
tutions, the child’s best interests must be a primary consideration. 
3. Every child shall have the right to maintain on a regular basis a personal relationship and 
direct contact with both his or her parents, unless that is contrary to his or her interests. 
 
 
FOR FURTHER READING on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights:  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT 
 
The child, who is sufficiently capable of forming his or her own views, shall be given 
the opportunity to be heard unless a hearing is considered inappropriate having 
regard to his or her age or degree of maturity. Furthermore, where a Court decides 
to hear the child, it shall take all measures which are appropriate to the arrange-
ment of such a hearing, having regard to child’s best interests and the circum-
stances of each individual case.  
 
However, the Brussels II bis Regulation does not establish any common 
rules on the procedures regarding the hearing of the child, as indicated by 
its Recital 19.  
More precisely, the Brussels II bis Regulation does not address procedural 
issues whether judges are expected to act on their own initiative, that is 
regardless of whether parties made a reference for instance to Article 11.2 Brussels 
II bis Regulation in their submissions; the minimum appropriate age for hearing a 
child; the methods and means available to the Court to hear the child, whether the 
Judge must personally hear the child or whether a hearing by a mandated social 
worker or other professional suffices. 
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The issue is regulated by the lex fori. The Courts of Member States of origin 
shall give the child an opportunity to be heard in legal proceedings affecting 
him or her, if the child is capable of freely forming and expressing his or her 
own views. The physical presence of the child is not required by the Brussels II bis 
Regulation. The Courts of Member States of origin shall give to child’s views the 
appropriate weight depending on his or her age and maturity and shall record in 
their judgment and in the annex Certificate their decision on the weight given to 
the views of the child. 
Since the Brussels II bis Regulation does not set common minimum standards for 
all Member States on the procedure to hear children, in many cases the best inter-
est of the child is not sufficiently considered.  
Article 42.2 Brussels II bis Regulation sets out a special procedure which seeks to 
guarantee the immediate return of the child wrongfully removed or retained, by 
excluding any appeal against the issuing of a certificate and by precluding parties 
from opposing its recognition. 
 
Article 42.2 Brussels II bis Regulation – Return of the child 
2. The Judge of origin who delivered the judgment referred to in Article 40(1)(b) shall 
issue the Certificate referred to in paragraph 1 only if: 
(a) the child was given an opportunity to be heard, unless a hearing was considered inappro-
priate having regard to his or her age or degree of maturity; 
(b) the parties were given an opportunity to be heard; and 
(c) the Court has taken into account in issuing its judgment the reasons for and evidence 
underlying the order issued pursuant to Article 13 1980 Hague Convention. 
In the event that the Court or any other authority takes measures to ensure the protec-
tion of the child after its return to the State of habitual residence, the certificate shall 
contain details of such measures. 
The Judge of origin shall out of his or her own motion issue that Certificate using the 
standard form in Annex IV (Certificate concerning return of the child(ren)). 
The Certificate shall be completed in the language of the judgment. 
 
Article 42.2 Brussels II bis Regulation lays down a number of conditions for issuing 
the certificate. Thus, the Court in the Country of origin shall issue the certificate for 
the return of the child referred to in Article 42 of the Regulation by using the stand-
ard form set out in Annex IV, provided the following conditions have been satisfied:  
– the child and the parties were given the opportunity to be heard and the Court has 
taken into account the reasons for the non-return judgment issued according to Ar-
ticle 13 of the 1980 Hague Convention and the evidence administered in the process.  
Hence, certifying the return order under Articles 11.8 and 42 of the Brussels II bis 
Regulation is conditional upon, inter alia, the child having been given the oppor-
tunity to be heard during the proceedings, unless the hearing of the child is inap-
propriate. 
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The judgment becomes enforceable at the moment of issuing the certificate for the 
return of the child. Article 42.1 Brussels II bis Regulation, paragraph 2, entitles the 
Court to declare the judgment enforceable without bringing prejudice to any appeal. 
Issuing the certificate for the return of the child has the following legal consequences 
and effects: it is no longer required to file for exequatur and it is not possible to op-
pose the enforcement of the judgment in the Member State of enforcement. 
 
Article 42.1 Brussels II bis Regulation – Return of the child 
1. The return of a child referred to in Article 40(1)(b) entailed by an enforceable judgment 
given in a Member State shall be recognised and enforceable in another Member State 
without the need for a declaration of enforceability and without any possibility of oppos-
ing its recognition if the judgment has been certified in the Member State of origin in 
accordance with paragraph 2. 
Even if national law does not provide for enforceability by operation of law, notwith-
standing any appeal, of a judgment requiring the return of the child mentioned in Article 
11(b)(8), the Court of origin may declare the judgment enforceable. 
 
Return orders issued in the Member State of the child’s habitual residence imme-
diately before his/her wrongful removal or retention on the basis of Article 11.8 
Brussels II bis Regulation are directly enforceable under the enforcement scheme 
of Section 4. 
Thus, there is no need to obtain a declaration of enforceability for return orders 
which are certified according to Article 42.2 Brussels II bis Regulation in a Member 
State of origin.  
Because of these cases, Member States do not trust the domestic procedures of 
other Countries and the question arises whether a failure to hear a child may be 
invoked as a reason for declining recognition and enforcement of judgments.  
 
The CJEU, in the decision of 11 July 2008, C-195/08, Inga Rinau, 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:406, has provided some clarifications as to the interpretation 
of Articles 42.2 Brussels II bis Regulation.  
 
CJEU, 11 July 2008, C-195/08, Inga Rinau, ECLI:EU:C:2008:406 
68. As regards the effects of certification, once the certificate has been issued, the judg-
ment requiring the return of a child referred to in Article 40.1(b) is to be recognised and 
enforceable in another Member State without the need for a declaration of enforceabil-
ity and without any possibility of opposing its recognition. 
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C. Conclusion 
The issuance of the Certificate using the standard form in Annex IV (cer-
tificate concerning return of the children) according to Article 42 Brussels 
II bis Regulation does not guarantee the Member State of enforcement 
that the child has been heard or has been given the opportunity to be heard. 
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Scenario II 
Now assume that the French Court granted a divorce with permanent custody to the father and 
asked the mother to return the child to the father. The Court issued a certificate in accordance with 
Article 42 Brussels II bis Regulation. In that time the boys where nine and a-half years old and 11 
years and mature, so the mother was of the opinion that their views should be taken into account 
and be heard. 
1) May the Court in Greece decide the non-return of the children? Under what circum-
stances? 
2) If Agata considers that the French Court has issued a Certificate in violation of Article 
42.2(a) before which Court should she bring legal proceedings? 
Answer 1: 
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources  
1) Regulation (EU) No. 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the 
matters of parental responsibility (hereinafter: Brussels II bis Regulation). 
Material scope of application: the Brussels II bis Regulation applies, whatever the 
nature of the Court or Tribunal, in civil matters relating to: 
a) divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment; 
b) the attribution, exercise, delegation, restriction or termination of parental re-
sponsibility.  
Territorial scope of application: the Brussels II bis Regulation applies between all 
Member States of the European Union. 
Temporal scope of application: the Brussels II bis Regulation applies from 1 March 
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2005, with the exception of Articles 67, 68, 69 and 70, which apply from 1 August 
2004 (Article 72). 
 
 
FOR FURTHER READING on the Brussels II bis Regulation:  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri= CELEX%3A32003R2201 
 
2) Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 concerning the Civil Aspects of Interna-
tional Child Abduction (hereinafter: the 1980 Hague Convention). 
Material scope of application: the 1980 Hague Convention aims to: 
a) secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any 
Contracting State; and 
b) ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting 
State are effectively respected in the other Contracting States. 
Territorial scope of application: the 1980 Hague Convention applies between the 
States signatory to the Convention, including France, Greece and Germany. 




FOR FURTHER READING on the 1980 Hague Convention:  
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions 
B. Find the correct provision 
The 1980 Hague Convention establishes procedures to secure the urgent return of 
children to the State of their habitual residence in cases of abduction, establishing 
only limited exceptions allowing children’s non-return, namely:  
1) the person, institution or other body having the care of the person of the child 
was not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention, 
or had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention (Article 
13.1(a));  
2) a grave risk that return will expose the child to harm or place him or her in an 
intolerable situation (Article 13.1(b));  
3) the objection by a mature child (Article 13.2); and  
4) the violation of fundamental human rights (Article 20).  
The child becoming settled due to the passing of time may play a relevant role in 
this respect according to the Article 12.2 of the 1980 Hague Convention: but only 
if more than one year has elapsed between the abduction and the date when 
the return application was filed with the Court competent to decide upon it. 
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Article 12.2 1980 Hague Convention 
2. The judicial or administrative authority, even where the proceedings have been com-
menced after the expiration of the period of one year referred to in the preceding para-
graph, shall also order the return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is 
now settled in its new environment. 
 
Article 13 1980 Hague Convention  
Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or administrative 
authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if the per-
son, institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that: 
(a) the person, institution or other body having the care of the person of the child was 
not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or had con-
sented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention; or 
(b) there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psycho-
logical harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation. 
The judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order the return of the child if 
it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of 
maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views. 
In considering the circumstances referred to in this Article, the judicial and administrative 
authorities shall take into account the information relating to the social background of 
the child provided by the Central Authority or other competent authority of the child’s 
habitual residence. 
 
In the presence of any of those exceptions the Court of the State to which the child 
was abducted and is currently located has discretion as to whether to return him or 
her to the Member State of his or her habitual residence. The exceptions therefore 
do not apply automatically and do not impose on the Judge a duty to refuse to return 
the child, but give him or her discretion to decide. In addition, the Court must inter-
pret these exceptions strictly, due to the strong presumption favouring the return of 
the wrongfully removed or retained child under the 1980 Hague Convention. 
 
Article 11.2 Brussels II bis Regulation – Return of the Child 
2. When applying Articles 12 and 13 of the 1980 Hague Convention, it shall be ensured 
that the child is given the opportunity to be heard during the proceedings unless this 
appears inappropriate having regard to his or her age or degree of maturity. 
 
The Brussels II bis Regulation explicitly states that a child is to be given an oppor-
tunity to be heard in return proceedings in the Member State where a child has 
been wrongfully removed or retained. This provision may be seen as having a prec-
edent in Article 13.2 of the 1980 Hague Convention, according to which the judicial 
or administrative authority may also refuse to order the return of the child if it finds 
Case 1. Scenario II 133 
that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of ma-
turity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views. 
In the light of the foregoing, it is clear that non-return decision is in the discretion of 
the Court in the Member State to which the children were abducted, i.e. the Court in 
Greece. The Court in Greece may decide not to return the children to the Germany 
only in exceptional cases and pursuant to Article 13 of the 1980 Hague Convention. 
C. Conclusion 
The Court in Greece may decide not to return the children to the Germany 
only in exceptional cases and pursuant to Article 13 of the 1980 Hague 
Convention. 
Answer 2: 
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources  
See answer 1, A 
B. Find the correct provision 
If one of the parties considers that the Court of the Member State of origin has 
issued a certificate in violation of Article 42.2(a) Brussels II bis Regulation, then it 
must bring legal proceedings before the Court of that Member State.  
It is therefore only for the Courts of the Member State of origin to determine 
whether the judgment certified pursuant to Article 42 Brussels II bis Regulation is 
violated by an infringement of child’s right to be heard. 
The CJEU, in the decision of 22 December 2010, C-491/10, Joseba Andoni Aguirre 
Zarraga v Simone Pelz, ECLI:EU:C:2010:828, had to decide whether the enforce-
ment of a judgment in accordance with Article 42 Brussels II bis Regulation could 
exceptionally be opposed on the ground that the Court of origin, despite stating in 
the accompany Certificate that it had fulfilled its obligation to give the child an op-
portunity to be heard, had in fact not done so. It is solely for the National Courts of 
the Member State of origin to examine the lawfulness of that judgment with refer-
ence to the requirements imposed, in particular, by Article 24 EU Charter of Funda-
mental Rights and Article 42 Brussels II bis Regulation and state that the Courts in 
the State of enforcement could not oppose the enforcement. 
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CJEU, 22 December 2010, C‑491/10, Joseba Andoni Aguirre Zarraga v Simone Pelz, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:828 
54. The first subparagraph of Article 42.2 in no way empowers the Court of the Member 
State of enforcement to review the conditions for the issue of that certificate as stated 
therein. 
55. Such a power could undermine the effectiveness of the system set up by Brussels II 
bis Regulation, as described in paragraphs 44 to 51 of this judgment. 
56. It follows that, where a Court of a Member State issues the Certificate referred to 
in Article 42, the Court of the Member State of enforcement is obliged to enforce the 
judgment which is so certified, and it has no power to oppose either the recognition or 
the enforceability of that judgment. 
 
The CJEU decision of 22 December 2010, C‑491/10, Joseba Andoni Aguirre Zar-
raga v Simone Pelz, ECLI:EU:C:2010:828 concerns the removal of a minor child 
from Spain to Germany in breach of custody rulings. The CJEU was asked 
whether the German Court (i.e. the Court of the Country the child was removed to) 
could oppose the enforcement order by the Spanish Court (the Country of origin) 
on the basis that the child had not been heard, thereby infringing Article 42.2 Brus-
sels II bis Regulation and Article 24 Eu Charter of Fundamental Rights. The child had 
opposed the return when she expressed her views within proceedings before the 
German Court. 
The CJEU reasoned that hearing a child is not an absolute right, but that if a Court 
so decides it is necessary, it must offer the child a genuine and effective opportunity 
to express his or her views. It also held that the right of the child to be heard, as 
provided in the Eu Charter of Fundamental Rights and Brussels II bis Regulation, 
requires legal procedures and conditions which enable children to express their 
views freely to be available to them, and the Court to obtain those views. The Court 
also needs to take all appropriate measures to arrange such hearings, with regard 
to children’s best interests and the circumstances of each individual case.  
According to CJEU’s ruling, however, the authorities of the Country the child had 
been removed to (Germany) could not oppose a return of the child on the basis of 
a breach of the right to be heard in the Country of origin (Spain). 
C. Conclusion 
If Agata considers that the French Court has issued a Certificate in violation 
of Article 42.2(a), Brussels II bis Regulation, she must bring legal proceed-




Jurisdiction over Child Custody 
and Abduction Issues 
Scenario I 
Maria, a Spanish citizen, and Hugo, a Polish citizen, met when both of them were students at the 
University of Warsaw. They married in Warsaw (Poland). Jorge, their son, started preschool in Poland, 
and his primary language was Polish.  
Unfortunately, Maria and Hugo divorced, with the Polish Court ordering shared custody of Jorge and 
with Jorge residing with his mother, Maria.  
As Maria left Poland with Jorge and moved to Madrid (Spain), without noticing him, Hugo instituted an 
action before the Spanish Courts in Madrid to return Jorge to Poland. Hugo fully participated in the case. 
However, the Spanish Court ruled that returning Jorge to Poland would cause him severe psychological 
injury and was not in the child’s best interest. As a result, the Spanish Court denied Hugo’s request. 
Subsequently, Hugo brought an action before the Polish Court in Warsaw, seeking a declaration that 
the Polish Court would not recognize the judgment of the Spanish Court. 
Is the Polish Court able to deny recognition of the judgment of the Spanish Court, refusing 
to return Jorge to Poland? 
Answer: 
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources  
1) Regulation (EU) No. 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the 
 
 
 Katarzyna Antolak-Szymanski (SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities). 
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matters of parental responsibility (hereinafter: Brussels II bis Regulation). 
Material scope of application: the Brussels II bis Regulation applies, whatever the 
nature of the Court or Tribunal, in civil matters relating to: 
a) divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment; 
b) the attribution, exercise, delegation, restriction or termination of parental re-
sponsibility.  
Territorial scope of application: the Brussels II bis Regulation applies between all 
Member States of the European Union including Spain and Poland. 
Temporal scope of application: the Brussels II bis Regulation applies from 1 March 
2005, with the exception of Articles 67, 68, 69 and 70, which apply from 1 August 
2004 (Article 72). 
 
 
FOR FURTHER READING on the Brussels II bis Regulation:  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri= CELEX%3A32003R2201 
 
2) Regulation (EU) No. 2019/1111 of 25 June 2019 on jurisdiction, the recognition 
and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental 
responsibility, and on international child abduction (hereinafter: Brussels II ter Reg-
ulation). 
Material scope of application: the Brussels II ter Regulation applies in civil matters 
of: 
a) divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment; 
b) the attribution, exercise, delegation, restriction or termination of parental re-
sponsibility. 
Territorial scope of application: the Brussels II ter Regulation applies between all 
Member States of the European Union. 
Temporal scope of application: the Brussels II ter Regulation shall apply from 1 Au-
gust 2022, with the exception of Articles 92, 93 and 103, which shall apply from 22 
July 2019 (Article 105). 
 
 
FOR FURTHER READING on the Brussels II ter Regulation:  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELLAR%3A524570fa-
9c9a-11e9-9d01-01aa75ed71a1 
B. Find the correct provision 
Matrimonial matters between married couples, including matters over child cus-
tody and abduction issues, fall within the scope of application of the Brussels II bis 
Regulation (cf. Article 1).  
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The new Brussels II ter Regulation will replace the Brussels II bis Regulation, but 
only as regards decisions given in legal proceedings instituted on or after 1 August 
2022 (Article 100.1). 
As a general proposition, Member States should recognize each other’s judge-
ments, pursuant to Recital 21 of the preamble to Brussels II bis Regulation. 
 
Recital 21 Brussels II bis Regulation 
The recognition and enforcement of judgments given in a Member State should be based 
on the principle of mutual trust and the grounds for non-recognition should be kept to 
the minimum required. 
 
In the area of family law and specifically child custody, Article 23(a) Brussels II bis 
Regulation creates a limited exception to this general rule. 
 
Article 23(a) Brussels II bis Regulation – Grounds of non-recognition for judgments relat-
ing to parental responsibility 
A judgment relating to parental responsibility shall not be recognized: 
(a) if such recognition is manifestly contrary to the public policy of the Member State in 
which recognition is sought taking into account the best interests of the child. 
 
The public policy exception is quite limited. In particular, it does not give a 
Member State the right to review another Member State Court’s jurisdiction 
to make a judgment, according to Article 24 Brussels II bis Regulation. 
 
Article 24 Brussels II bis Regulation – Prohibition of review of jurisdiction of the Court of 
origin 
The jurisdiction of the Court of the Member State of origin may not be reviewed. The test 
of public policy referred to in Articles 22(a) and 23(a) may not be applied to the rules re-
lating to jurisdiction set out in Articles 3 to 14. 
 
Nor can the substance of that judgment be reviewed, according to Article 26 Brus-
sels II bis Regulation. 
 
Article 26 Brussels II bis Regulation – Non-review as to substance 
Under no circumstances may a judgment be reviewed as to its substance. 
 
Moreover, while a Member State’s public policy may provide grounds for the non-
recognition of another Member State Court’s judgment as to custody, the public 
policy must be related to the best interest of the child and recognizing the judgment 
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would result in a “manifest breach” of the legal order of the State. The CJEU, 19 
November 2015, C‑455/15, P v Q, ECLI:EU:C:2015:763, states that: 
 
CJEU, 19 November 2015, C‑455/15, P v Q, ECLI:EU:C:2015:763 
39. Recourse to the public policy rule in Article 23(a) Brussels II bis Regulation should 
thus come into consideration only where, taking into account the best interests of the 
child, recognition of the judgment given in another Member State would be at variance 
to an unacceptable degree with the legal order of the State in which recognition is 
sought, in that it would infringe a fundamental principle.  
In order to comply with the prohibition laid down in Article 26 Brussels II bis Regulation 
of any review of the substance of a judgment given in another Member State, the in-
fringement would have to constitute a manifest breach, having regard to the best inter-
ests of the child, of a rule of law regarded as essential in the legal order of the State in 
which recognition is sought or of a right recognized as being fundamental within that 
legal order. 
C. Conclusion 
It is possible for the Polish Court to deny recognition of the Spanish Court’s 
judgment for Jorge to stay in Spain, so long as the requirements of Article 
23(a) Brussels II bis Regulation are met. However, here, it is unlikely that 
these strict requirements are met. According to CJEU, 19 November 2015, 
C‑455/15, P v Q, ECLI:EU:C:2015:763, in the facts presented, there is no evidence 
that a “manifest breach” of the rule of law in Poland would occur by recognizing 
the Spanish judgment.  
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Scenario II 
Assume the Spanish Court’s decision was based on the erroneous conclusion that it had jurisdic-
tion over the case pursuant to Article 15 Brussels II bis Regulation (i.e., that the case had been 
“transferred” to it within the meaning of that Article, while in fact no transfer had ever occurred).  
Could the Polish Court refuse to recognize the Spanish Court’s judgment, on the basis that it had 
incorrectly applied EU law (specifically, Article 15 Brussels II bis Regulation)? 
Answer: 
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources 
See Case 1, Scenario 1, A 
B. Find the correct provision  
Article 24 Brussels II bis Regulation prohibits a Court from reviewing the jurisdic-
tion of the Court of another Member State. However, it also acknowledges the 
public policy exception set forth in Article 23(a) Brussels II bis Regulation for non-
recognition of judgments, and states that the test of public policy referred to in Article 
23(a) may not be applied to the rules relating to jurisdiction set out in Articles 3 to 14. 
 
Article 24 Brussels II bis Regulation – Prohibition of review of jurisdiction of the Court of 
origin 
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test of public policy referred to in Articles 22(a) and 23(a) may not be applied to the rules 
relating to jurisdiction set out in Articles 3 to 14. 
 
Article 15 Brussels II bis Regulation, obviously, is not listed, and arguably this could 
mean that questions about a Court’s jurisdiction could be reviewed under the Arti-
cle 23(a) Brussels II bis Regulation process. Fortunately, the CJEU directly addressed 
this exact argument in the decision of 19 November 2015, C‑455/15, P v Q, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:763. The CJEU concluded that a Member State could not contest 
another Member State Court’s jurisdiction neither under Articles 3-14 nor Article 
15 Brussels II bis Regulation, explaining that:  
 
CJEU, 19 November 2015, C‑455/15, P v Q, ECLI:EU:C:2015:763 
44. […] it must be noted that Article 15 of Regulation No 2201/2003, which is in Chapter 
II, entitled “Jurisdiction”, supplements the rules of jurisdiction in Articles 8 to 14 of that 
chapter by introducing a means of cooperation by which a Court of a Member State which 
has jurisdiction to hear the case under one of those rules may, by way of exception, transfer 
it to a Court of another Member State which is better placed to hear the case. 
45. It follows that, as the Advocate General observes in point 72 of his view, an alleged 
breach of Article 15 of that Regulation by a Court of a Member State does not allow a 
Court of another Member State to review the jurisdiction of that Court, despite the fact 
that the prohibition in Article 24 Brussels II bis Regulation does not refer expressly to 
Article 15. 
46. Moreover, it must be recalled that the Court of the State in which recognition is 
sought cannot, without calling into question the purpose of Brussels II bis Regulation, 
refuse to recognise a judgment from another Member State solely on the ground that it 
considers that national or EU law was misapplied in that judgment. 
 
Therefore, even if the Spanish Court made an error of EU law by misapplying 
Article 15 Brussels II bis Regulation, this alone would not be enough for Po-
land to refuse recognition of that Court’s judgment. 
C. Conclusion 
The misapplication of Article 15 Brussels II bis Regulation by the Spanish 
Court does not provide a basis for the Polish Court to refuse recognition 
of the Spanish Court’s judgment.  
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Scenario III 
Assuming that the Polish Court cannot refuse to grant recognition of the judgment of the Spanish 
Court ruling that returning Jorge to Poland would cause him severe psychological injury and was not 
in the child’s best interest. 
Is there any other procedure under the Brussel II bis Regulation by which Polish Courts could at-
tempt to order Jorge to return to Poland? 
Answer: 
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources 
1) See Case 1, Scenario 1, A 
2) Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 concerning the Civil Aspects of Interna-
tional Child Abduction (hereinafter: the 1980 Hague Convention) 
Material scope of application: the1980 Hague Convention aims to: 
a) secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any 
Contracting State; and 
b) ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting 
State are effectively respected in the other Contracting States. 
Territorial scope of application: the 1980 Hague Convention applies between the 
States signatory to the Convention, including Poland and Spain. 
Temporal scope of application: the 1980 Hague Convention applies from 1 Decem-
ber 1983. 
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FOR FURTHER READING on the 1980 Hague Convention:  
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions 
B. Find the correct provision 
Pursuant to Article 11.8 Brussels II bis Regulation, notwithstanding a judgment of 
non-return pursuant to Article 13 of the 1980 Hague Convention, any subsequent 
judgment which requires the return of the child issued by a Court having jurisdic-
tion under this Regulation shall be enforceable in accordance with Section 4 of 
Chapter III below in order to secure the return of the child. 
 
Article 11.8 Brussels II bis Regulation – Return of the child 
8. Notwithstanding a judgment of non-return pursuant to Article 13 of the 1980 Hague 
Convention, any subsequent judgment which requires the return of the child issued by a 
Court having jurisdiction under this Regulation shall be enforceable in accordance with 
Section 4 of Chapter III below in order to secure the return of the child. 
 
Article 13 1980 Hague Convention 
Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or administrative 
authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if the per-
son, institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that: 
(a) the person, institution or other body having the care of the person of the child was 
not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or had con-
sented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention; or 
(b) there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psycho-
logical harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation. 
The judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order the return of the child if 
it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of 
maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views.  
In considering the circumstances referred to in this Article, the judicial and administrative 
authorities shall take into account the information relating to the social background of 
the child provided by the Central Authority or other competent authority of the child’s 
habitual residence. 
 
The Polish Court has jurisdiction over the question of custody pursuant to Ar-
ticles 8 and 11.1 Brussels II bis Regulation, since Jorge was a habitual resident 
of Poland at the time of his removal to Spain by his mother, Maria.  
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Article 8 Brussels II bis Regulation – General jurisdiction 
1. The Courts of a Member State shall have jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility 
over a child who is habitually resident in that Member State at the time the Court is seised. 
2. Paragraph 1 shall be subject to the provisions of Articles 9, 10 and 12. 
 
Article 11.1 Brussels II bis Regulation – Return of the child 
1. Where a person, institution or other body having rights of custody applies to the com-
petent authorities in a Member State to deliver a judgment on the basis of the Hague 
Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 
(hereinafter “the 1980 Hague Convention”), in order to obtain the return of a child that 
has been wrongfully removed or retained in a Member State other than the Member 
State where the child was habitually resident immediately before the wrongful removal 
or retention, paragraphs 2 to 8 shall apply. 
 
As it has jurisdiction over the case according to Articles 8 and 11.1 Brussels II 
bis Regulation the Polish Court could order the return of Jorge to Poland under 
Article 11.8 Brussels II bis Regulation.  
 
However, as clarified by the CJEU in the decision of 1 July 2010, C‑211/10, Doris 
Povse v Mauro Alpago, ECLI:EU:C:2010:400 and in the decision of 19 November 
2015, C‑455/15, P v Q, ECLI:EU:C:2015:763:  
 
CJEU, 1 July 2010, C‑211/10, Doris Povse v Mauro Alpago, ECLI:EU:C:2010:400 
59. It must be borne in mind that, before making that judgment, the Court which has 
jurisdiction must take into consideration the reasons for and evidence underlying the 
decision of non-return. The consideration of those matters is one reason why such a judg-
ment, once it is made, is enforceable, in accordance with the principle of mutual trust 
which underpins the Regulation. 
 
CJEU, 19 November 2015, C‑455/15, P v Q, ECLI:EU:C:2015:763 
52. It must, however, be recalled that, before making that judgment, the Court which has 
jurisdiction must take into consideration the reasons for the decision of non-return and 
the evidence on which it is based (judgment in CJEU, 1 July 2010, C‑211/10, Doris Povse 
v Mauro Alpago, ECLI:EU:C:2010:400, paragraph 59). 
C. Conclusion 
As it has jurisdiction over the case according to Articles 8 and 11.1 Brussels 
II bis Regulation the Polish Court may order the return of Jorge to Poland 




Hector (Spanish) and Ania (Polish) are a married couple with a daughter, Jadwiga, living in Salamanca 
(Spain). Unfortunately, they are getting a divorce. Pursuant to the Spanish Court’s order granting the 
divorce, Jadwiga will live with Ania, but both parents have custody rights and Ania is prohibited from 
taking Jadwiga out of the Country.  
One day, Ania moves back to Lublin (Poland), with Jadwiga, without giving any notice to Hector. There-
fore, Hector files an action in the Polish Courts, under the 1980 Hague Convention, requesting that 
Jadwiga be returned to Spain. In the meantime, the Spanish Court revises its original order, and pro-
visionally allows Ania to take Jadwiga outside of Spain and make decisions for her. The Spanish Court’s 
revised judgment also gives Hector custody rights and orders a social worker to make another evalu-
ation of the situation to see if Hector’s parental rights are being respected. The Polish Court rejects 
Hector’s request, based in part on the Spanish Court’s revised order, and also because returning 
Jadwiga to Spain would cause her severe psychological harm.  
Subsequently, Ania files a case in the Polish Court, seeking full custody of Jadwiga. The Polish Court 
then requests that the Spanish Court transfers jurisdiction to it under Article 15.5 Brussels II bis Reg-
ulation. The Spanish Court refuses, and instead issues a new judgment, pursuant to Article 11.8 Brus-
sels II bis Regulation that orders Jadwiga to return to Spain, and certifies this judgment under Article 
42 Brussels II bis Regulation. However, this order is not a final judgment granting Hector full custody, 
and the Court reserved making a decision on this point until it could evaluate the entire situation once 
Jadwiga was back in Spain. The Polish Court then grants provisional custody to Ania. 
Did the Spanish Court lose international jurisdiction over the case within the meaning of 




 Katarzyna Antolak-Szymanski (SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities). 
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Answer: 
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources 
1) Regulation (EU) No. 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the 
matters of parental responsibility (hereinafter: Brussels II bis Regulation). 
Material scope of application: the Brussels II bis Regulation applies, whatever the 
nature of the Court or Tribunal, in civil matters relating to: 
a) divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment; 
b) the attribution, exercise, delegation, restriction or termination of parental re-
sponsibility. 
Territorial scope of application: the Brussels II bis Regulation applies in all Member 
States of the European Union (including Spain and Poland) except for Denmark 
(cf. Article 2.3). 
Temporal scope of application: the Brussels II bis Regulation applies from 1 March 
2005, with the exception of Articles 67, 68, 69 and 70, which apply from 1 August 
2004 (Article 72). 
 
 
FOR FURTHER READING on the Brussels II bis Regulation:  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri= CELEX%3A32003R2201 
 
2) Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 concerning the Civil Aspects of Interna-
tional Child Abduction (hereinafter: the 1980 Hague Convention). 
Material scope of application: the1980 Hague Convention aims to: 
a) secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any 
Contracting State; and 
b) ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting 
State are effectively respected in the other Contracting States. 
Territorial scope of application: the 1980 Hague Convention applies between the 
States signatory to the Convention, including Poland and Spain. 




FOR FURTHER READING on the 1980 Hague Convention:  
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions 
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B. Find the correct provision 
Article 10 Brussels II bis Regulation provides special rules of jurisdiction in child 
abduction cases. Essentially, the Court in the Member State where the child habit-
ually lived prior to the abduction retains jurisdiction, unless and until the following 
events have occurred: 
 
Article 10 Brussels II bis Regulation – Jurisdiction in cases of child abduction 
In case of wrongful removal or retention of the child, the Courts of the Member State 
where the child was habitually resident immediately before the wrongful removal or 
retention shall retain their jurisdiction until the child has acquired a habitual residence 
in another Member State and: 
(a) each person, institution or other body having rights of custody has acquiesced in the 
removal or retention; or 
(b) the child has resided in that other Member State for a period of at least one year after 
the person, institution or other body having rights of custody has had or should have had 
knowledge of the whereabouts of the child and the child is settled in his or her new en-
vironment and at least one of the following conditions is met: 
(i) within one year after the holder of rights of custody has had or should have had 
knowledge of the whereabouts of the child, no request for return has been lodged before 
the competent authorities of the Member State where the child has been removed or is 
being retained; 
(ii) a request for return lodged by the holder of rights of custody has been withdrawn and 
no new request has been lodged within the time limit set in paragraph (i); 
(iii) a case before the Court in the Member State where the child was habitually resident 
immediately before the wrongful removal or retention has been closed pursuant to Arti-
cle 11.7; 
(iv) a judgment on custody that does not entail the return of the child has been issued 
by the Courts of the Member State where the child was habitually resident immediately 
before the wrongful removal or retention. 
 
The CJEU, in the decision of 1 July 2010, C‑211/10, Doris Povse v Mauro Alpago, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:400 has clarified the meaning of Article 10(b)(iv) Brussels II bis Reg-
ulation: 
 
CJEU, 1 July 2010, C‑211/10, Doris Povse v Mauro Alpago, ECLI:EU:C:2010:400 
50. […] the answer to the first question is that Article 10(b)(iv) Brussels II bis Regulation 
must be interpreted as meaning that a provisional measure does not constitute a “judg-
ment on custody that does not entail the return of the child” within the meaning of that 
provision, and cannot be the basis of a transfer of jurisdiction to the Courts of the Mem-
ber State to which the child has been unlawfully removed. 
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In this case, Ania and the Polish Courts would probably rely on Article 10(b)(iv) 
Brussels II bis Regulation to argue that the Spanish Courts lost jurisdiction. By 
April, 2017, Jadwiga had lived in Lublin, Poland for one year, and the Spanish 
Court issued an order in March 2016 allowing Ania to leave Spain with Jadwiga and 
gave Ania decision making rights. This judgment could be construed as a “judgment 
on custody that does not entail the return of the child” within the meaning of Article 
10(b)(iv) Brussels II bis Regulation. However, pursuant to the CJEU’s decision in Doris 
Povse v Mauro Alpago, an “Article 10(b)(iv) Brussels II bis Regulation judgment” 
must be a final judgment. Here, the Spanish Court’s decision was clearly provi-
sional, and therefore the requirements of Article 10 Brussels II bis Regulation are 
not met.  
Consequently, Spain retains jurisdiction over the case.  
C. Conclusion 
The Spanish Court did not lose international jurisdiction over the case 
within the meaning of Article 10 Brussels II bis Regulation. 
   
148 Section  2 
 
Scenario II 
Given the facts of scenario I, does the Spanish Court have the right to issue a judgment ordering the 
return of Jadwiga to Spain, before it makes a final decision about custody? 
Answer: 
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources 
See Case 2, Scenario 1, A 
B. Find the correct provision 
Spanish Courts have the right to order the return of the child pursuant to Article 
11.8 Brussels II bis Regulation. 
 
Article 11.8 Brussels II bis Regulation – Return of the child 
18. Notwithstanding a judgment of non-return pursuant to Article 13 of the 1980 Hague 
Convention, any subsequent judgment which requires the return of the child issued by 
a Court having jurisdiction under this Regulation shall be enforceable in accordance with 
Section 4 of Chapter III below in order to secure the return of the child. 
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Article 13 1980 Hague Convention 
Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or administrative 
authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if the per-
son, institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that: 
(a) the person, institution or other body having the care of the person of the child was 
not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or had con-
sented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention; or 
(b) there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psy-
chological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation. 
The judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order the return of the child if 
it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of 
maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views.  
In considering the circumstances referred to in this Article, the judicial and administrative 
authorities shall take into account the information relating to the social background of 
the child provided by the Central Authority or other competent authority of the child’s 
habitual residence. 
 
More precisely, Spain maintained jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Articles 8 
and 10 Brussels II bis Regulation and, therefore, has the power to order “any sub-
sequent judgement” requiring Jadwiga’s return. The expression “Any… judgment” 
listed in Article 11.8 Brussels II bis Regulation is not limited to final judgments which 
resolve all custody questions.  
While Article 11.7 Brussels II bis Regulation specifies certain notice requirements 
for the parties before such an order is made, so that they can weigh in on the issue 
of custody, this does not mean the subsequent order for the return of the child has 
to finally resolve all custodial questions, as clarified by the CJEU, 1 July 2010, 
C‑211/10, Doris Povse v Mauro Alpago, ECLI:EU:C:2010:400. 
 
CJEU, 1 July 2010, C‑211/10, Doris Povse v Mauro Alpago, ECLI:EU:C:2010:400 
67. […] Article 11.8 Brussels II bis Regulation must be interpreted as meaning that a judg-
ment of the Court with jurisdiction ordering the return of the child falls within the scope 
of that provision, even if it is not preceded by a final judgment of that Court relating to 
rights of custody of the child. 
C. Conclusion 
Spain maintained jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Articles 8 and 10 
Brussels II bis Regulation, and therefore has the power to order “any sub-
sequent judgement” requiring Jadwiga’s return. 
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Scenario III 
Assume that the Spanish Court makes an Article 11.8 Brussels II bis Regulation judgment ordering the 
return of Jadwiga, and certifies it under Article 42 Brussels II bis Regulation. 
Is there any lawful way for the Polish Courts to refuse to return Jadwiga to Spain? Specif-
ically, does the 1980 Hague Convention give the Polish Courts the right to refuse to return 
Jadwiga? 
Answer: 
A. Find the relevant EU legal sources 
See Case 2, Scenario 1, A 
B. Find the correct provision  
Article 11 Brussels II bis Regulation provides a precise procedure to order the return 
of a child, notwithstanding an order of non-return issued under the 1980 Hague 
Convention. As Recital 17 Brussels II bis Regulation explains: 
 
Recital 17 Brussels II bis Regulation 
In cases of wrongful removal or retention of a child, the return of the child should be 
obtained without delay, and to this end the 1980 Hague Convention would continue to 
apply as complemented by the provisions of this Regulation, in particular Article 11. The 
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Courts of the Member State to or in which the child has been wrongfully removed or re-
tained should be able to oppose his or her return in specific, duly justified cases. However, 
such a decision could be replaced by a subsequent decision by the Court of the Member 
State of habitual residence of the child prior to the wrongful removal or retention. Should 
that judgment entail the return of the child, the return should take place without any spe-
cial procedure being required for recognition and enforcement of that judgment in the 
Member State to or in which the child has been removed or retained. 
 
Normally, the 1980 Hague Convention does permit a State to refuse to return a 
child in an abduction case in certain limited circumstances, particularly where or-
dering a return would cause severe harm to the child. 
 
Article 13 1980 Hague Convention 
Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or administrative 
authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if the per-
son, institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that: 
(a) the person, institution or other body having the care of the person of the child was 
not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or had con-
sented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention; or 
(b) there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or 
psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation. 
The judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order the return of the child if 
it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of 
maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views.  
In considering the circumstances referred to in this Article, the judicial and administrative 
authorities shall take into account the information relating to the social background of 
the child provided by the Central Authority or other competent authority of the child’s 
habitual residence. 
 
However, Article 60(e) Brussels II bis Regulation provides that, in relations between 
Member States, the Regulation is to take precedence over, inter alia, the 1980 
Hague Convention. 
 
Article 60(e) Brussels II bis Regulation – Relations with certain multilateral conventions 
In relations between Member States, this Regulation shall take precedence over the fol-
lowing Conventions in so far as they concern matters governed by this Regulation: 
(e) the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction. 
 
As clarified by the CJEU, 1 July 2010, C‑211/10, Doris Povse v Mauro Alpago, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:400: 
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CJEU, 1 July 2010, C‑211/10, Doris Povse v Mauro Alpago, ECLI:EU:C:2010:400 
20. Article 60 Brussels II bis Regulation headed “Relations with certain multilateral con-
ventions”, provides that, in relations between Member States, the Regulation is to take 
precedence over, inter alia, the 1980 Hague Convention. 
 
Accordingly, the Polish Courts cannot use an order of non-return under the 1980 
Hague Convention to stop or otherwise block a Member State from making a 
subsequent return order pursuant to Article 11.8 Brussels II bis Regulation.  
 
Likewise, Article 47 Brussels II bis Regulation provides no support to Ania or 
the Polish Courts in this case.  
Article 47 Brussels II bis Regulation deals with enforcement of orders within 
the scope of the Regulation, including those orders certified under Article 42 Brus-
sels II bis Regulation (as was the Spanish Court’s Article 11.8 Brussels II bis Regula-
tion order to return Jadwiga). In pertinent part, Article 47 Brussels II bis Regulation 
contains the following limitation on enforcement:  
 
Article 47 Brussels II bis Regulation – Enforcement procedure 
[…] a judgment which has been certified according to Article 41.1 or Article 42.1 cannot 
be enforced if it is irreconcilable with a subsequent enforceable judgment. 
 
In the case at hand, Ania could argue that the Polish Court’s judgment granting pro-
visional custody to her is an “irreconcilable… subsequent judgment” within the 
meaning of Article 47 Brussels II bis Regulation, precluding enforcement of the 
Spanish Court’s order of return.  
However, the CJEU, 1 July 2010, C‑211/10, Doris Povse v Mauro Alpago, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:400, ruled that Article 47 Brussels II bis Regulation, was only refer-
ring to irreconcilable judgments in the Member State with original jurisdiction, and 
not such judgments in the enforcing Member State.  
 
CJEU, 1 July 2010, C‑211/10, Doris Povse v Mauro Alpago, ECLI:EU:C:2010:400 
77. Such irreconcilability might arise not only in cases where the judgment was set aside 
or varied following legal action brought in the Member State of origin. It was observed 
at the oral hearing that the Court with jurisdiction may, on its own motion or, in some 
circumstances, at the request of the social services, revisit its own position, when the 
interests of the child so require, and hand down a fresh enforceable judgment, without 
expressly withdrawing the first, which would thereby lapse. 
78. To hold that a judgment delivered subsequently by a Court in the Member State of 
enforcement can preclude enforcement of an earlier judgment which has been certified 
in the Member State of origin and which orders the return of the child would amount to 
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circumventing the system set up by Section 4 of Chapter III Brussels II bis Regulation. Such 
an exception to the jurisdiction of the Courts in the Member State of origin would deprive 
of practical effect Article 11.8 Brussels II bis Regulation, which ultimately grants the right to 
decide to the Court with jurisdiction and which takes precedence, under Article 60 Brussels 
II bis Regulation, over the 1980 Hague Convention, and would recognise the jurisdiction, on 
matters of substance, of the Courts in the Member State of enforcement. 
79. Consequently, the answer to the fourth question is that the second subparagraph of 
Article 47.2 Brussels II bis Regulation must be interpreted as meaning that a judgment de-
livered subsequently by a Court in the Member State of enforcement which awards pro-
visional custody rights and is deemed to be enforceable under the law of that State can-
not preclude enforcement of a certified judgment delivered previously by the Court which 
has jurisdiction in the Member State of origin and ordering the return of the child. 
 
Since Poland is the enforcing Member State, its judgment in favor of Ania does 
not qualify as an Article 47 Brussels II bis Regulation irreconcilable judgment.  
For an order for the return of the Court to be certified under Article 42 Brussels 
II bis Regulation, there are certain minimum requirements that must be met:  
 
Article 42 Brussels II bis Regulation – Return of the child 
1. The return of a child referred to in Article 40.1(b) entailed by an enforceable judg-
ment given in a Member State shall be recognised and enforceable in another Member 
State without the need for a declaration of enforceability and without any possibility 
of opposing its recognition if the judgment has been certified in the Member State of 
origin in accordance with paragraph 2. 
Even if National law does not provide for enforceability by operation of law, notwith-
standing any appeal, of a judgment requiring the return of the child mentioned in Article 
11(b)(8), the Court of origin may declare the judgment enforceable. 
2. The Judge of origin who delivered the judgment referred to in Article 40.1(b) shall issue 
the certificate referred to in paragraph 1 only if: 
(a) the child was given an opportunity to be heard, unless a hearing was considered in-
appropriate having regard to his or her age or degree of maturity; 
(b) the parties were given an opportunity to be heard; and 
(c) the Court has taken into account in issuing its judgment the reasons for and evidence 
underlying the order issued pursuant to Article 13 of the 1980 Hague Convention. 
In the event that the Court or any other authority takes measures to ensure the protec-
tion of the child after its return to the State of habitual residence, the Certificate shall 
contain details of such measures. 
The Judge of origin shall out of his or her own motion issue that Certificate using the 
standard form set forth in Annex IV (certificate concerning return of the child(ren)). 
The Certificate shall be completed in the language of the judgment. 
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Pursuant to Article 47 Brussels II bis Regulation, once the issuing Court determines 
that these points have been satisfied, and issues a Certification, the order is essen-
tially automatically enforceable in another Member State, without a possibility of 
appeal. So in this case, the Polish Courts cannot lawfully block the return of 
Jadwiga to Spain. 
C. Conclusion 
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